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In 1973, the Ulster Unionist Party fragmented after 
fifty years as the dominant party within Northern Ireland. 
However, this fragmentation did not simply occur in reaction 
to the events of the 1960's and early 1970's. It was a 
long ongoing process that can be traced back to the 1940's 
and 1950's. 
This study is concerned with the splintering of the 
Ulster Unionist Party and the reasons that lay behind the 
division. The first contention in this thesis is that 
the Ulster Unionist Party was never the single united 
political party that it was o ften supposed to have been. 
It was a localized party designed to organize a localized 
State; supported by a cross-class alliance of �oters; 
thus reflecting the inherent divisions and contradictions 
that this type of party inherently must contain. In fact, 
the leadership have always had to work hard to maintain 
unity and therefore political dominance. The only issue 
all Unionists were agreed upon.was the Constitutional one 
i.e. Northern Ireland was to remain an integral part of 
the United Kingdon. 
This leads to the central point of the thesis; which 
is that the fragmentation of the Ulster Unionists is not 
merely the result o f  t he current "troubles" in Northern 
Ireland. It is argued here that the root causes of the 
division of the Ulster Unionist Party are located in the 
Socio-economic changes that occupied in Northern Ireland 
in the post-World War II era. 
The Ulster Unionist Party as the defender of the 
interests o f  local capital and Protestant supremacy in­
creasingly found itself at odds with much of its support. 
Northern Ireland was integrated into the wider inter­
national market economy with the demise of the traditional 
local industries such as shipbuilding, textiles, and 
agriculture. The Unionist goverTu�ent was forced to play 
a greater role in the economy of the state, introducing 
economic planning and centralization. This meant the 
Ulster Unionist Party at the local level lost its room 
to manoever and increasingly lots of its power. This was 
compounded with the introduction of the Westminster con­
trolled Welfare State, which integrated the Catholics into 
the Northern Irish State, as least at the economic level. 
The Ulster Unionist Party as the defender of local 
bourgeois interests and Protestant Supremacy increasingly 
found itself acting as an agent for international capital 
and the integration of Catholics into the economic Sphere 
of the State. However, the Ulster Unionist Party tried 
to do it in such a way so not to threaten the political 
power of the Protestants, thus maintaining a "Protestant 
State for a �rotestant people". 
Increasingly this caused problems. Many Unionists 
at the local level were becoming alienated with the Unionist 
government at Storemont. At the same time most Catholics 
were not really getting all the economic benefits they had 
hoped for, while at the political level, they were still 
discriminated against. As a result the C ivi l  Rights Move­
ment arose. The Ulster Unionist Party was unable to cope 
with the Civil Rights demands partly because it feared 
alienating any further the support of hard-line and local 
Protestants and partly because the party was not organized 
to allow full Catholic particiaption in the political life 
of the State. One of its main functions was to ensure 
that Catholics did not threated Protestant Supremacy. 
It is in this period of the 1960's and early 1970's 
that the inherent divisions of a cross-class party finally 
became apparent. The Ulster Unionist Party finally did 
break-up,over the political issues of law and order, Direct 
Role and power-sharing. But these political divisions 
cannot be seen in a vacuum. The Socio-economic conditions 
of Northern Ireland had changed, without corresponding po­
litical changes. Greater Catholic integration into the 
1forthern Irish State at the economic and Social level, 
demanded greater political integration. The Ulster Unionist 
Party adapted ta the Socio-economic change as best it could 
without trying to change the basic po litical nature of 
the State, but it was not enough. 
When Socio-economic change occurs there must be cor­
responding political change. The Ulster Unionist Party could 
not act as an agent for this change, as it was not . designed 
to. When the British government intervened to act as the 
agent of change the Ulster Unionist Party lost its raison 
d' etre, causing a realignment in Unionist politics . The 
party had little choicebut to fragment and adapt to the 
new political situation in Northern Ireland. 
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CHAPTE R  l 
I NTRODUCTION  
1 
The pu rpose o f  th i s  the s i s  i s  to a na l ys e  the fragmen ta t i o n  of  U l s te r  
Un i on i sm ,  i n  parti cu l a r  the s p l i n te ri ng  o f  t h e  U l s te r  Un i on i s t  Pa rty 
between the North ern I re l a n d  Stormont  e l ecti on s o f  1 969  a nd the 
Assemb l y  e l ec t i ons  of  1 9 7 3 , a nd the reasons  beh i nd the  d i s sens i on of 
these  years . The e l ect i o ns fo r the Stormon t  Par l i ament  i n  1 969  
seemed to  be t he  l a s t  t i me that  the  o l d U n i on i s t Party ' b l oc k '  
domi nated a n d  contro l l ed any Nor th ern I r i s h  e l ected body for by 1 97 3  
th e Party h a d  l i te ra l l y  fa l l en apart . For the fi r s t  t i me i n  U l s ter ' s  
h i s tory the U n i on i s t  Pa rty d i d  not  ac h i eve a n  ou tr i gh t  maj or i ty of  
seats  i n  a prov i n ce -wi de e l ect i on , hav i ng to  s hare  wi th  a n umbe r  of  
other  U n i on i s t Part i e s . 
My centra l  hypothes i s  i s  tha t the U l s te r  Un i on i st Party d i d n ot  b rea k 
u p  s i mp l y  becau se  o f  i t's fa i l u re to  co pe  wi th the C i v i l R i g hts  
Movemen t  a nd e n s u i n g  prob l em of  11l aw a nd  o rder " . I ndeed , I hope to 
s how tha t  the Un i on i st  Party wa s prone  to i nte rna l d i s s ent  i nh e rent l y  
d u e  to i ts a l l i a nce  of  ma n y  d i fferent  a n d  con trad i cto ry tenda nc i es 
a ro u nd th e s i ng l e  i s s ue  o f  the Un i on  o f  Great  Br i ta i n  a nd Northern  
I re l a nd . The  Un i on i st  Party  was  a l ways a l oo s e l y  o rga n i sed Party wi th 
a fact i t i ous  n atu re , never th e mono l i th i c  b l oc k  i t  wa s often s u pposed  
to  be . Un i on i s t  l eaders h i p was a l ways con s c i o u s  o f  the  need to wor k  
a t  a n d  ma i nta i n  u n i ty .  
The ma i n  varia b l e s  a ffec t i n g  the  b rea k- u p  o f  the Un i on i st  Pa rty were 
pr i ma r i l y  soc i a l  and economi c  po l i c i es i n  the pos t- 1 94 5  per i od . 
C i v i l R i g ht s , the prob l em o f  l aw a nd o rder  a n d  Br i t i s h  i nterven t i on  
a re a l l very i mportan t va r i a b l e s  affecting Un i on i s t  fra gmen ta t i on . 
However , i t  i s  my content i on that  the soc i a l  a nd  econom i c  po l i c i es 
pr i o r  to these  events  a ffected the  l og i c of the Northern  I r i s h  s ta te 
a n d  i ts cont i nu ed exi s tence i n  i ts o l d form and  th erefo re the l og i c  
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of the Un i o n i s t  Party i ts e l f a s  the  overseer  of  the  o l d No rth ern I r i s h  
s ta te . Th i s  c reated deep d i v i s i on s  wi t h i n the  Union i st  Party wh i ch 
o n l y  came to the s u rface  i n  the l ate 1 960's w i th  the  advent  of the 
C i v i l Ri ghts  Moveme n t , commun a l  v i o l e nce and  i nc rea sed Br i t i s h  
i nverve n t i on;  a l l o f  wh i ch  we re l a rge l y  the res u l t o f  the  afo re ­
men t i oned  soc i a l  a n d  economi c change s . 
I n  th e fi r s t  cha pte r ,  the actua l  e l ec t i on s  of 1 969  wi l l  be  compa red to 
that  of 1 9 7 3 , so to be a b l e to exam i ne  the a c tua l fragmen ta t i on  of the  
U n i o n i s t  Party i n  the l 96 0 ' s ,  when  i t s compos i ti on d i d not  l end i ts e l f 
to the demand s of a l a rg e l y  soc i a l i sed , p l a n n ed economy a nd comp l ex 
soc i ety i n  U l s te r .  
T h e  U l s te r  Un i on i sts  eventu a l l y  broke u p  over  a who l e s e r i e s  o f  
po l i c i es .  N o  o n e  s i ng l e s i tu a t i on  or  po l i cy c an  b e  po i nted o u t  a s  the 
determi nant  of the fragmenta t i o n  of the U l s te r  Un i on i s t  Party ;  i t  wa s 
very mu c h  a n  ongo i ng proc e s s .  T h e  s eco nd c ha pter wi l l  be  l oo ki n g  a t  
t h e  U n i o n i s t  econom i c po l ic i e s  of  the  1 9 50 ' s  a nd  1 96 0 's s uch  a s  the  
i n trod u c t i o n  of  economi c p l a n n i n g  a nd regu l a t i on  a nd  the  neces s i ty for 
i nc rea s ed s ta te i nvervent i on , wh i ch  c a u sed mu c h  dis sens i on a t  the 
l oca l l ev e l . The t h i rd cha pter wi l l  concen tra te u po n  s oc i a l  po l i c i e s 
wi t h i n Northern I re l and  d ur i ng  the same per i od . Pr i ma r i l y ,  t h i s wi l l  
exami n e  the  i ntrodu c t i o n  o f  t h e  Wel fa re Sta te , Na t i ona l  Hea l th Serv i ce , 
free edu ca ti o n  a nd the  pro v i s i on of  p u b l i c  hou s i ng . I t  i s  the  
content i on here that  the U n i o n i st  Party became ou tmoded , wi th Northern 
I re l and  becomi ng i n tegra ted i nto the  l a rger  i nterna t i ona l  c ap i ta l i s t  
economy a s  a consequence  o f  thei r econom i c  po l i c i es ,  wh i c h were 
comp l i men ted by the i r soc i a l  po l i c i e s a nd the r i s e  of the Wel fare 
S tate . The U n i on i s t  Pa rty a t  Stormont  we re forced to c oncentra te 
economi c power i nc rea s i ng l y  i n  thei r hands  a nd ta ke overa l l 
3 
respo ns i b i l ity for man y  d i ffe re n t  a s p ects  o f  peopl e ' s  l i ves . The 
Un i on i s t  Party was not  orga n i sed  nor  equ i pped to ru n th i s  type of  
s ta te u pon  l i b e ra l -democ ra t i c l i n es .  Con sequ entl y ,  the U n i on i s ts 
became d i v i ded  (but  n o t  s p l i t ) a s  wel l a s  ou tmoded , over  the  natu re 
a nd  accepta b i l i ty of thes e deve l opmen ts . 
The fou rth chapter wil l exami ne the r i se  of the  C i v i l Ri g h ts Movement , 
thei r dema nds a nd a c t i ons , and  how the  Un i o n i s t s  were u na b l e to cope  
wi th th e s i tu a ti on po l i ti ca l l y .  Catho l i c  dema nds  for Ci v i l R i g hts 
were o n l y  l og i ca l , i n  l i g h t  of  preceed i n g  soc i a l  a nd  econom i c 
devel opmen ts i n  Northern I re l a nd .  However , t h i s on l y  l ed to a l aw and  
o rder p rob l em ,  a nd the  ri s e  o f  v i o l ence  i n  l i ght  of  the  U n i onis ts 
i na b i l i ty to cope w i th  th e c ha l l enge  o f  C i v i l R i g ht s .  The Un i on i s t s  
tri ed to  s to p  C i v i l  R i g ht s  demo nstra t i ons  by the  u se of po l i ce a nd  
heavy-handed  tac ti c s , wh i ch o n ly  tu rned many Catho l i c s to  counter­
v i o l ence . Aga i n ,  the  U n i on i s t  P a rty was further d i v i de d  over  how to 
cope wi th an i ncrea s i ng l y  ag i ta ted Ca tho l i c  mi nor i ty a n d  very often 
react i ve  Pro te s ta n t  worki ng  c l a s s . The  fi fth  c hapter w i l l  l ook  a t  the 
i mpact  of  D i rect  Ru l e  a nd the Wh i te P a pe r  of  1 9 73 . I t  was th i s  f i n a l  
Bri t i s h  ta ke o v e r  wh i c h  comp l eted a p rocess  whereby the Uni on i s t  Party 
was becomi n g  o utmoded a nd  cau s i ng the  a c tua l s p l i t  i n  the  party pr i o r  
t o  the 1 9 73  e l ect i on s . 
Party Deve l opment  
Though  the  Al l i a nce Pa rty and  t he Northern I r i s h  Labour  Pa rty (NILP) 
were s tri ct ly  s pea k i ng  Un i on i st  Part i e s  i n  the  sense  that  they 
s upported the Un i on  of Great  Br i ta i n and  North ern I re l a n d ; they have  
been l a rge l y  exc l uded  from t h i s  a na l ys i s ( except where they d i rectl y 
affect  the Un i on i s t  Party ) beca u s e  th ey have a l ways represented the 
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centre wi th i n U l ste r  po l i t i cs . As  s u c h , the i r commi tmen t  to Un i on i s m  
wa s a l ways open  to re -eva l u a t i o n  a nd therefore  they were  never  
rega rded a s  be i ng  p a rt of  ma i ns tream Un i on i sm .  In add i t i on , th ere 
wi l l  no t be an exami na t ion  of t he  rol e of  the extra - pa r l imenta ry 
Un i on i s t  groups , suc h  a s  the  U l s ter  Defence As soc i a t i on (UDA) o r  
Orange I n s t i t ut ion  i n  a ny g reat  deta i l . Tho u gh ma ny o f  these  groups  
a re o f  i mportance  they wi l l  o n l y be  d i s c u s sed as  they re l a te to  the 
fragmentati on of the Un i on i st  Pa rty a n d  the Un i on i st mo nopo l y  o f  State 
powe r . As wa s s ta ted  ear l i e r , the  ma i n  thru s t  of t h i s thes i s  i s  to 
exam i ne th e a ctua l  d i vi s i o n  of the U n i on i s t Pa rty a nd how th i s  was 
a ffected by po l i c i e s  and  devel o pmen ts from 1 94 5  to 1 973 . 
I t  c a n  b e  s ta ted , a s  a genera l  t heory about  pa rty devel o pmen t , that  
po l i t i c a l  par t i e s  Brea k  up  over  genera l pol i t i c a l  i s s u e s , and  how they 
s hou l d be  re so l ved . Howeve r ,  t h i s i s  o n l y a refl ect i on o f  fundamenta l  
d i ffere nces  o n  a who l e  range  of  ba .s i c  s oc i o- economi c i s sues . As 
K i rchhe i me r  p o i nts  o u t ma ny of  the  o l d bourgeois part i e s  i n  Wes tern 
Europe  fragmented  or were  s uperceded b ecau s e  they were not  a b l e to 
face  up to th e c han g i ng  c i rcums ta nces  or the 11 l aws o f  the  po l i t i ca l  
ma rket 11• (Ki rc h he i mer : l 66 : 1 83 ) .  Po l i tica l  d i v i s i o n do not  a ri s e  i n  
a vacum , they occur  due  to  a q u a l i ta t i v e  change in the  cond i t i on s  o f  
s oc i ety . 
A l mond  argues  that po l i ti c a l  pa rt i e s  s e rve a n umber of fu nctio n s  s uch  
a s  s o c i a l i sa t i on , i nte re s t  art i c u l a t i on , po l i tica l conmu n i ca t i o n  etc 
a nd whe n they no l onge r s erve  these fu nc t i on s  beca u s e  t hey have not 
or  cannot  a da pt  to cha nges  then  the  party dec l i ne s  or  fa l l s  a part . 
(A l mond : l 960 : 2 6 - 5 7 ) . Tho u g h  th ere i s  not rea l l y  a ny l i tera tu re wh i c h  
perta i ns d i rec t l y t o  t h i s  pa per's ma i n hypo the s i s , whi c h  i s  tha t 
soc i a l  a nd economi c c ha nges  were the  u n derl y i n g  c a u se  o f  Un i on i s t  
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fragmen ta t i on , ma ny a u thors  do a g ree  that c hang i n g  economi c a n d  
s oc i a l  cond i t i ons  d o  a ffec t  Pa rty deve l opme nt  a s  much  ·a s d i rec t  
pol i t i ca l  i ss u es . As  La  Pa l ombara a n d  We i ne r  s ta te " the  h i s tor i ca l  
graveya rds a re c l uttered wi th  part i es  wh i ch d om i nated the  pol i ti ca l  
scene  b u t  s u b s equen tl y fa i l ed t o  adop t to new c i rcumsta nces  a nd 
th erefo re die d , were  a bsorbed by new a c t i ve movements  o r  wh i thered 
i n to sma l l ma rg i na l  parti es " .  ( La Pa l ombara a nd We i ne r : 1 9 66 : 7 ) .  
Even fu nc t i ona l i s ts s u c h  a s  L a  Pa l ombara a n d  We i ner  concede  t hat  
po l i ti ca l  parti e s  can  be v i ewed a s  11the  cu l mi na ti on  . . . . . . . . . • . .  of  
proce s s e s  of  s oc i a l , econom i c  a nd po l i t i ca l  c hange " .  ( La Pa l omba ra 
and  We i ner : 1 96 6 : 4 1 ) .  
The Un i o n i s t  Pa rty was ab l e  t o  cope w i th  the I RA ,  Briti s h  medd l i ng 
a nd  demands  fo r C i v i l Ri ghts  from the Ca tho l i c  m i nori ty pri or to the 
Second Wor l d Wa r .  However ,  by the  1 9 60 1s the soc i o-econom i c 
cond i t i ons  of  soc i e ty wi t h i n U l ster  h ad changed . Catho l i c s  were 
i nc rea s i n g l y  i n tegrated i nto s o c i ety . Power ( a s a n  age n t  of  B r i t i s h  
economi c and  soc i a l  po l i c i es)  was i nc rea s i n g l y  centra l i s ed therefore 
brea k i n g  down l oca l  U n i on i s t a rra ngements so that  the traditional methods 
of  meet i ng  perce i ved threa ts a nd  c ha l l e nges  to the Un i on i s t  monopo l y  
of  s ta te power we re n o  l o nger a pp l i ca b l e .  The U n i on i s t  Party d i d  not  
adapt  to  the n ew c i rcums tanc e s  s u cces s fu l l y . As  Eps te i n po i n ts o ut , 
po l i ti ca l  parti es a re " dependan t i n  t he  sen s e  o f  be i ng  determ i n ed i n  
th e i r type  and  fo nn by ba s i c  n a ti onal  c i rcums ta nces11• ( Eps te i n : l 980 : 
8 ) . Th e Un i o n i st  P arty was org a n i sed to ru n a n  a u to nomo u s  secta r i a n  
s ta te ; i t  grew o u t  o f  t he exi s tence o f  U l ster . When tha t  U l s te r  
cha nged i t  necessated c ha n ge s  w i th i n t h e  pa rty a nd  how i t  r a n  the  
s ta te ;  these  changes  cou l d not  b e  s u cce s sfu l l y  accommoda ted  i n  the  
l on g  run . 
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Method o l ogy 
Obv i ou s l y  i t  i s  d i ffi c u l t to l ook  at everyth i ng i n  thi s per i od  a n d  
a na l ys e  effects  u p o n  U l s ter  Un i o n i sm. The po l i c i es exami ned ( th e  
ones  men t i oned previ ous l y) a re those  t h a t  a re o f  t h e  mo s t  genera l 
i mpo rtance  to the  s i tuat i on  i n  North ern I re l a nd  a s  i t  re l a te s to the  
Un i on i s t  Party a nd Un i on i sm i n  genera l . I f  a ny of these  po l i c i es 
cau sed a change  i n  the  materi a l  c ond i t i ons  o f  s o c i ety to s u c h  a n  
extent tha t t h e  Un i o n i st  Party had  to  make c ha nges  i n  how i t  opera ted  
o r  func t i oned , and  as  a res u l t  cau s i n g  d i s se ns i on o r  c ontrad i ct i on s  
wi th i n t he Un i oni s t  Pa rty ,  t he n  they w i l l  b e  cons i dered to  have  had  a n  
i ndependa n t  a ffect  u po n  t h e  Ul ster  Un i on i s t  Pa rty a n d  U n i on i sm a s  a 
who l e .  Fo r exampl e ,  t h e  C i v i l R i g ht s  a nd the  Un i o n i sts  hand l i ng o f  the 
s i tua t i o n  ca u sed changes  with i n U l s te r ,  fo rc i n g  the Party to make 
reforms c a Ls i n g d i s sent. Therefore the  C i v i l Ri ghts  moveme n t  d i d  have  
a n  i ndependa nt  effec t  upon  the  U ni on i s t  Pa rty. I n  other  word s , i f  
a ny o f  t h e  p o l i c i e s  o r  cond i ti on s  a n a l ysed have caused  i n ter-Un i on i s t 
d i s s en s i on , then they had a n  i ndependan t  effect.  
The me thod of i nve s tigat i on used wi l l  be  one o f  l og i ca l  a na l ys i s ,  
b a s ed ten ta t i v e l y  with i n the  Ma rx i a n  tra c:i ti on ,  However , th i s  i s  not  
to s ay that  the  i nfo rma t i o n  p re s e n ted  a nd u se d  h ere i s  neces s ar i ly  of 
a h ig h l y s e l ecti ve n atu re.  I ndeed , muc h  non-Ma rx i s t  i nforma ti o n  h a s  
bee n  u s ed. M o s t  o f  the  informat i o n  u sed  i s  taken  from b o o k s  a nd 
art i c l e s .  L ack  of l i tera ture  dea l i ng s pec i f i c a l l y  w i t h  the  U l s ter 
Un i on i s t  Party a nd the rea s o n s  beh i nd i ts fragmenta t i on ha s been a 
prob l em .  Howeve r ,  th i s  prob l em ha s l a rge l y been ove rcome throug h 
exten s i ve rea d i ng  o n  U l s te r  a nd a p roce s s  o f  p i c k i ng  o u t  the re l evant  
sect i on s .  
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L i tera tu re Rev i ew 
There a a good ma ny wo rks  cov e r i ng  the  per i od a s  a who l e ,  s u c h  a s  
Buck l a nd (1981). He prov i de s  a deta i l ed his to r i c a l  ana l ys is  o f  U l s ter 
po l i t i c s  from 1921 to the l a te 1970's. Pro b ert (1978} dea l s s pec i f i c ­
a l l y  w i t h  t h e  ro l e o f  th e state  from 1 9 2 1  to 1974 a nd the  U l s ter  
Workers ' Str i ke , g i v i ng pr i d e  o f  p l ace  to the  entry o f  monopo l y  c a p i ta l  
a s  t h e  ma i n  c a u s e  of  U n i o n i st fragmentation;  th i s  i s l a rge l y  s u ppo rted 
by Farrel l (1976} a nd Mc ca nn (1974}. Tho ugh  P ro be rt does  not  tend to 
trea t U n i o n i sm a s  a mo no l i th i c  who l e ,  bo t h  Farre l l a nd McCann  do tend 
to s ee U n i o n i sm a s  s uc h ,  ma i n l y  he l d  together  by the  Ora ng e  I ns t i tu t i o n  
( Farre l 1 :1 97 6:327} .  Ha rbi ns o n  (1973} g ives  a deta il ed a c c o u n t  o f  the 
Un i o n i st Party 1 s forma 1 orga n i s a ti o n  a nd structura 1 d i vi s i o n s , empha s ­
i s i ng i ts i nherent ly d i v i ded n a ture .  Bu t even  he a rgu e s  tha t a l l 
U n i o n i sts  of  wha tever  Pa rty o r  c l a s s  wo u l d  not do  anyth i n g  to  endanger 
the  U n i o n  o r  go too fa r in regards  to c l a ss  pol i t i cs .  (Harbinson:1973: 
2 1 3) .  Dev l i n  (19691 ha s wri tte n  a hi g hl y persona l a ccount  of  her ro l e  
wi th i n t he Ci v i l  Rights Mo vement  a nd s ee s  C i vtl Rigfits a s  t he wedge  
wh i c h  s pl i t  the  U n ionists . Others such a s  IIew , Gi6bon and  Patterson  
(1979) s ee t he power s trugg l e  wi thi n the  U n i on i st camp its e l f a s  the  
maj o r  facture  i n  expla in i ng  the s p l i nteri ng . 
Much o f  the pre-mi d - 1 9701s l i terature  doe s  v iew  the U n i :oni:st Party a s  
b e i n g  very u n i ted a nd cohe s i ve. .  Wa l l ace (19711 argu e s  t ha t  wh i l s t  
the  Un i o ni s t  gov ernment  was a l ways sensitive t o  c rtti:c ism from the  
r i g h t-wi ng o f  the Pa rty , U n i on i sm and  the  Un i .o n i st  Pa rty ma i nta i ned 
a n  uncompromising a tt i tude  a nd s tood i n  a s o l id block i n  i ts d i s l i ke 
of  C atho l i c i sm ,  Eire and Repu b l i ca n i sm .  (Wal lace:l974:69-70}. A 
much l a ter wo rk by Mc Al i ster (1983} c a rr i es  on  the not i on tha t the 
Un i o n i s ts were  mono l ith i c . He a rgues  tha t  de sp i te potent i al  d i v i s i ons 
be b e i ng  a c l a s s  a ll tance,  the U n i o n i st Party man aged to avo i d  t hem; 
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be i ng whol l y  u n i te d  i n  a s i ng l e i s s ue .  ( McAl iste r : l 983 ; 65). As wa s 
a l ready po i n te d  out  th i s argume n t  wa s s u ppo rted i n  varyi ng degrees by 
Dev l i n  ( 1 969),  McCann  (1 974 ) a nd Farre l l (1 9 7 6 ) .  Ev i dence  i n  the next  
c ha pte r wi l l  he l p refute the n o t i on  of  the  mono l i th i c U n i on i s t  Party. 
Th i s  i s  not to deny tha t po l i t i ca l  p art i es have an i nd e penda nt  effect 
i n  th at  they can  a ct a s  agents  fo r po l i ti ca l  c ha nge.  ( Eps te i n : l 980 : 8). 
The Un i on i s t  Party d i d  h ave a c ons i derab l e  effe c t  a s  a n  agen t of  c ha nge  
wi thi n U l ster  over  the  years .  However , a s  Ma rx s ta ted , 11Li fe i s  not  
detenni ned by consc i ou s ne s s ,  but  con s c i ou s ne s s by  l i fe". ( Ma rx : 
1 974 : 47 ). I n  other  wo rd s the  mate ri a l  cond i t i on s  of  s o c i ety have a 
determi n i ng effect u pon  the  po l i t i ca l  fo nns that  ex i s t ,  a nd when the  
mater i a l  cond i t i on s  change , i e , the  s u bs truc t u re , s o  wi l l  th e s u per­
s tructure  to  accommoda te tha t  c ha n ge .  The U n i on i s t  Pa rty rea l i s ed 
that  there were certa i n c ha ng e s  wh i c h  they c o u l d not res i st s o  they 
tri ed  to adapt  them to the  secta ria n  s i tua ti o n  of U l ster , wi tho u t  
cha ngi ng  themse l ve s  o r  t h e  n atu re of  the  s tate  too muc h .  I n  t h i s they 
were u nsucce s s fu l , l ead i ng to the downfa l l  o f  th e Stormo n t  reg i me and 
s p l i nter i ng of the  Party. 
.___ ___ _ 
I t  i s  not the  a im here to propose  a ny s o l u t i o n  to  the  probl ems faced 
i n  Northern I re l and  or even ta l k  abo u t  the e ffec ts  of the po l i t i ca l  
i mpa s s e ;  i t  i s  s im p l y  to understa nd wha t ha s happened i n  thi s peri od , 
v i s - a - v i s  t he  Un i on i s ts a nd the i r pa rty.  A l l too o ften the i r centra l  
ro l e  i n  crea t i ng a n d  s ha p i n g  t h e  pre s en t  s i tua ti on i n  U l s ter i s  
treate d  s u perfi c i a l l y  a s  a c o l l ect i o n  of  rea c t i o na r i es be i ng 
i n tra n s i gent  i n  th e face of so c i a l -domoc rat i c  refo rm i sm . As Mi c he l  
a rgues ; " Pre c i se diagnos i s  i s  the  l o g i c a l  a n d  i nd i s pen s i bl e  
p re l i n i nary to any pos s i ble prognos i s ". ( M i c he l : l 958 : 6 ) .  Some 
Un i on i s ts d i d a pprove change , oth ers d i d  not . What is i mporta n t  i s  to 
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unders tand the  natu re  of these  change s wi thi n U l ster  and  how they 
affected  the  Pa rty a n d  how the  Party dea l t w i t h  i t. 
Other  work w h i c h  does h i g h l i g h t  the  fac t i to u s  n ature o f  Un i on i sm i s  
O ' Dowd , Ro l s to n  and  Toml i nso n (1 980 ) who  p ro v i de a n  a na l ys i s  o f  the 
ro l e  of  the B r i ti s h  g overnmen t  a nd the demands  of the  modern c a p i ta l i s t 
economy i n  b r i ng i ng down Un i on i sm and  the  Un i on i s t  Pa rty; emp ha s i s i ng 
tha t the  c l a s s  a l l i ance  wa s a l ways a d i ffi cu l t o n e  to ma i nta i n . B e l l 
( 1 978 ) , Ne l s o n  (1 9 74)  a nd Wr i g h t  ( 1 97 3 ) a l l prov i de a n a l yt i c a l  accounts 
of Pro te s ta n t  and  Un i on i st  11i deo l og i e s 11• Both  Ne l s o n  a n d  Wri gh t  
emp ha s i se  th e rea sons  why P ro te s ta nts percei ve d  reform and  C a tho l i c  
i ntegra ti on  a s  a t hrea t  the reby to C a t ho l i c  dema nds  a n d  those  who 
oppose  a nyth i ng to do  wi th them; w i th a a l i e na te d  Protesta n t  work i ng­
c l a s s  becomi ng  i nc reas i n g l y  de s i l l u s i o ned.  F i na l l y ,  t here i s  O ' Ne i l l  
( 1 96 9 ) P r i me Ministe r  a nd  l eade r  of  t h e  Un i on i s t  Party throughout  much 
of  the 1 960 ' s . He s pe nd s muc h  t ime exp l a i n i ng and  j u s t i fyi ng  h i s 
po l i c i es a nd i s  a good examp l e of  b l a mi ng  fragme n ta t i o n  s imp l y  upon  
those  wi th i n U n i on ism who opposed  reform and  the  r i g h t  o f  the  Br i t i sh  
to  make dema n d s  upon  the Un i on i sts .  (O 'Ne i l l :1 969 ) .  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE U L STER UNIO N I ST PARTY 
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Thi s chapter  wi l l  exami ne  b ri ef l y the o rgan i s a ti o n  and  s tructure of the 
Un i on i s t Party a n d  i ts f i s s i pa rou s  na tu re. The Pa rty was a l ways prone 
to s p l i t s a n d  frac tu re s with  much i nte rna l d i s sent  beca u se the  Un i o n i st  
Party i s  e s s e n ti a l l y  a n  a l l i ance , c u t t i ng  a c ro s s  c l a s s  l i ne s .  U n i onis t  
l eade rs have had t o  con s ta n t l y  work t o  ma i nta i n  a l l U n i on i s ts u n i te d  
u nder t he o ne P arty , the  wor k i ng-c l a s s  Un i o nists  o ften wa nti ng  
d i ffe rent  gov e rnment  acti on than  lande .d Un i on i s t s .  (Rose:l 9 7 1 :224 ) . 
I t  i s  i mportan t  to emphas i s e tha t the  Un i on i s ts have  a l ways been  
v u l n e ra b l e  to  fact i ona l d i s pu te s  a nd b rea kaway groups , beca u s e  a great 
dea l of the l i teratu re a s sumes that the pre-0 1Ne i l l  era , i e  p re - 1 963 
was one  of  Un i o n i st  harmo ny a nd u n i ty. In add i t i o n  to l oo k i n g  at the 
n atu re of the Party , th i s  cha pte r wi l l  a l so p resent  the res u l ts of the 
1 96 9  Stormont e l ect i o n s  a nd the 1 9 74  As sembl y e l e c t i ons  to h i g h l i ght  
t he  actua l  fra gmentat i o n  of  the  Party a nd g rowth o f  other  U n i on i st 
Part i e s .  
Orga n i s a t i on  of the Un i on i s t  Party a n d  i ts F i s s i parou s Tenda nc i es 
The  U l s ter  U n i o n i s t Pa rty wa s formed o n  the  3 Ma rch  1 905, a ri s i ng out  
o f  th e o l d I ri s h Un i on i st  Party , o nce  the  U n i o n i s ts of  U l s te r  rea l i sed 
they wou l d ha ve a b ette r c ha n ce of kee pi ng a P rotesta nt U l s te r  Br i t i s h , 
ra the r tha n a Cathol i c  I re l a nd.  It  was  org a n i sed a nd  r un  very much 
l oca l  l i nes , i ts many d i fferent  parts be i n g  l arge l y  a u tonomou s .  The 
ma i n  orga n i sa ti ona l u n i t fo r the Party at l a rg e  i s  the  l oca l  
const i tuency a s soc i a t i on . These cons t i tu ency a s soc i a ti o ns  had  a great 
dea l of l oca l  a u tonomy , s e l ect i ng l o ca l  cand i da te s  and n at i ona l  
cand i date s , trad i tiona l l y  w i t h  l i tt l e i nte rfe rence from cen tra l  offi ce 
or  Pa rty l eadersh i p. The l oca l Party ru n l oc a l  governmen t  wi th  i ts 
re l a t i v e l y  wi de  powers over  hou s i ng ,  p ub l i c  j o b s , hea l t h  care etc.  
Th i s  au tonomy a l l owed the  Pa rty to ta ke on a d i ffere n t  c hara c ter  
1 2  
depend i n g  u po n  the l ocati o n , n ot  hav i ng  to s t i c k  to a cen tra l  l i ne 
a nd , therefo re , he l p i n g  to conta i n  th e ma ny d i fferen t inte res ts wi th i n 
the  P a rty . (Arthu r:l 9 80:65) .  
T he  cen tra l  body wi th i n the  Pa rty wa s  the U l ster  Un i on i st  Cou nc i l ( UUC) .  
Th i s  had  l i tt l e con trol  over  po l i cy , wh i ch wa s u s u a l l y  dec i ded  by the 
Parl i amentary Party (o ften in reac t i o n  to  deve l opments  wi th i n the 
Un i ted Ki ngdom) . Its  ma i n pu rpos e was to i n tegra te and co-ord i nate th e 
v ar i o u s  a ff i l i ated o rg an i s a ti o n s  i n  t he  Prov i nce,  make s u re a l l l oc a l  
const i tuenc i es a n d  o ften affi l i ated o rgan i sa t i o n s  were c l ear o n  
e l e c t i o n  stra teg i es , gene ra l  po li cy ,  he l p t he  O ra n ge Order ga i n  acce s s  
t o  Un i on i s t  p o l i ti c an s . The U U C  i s  t he  b ody that effec t i ve ly  repre sents  
the ma s s  o f  the  Party in  the  country ,  i ts day- to- day wor k  be i ng  done 
l a rg e l y  by an execu t i ve  COITDlli ttee . ( Ha rbi n son:1 973:84) .  
As  c an  b e  s ee n  from Ta b l e 1 ,  t h e  U n i o n i st  Pa rty a s  a who l e cons i s te d  
o f  many d i ffe rent  parts , from t h e  As s oc i a t i o n  o f  Loca l Ora nge Women  i n  
I re l a nd to th e Parl i amentary Pa rty . The  pa rti c u l a r  funct i on  a nd  
re l evance  o f  each  p art i s  n ot  real l y  n ec e s s a ry to  u nders tand . Wha t  
i s  i mportant t o  u nders tand  i s  t h a t  the  Un i on i st  P arty a s  a who l e wa s 
made u p  o f  ma ny autonomous  p a rts , a l l prov i d i ng s truc tu ra l  ten s i ons  
w i th i n the  Pa rty ,  a l l l oo k i n g  out  for th e i r own pa rti c u l a r  i n te rests . 
For i ns ta nce , the  Parl i ame nta ry Pa rty was pri mari l y  i nte rested  i n  
ma i nta i n i ng u n i ty for e l ecto ra l  pu rpo s es , a s  we l l  a s  to face the  
po l i t i c a l  pro bl ems o f  runn i ng the  g ov e rnment , wh i l s t the Orange  Order  
wa s concerned wi th e n s uri ng the  s u premacy o f  the Prote s ta n t  fa i th both  
w i th i n the  Pa rty and S tate . Th e l oca l Pa rty i n  Wes t  Be l fa s t  may have  
been mo re concerned w i th  u nempl oyme nt a nd the  l oca l Party i n  th e We s t  
o f  U l s te r  wi t h  ma i n ta i n i ng a gr i cu l tu ra l  pri c e s . ( Ha rb i n s on:l 973:1 1 3) .  
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The ma i n reaso n  the U n i on i s t  Pa rty wa s a b l e to re ta i n th i s  broad 
a l l i ance  was due to the  n a tu re of th e State . North ern I re l and  wa s a n  
i nteg ra l  part o f  the Un i ted K i ng dom yet wi t h  i ts own devol ved 
governme nt l o ca te d  at  Sto rmon t  C a st l e .  Th e We s �i n ster governmen t  wa s 
respons i b l e pri ma ri l y  fo r U l s te r ' s externa l  defence a nd  external  
a ffa i rs .  I t  had  u l ti mate a u thori ty over  a l l affa i rs i n te rna l  and  pa i d  
for a l a rge p roporti o n  o f  No rthern Ire l a nd ' s  s erv i ces  a n d  bu i l d i ng and  
ma i ntenace o f  i ts i nfra s t ructure , b u t  i t  i n  e ffec t l eft the Un i on i s ts 
to i mp l ement  Bri t i s h  po l i c i es a s  they wo u l rl .  O f  course , the  U n i on i s ts 
were i ncrea s i ngl y  l eft wi th l i ttl e room for ma neouvre i n  terms  of  
soc i a l  po l i c i es a nd we l fa re ,  wi th  the  Br i ti s h  governmen t  l ayi ng  down 
s tri c t g u i de l i n es  on wh o s hou l d  rece i v e  what . 
There were i mportant  differences  howeve r ,  s u ch  a s  that vot i ng for 
Stormon t  wa s d i fferent  from vot i ng  fo r the Wes �i n s ter  Parl i ament , 
s i nce N o rthern I re l a nd  a l l o wed  for. p l u ra l  vot i n g  a nd d i s franch i s emen t  
on  th e g rounds  of  property . Th ere was a bu s i nes s  vote wh i c h  cou l d be 
exerc i sed i n  a Stormo nt  e l ec t i on , i n  a dd i ti on  to the res i den tial vote, 
by a pe rson  who  occu p i ed bu s i ne s s  p remi ses  i n  a c on st i tuency to the  
ra tea b l e va l u e o f  ten  pounds  ( a pp rox i mate l y  fou rteen do l l a rs)  or  mo re 
per  a n n um . There wa s a l s o  a gra d u a te s  vote for fou r seats  represen t i n g  
t h e  Queen ' s  U n i vers i ty o f  B e l fa s t . Th i s  had  obv i ou s  imp l i ca t i o n s : the 
b u s i ne s s  and g radua te v ote tended to g i ve  extra vote s to Un i o n i sm ,  
s i nce the b u s i ness , p ro fe s s i ona l a n d  educated c l a s ses  i n  U l ster  were 
predomi nate l y  P ro te s ta n t  and the refore U n i o n i s t . I n  add i t i on , a l l 
hou seho l ders were not  a l l owed  to vote . Aga i n th i s  affe c ted  th e 
Ca thol i cs mo s tl y, a s  there was mo re of  a tendancy for Cathol i c s to 
l i ve  w i th  fri ends , i n  parents ' h ou se , rooms o r  l odg i n gs . (Wa l l ace : 
1 9 70:Cha p te r  1 ) .  
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The mo st  obv i o u s  opportuni ty for man ipu l a t i n g  the  e l ecto ra l  system wa s 
to draft l oca l government consti tuency  bou nda ries  through  the proce s s  
of gerrymanderi ng ,  i e  fi x e l e ctora l  boundari e s  so tha t Protestant  
maj o ri ti es  were s afe . I f  a Catho l i c  maj ori ty occu rred ,  i t  wa s made 
huge and i nc l u ded as  ma ny Ca tho l ics i n  a tl o s t ' d i v i s i on a s  pos s i b l e . 
It was i n  l oca l gove rnment with the i r s pecia l  i mportance for s choo l s ,  
hous i ng ,  p u b l i c  j obs , etc  that  opportu n i t i es  for ma n i pu l a t i o n  through 
property qua 1 i f i  ca t i  ans , p 1 u ra l votes and  g erryrnanderi ng  were fu l ly  
and  s e ri ou s l y  exp l o i ted.  The U n i o n i sts  had  an i nbu i l t  maj ori ty of 
2 : 1 at S to rmont  as  s i xty- s i x  per cent of  the popu l at i on  were 
P rotes ta n t. But they a l so  contro l l ed most l oca l Counc i l s  even  i n  ma ny 
parts of  th e West  where Prote s ta n ts were c l e a rl y  outnumbered.  Loca l 
governments  with re l ative fre edom over the a l l ocat i o n  of p u b l i c  j obs  
and  hous i ng used the i r  p ower to  e n s u re Catho l i cs rema i ned  i n  thei r 
e l ectora l  g hettos  a nd  l oya l Protes tants  rece i ved j u s t  reward s .  I n  
add i t i on ,  l oc a l  governmen t h a d  fu l l contro l  over  p o l i ce a n d  l aw and  
orde r ,  and  they ensured tha t a P ro testant  Roya l  U l ster Cons ta bu l ary 
(RUC ) enforced the ru l es of a Protesta n t  State . (O ' Dowd et  a l : l 980: 
97) .  Th i s  type of po l i t i ca l  a utonomy he l ped mai nta in u n i ty. The 
Pa rty was a bl e  to adapt  its e l f to l oca l c ond i tions  a n d  ca rry o u t  a nd 
imp l emen t pol ic i es s u i ted to the i r pa rticul a r  conditions  wi tho u t  too 
mu c h  i nterference from Sto rmont , l et a l one  Wes tmin s ter .  
Org in a l l y  the  s trate gi c  obj ecti ves o f  t he  Un i on i st Pa rty and  i ts 
l eaders  were: f i rs t ,  the s i x  count i es  o f  Northern  I re l and  s hou l d  be  
prevente d  from fa l l i ng unde r southern (Du b l i n gove rnment)  c ontro l  
second , the  g reate st pos s ibl e deg ree of  autonomy f rom London  s h o u l d be  
sec u red , s i n ce the  B ri t i sh bad h i s to ri c a l l y  p ro ved to be u n re l i ab l e ;  
th i rd ,  the  u n i ty o f  the Un i o n i s t  a l l i a nce o f  c l a s ses s h ou l d be  
ma i n ta i ned a t  a l l co s ts .  However ,  a s  the threat  o f  repub l i can i sm 
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waned  a fter the ea rl y  1 920's , the  l ea ders  of Unioni sm had  to work  
more and  mo re upon  s ec u ring Un ion i s t  u n i ty .  ( Bew, Gi bbon a nd  
Pa tterson : l 980 : 1 56}. The  pr i ncip l e wea pon u s e d  wa s that  o f  
sectarianism, portra yi n g  a l l Cathol i cs a s  tra i tors who we re wa i t i ng 
for the firs t oppo rtu n i ty to integ ra te U l s te r  i nto the Irish Re pub l i c , 
and i mpose  "Rome Rul e". Protestant fears and  l o ya l tie s  were 
re i n forced  by l ocal governmen t a u th o ri ties mainta i nin g  segregation 
thro ugh  educat i on and  hous i n g  po l i c ie s .  Catho l i cs attended Cathol ic 
s c h oo l s a n d  we re kep t in  Ca thol i c  g hettos� Prote s tan ts enj oyed 
marginal l y  h i gher  standa rd s  o f  l i v i ng thro ug h being al l ocated mo re 
an d better p ubl i c  jobs a n d  ho u s e s . Th i s  was re in fo rced  through  the 
in forma l contacts  wtthin the O ra n ge Orde r ;  in wh i c h  Protes tants  of  a l l 
s o c i a l  c l a s ses  wou l d be to gether in d i s tr i c t  l odge s .  
The Un i oni s t  P a rty was re l at ivel y s ucces s ful in ma i nta i n i ng their 
organisational and  el ector a l  u n ity a c ross cla s s  l i n e s . T h i s u n i ty o f  
the Protes ta n t  working and  midd l e c l a s s e s  i n  s u ppo rt i n g  the Un i on i st  
Pa rty wa s nece ssa ry to mai nta i n  Unionist control of  U l ster; Wi thout  
s u pport  of  the Protestant working c l as s  they cou l d n ever  have hoped 
to run  Northern Ire l and . At the same ti me the Party l eadership was 
ca reful  not to impose i tse l f too much  u pon  the Party as a whol e ,  for 
fea r  of a l i en a t i ng  worki ng c l a s s  s u pport. T hu s  for the s a ke of u n i ty, 
the Par l i amentary Party wa s often forced to s u pport empl oyment scheme s 
that  were  a nathema to many of the i r  numb er. I n  addition, this he l ped 
to stave off cons is tent cha 11 enge s  from b rea k- away groups an d othe r  
Un i on i s t  Pa rti e s  as we l l  a s  conta i n  i n herent contradi.ctions. 
( P robert : l 978:82l. 
On th e o th e r  hand,  t hese  break-away factions and independent Un i on i s ts 
show that the Un i on i s t  a l li ance was not as united and mo no l i thic a s  i s  
1 7  . 
often s u ppos e d  oy a u t ho rs s uch  a s  Wa 1 1  ace (1 9 7 1  J ,  Dev l i n  ( 1 969) or  
De  Paor  ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  P r i o r  to the  Second Wor l d Wa r the b i gge s t  e l e ctora l 
cha l l enge  to the Unionis t  Pa rty was not  the Na ti ona l i s t Pa rty but  the 
Progres s i ve Un i o n is t  Party.  Th i s  Party was fo rmed i n  1 9 37  by Un i on i s t  
Pa rty members and  a ha ndfu l o f  Unfo n i s t  MP ' s  a t  Stormont , a l l mo s tl y  
from wes t  Be l fast . They wan ted more  empha s is i ng by gove rnmen t on the 
prob l ems of  jobs and  hou s i ng.  Th i s  oppos i ti on was e ffec t i ve ly  c rushed  
by the  bang i ng of  the  secta r i a n  drum. The Free Sta te governme n t  i n  
Southern I re l and  under  a new  hard- l ine  re pub l i ca n  P r i me M i n ister  
Eammon De ' Va l e ra , proc l a imed i n  De cemb er  1 9 3 7  a new  const i tu ti on , 
c l a imi ng  t he  who l e i s l and  of  Ire l and  a s  nat i ona l te rri to ry. I n  
effect ,  h e  was  rea s s e rt i n g  the s o uthern gove rnmen t ' s  c l a i m  over the 
no rthern s i x count i e s. Lord Craiga von , P r i me Mi n i S,ter  of  N orthern 
I re l a nd  (an d  the refo re l eader  o f  the Un i on i s t  Party} s e i zed  the 
opportu n i ty eager l y. He c a l l ed a,n e l ection for Stormont , p l ay i n g  
upon  the i s s ue of  th e ma i n tenance  of  the  Bo rde r an d rej e ct i on  of  the 
c l a i ms of De'Va l e ra , whi l s t  a t  t he s ame time enabl i n g the Un i on i s t to 
denounce the P rogres sive  U n i on i s t  a s  'wrec ke rs 1  a n d  'tra i tors ' .  As 
Ha rb i n son  s ucc i nct ly  puts i t  "j u s t  as the s e n s a t i ona l nove l i sts of  the  
ea r ly  n i neteenth century i n troduced appa r i t i on s  to deter the i r  
cha racters from ras h o r  crimi na l e nterpris e s , s o  t h e  i nvocat i o n  o f  
po l i t i ca l  phan toms was ex�ec ted t o  deter Pro te s ta n t  vo te rs  from 
s u pporti ng  Un i on i s t  d i .s s i dents 11• (Ha rbin son : l 973 : 2 2 l }. 
Di s s ent  ha s l a rge ly  been conta i ned t hro ugh p l ay i n g  upon  secta r i a n  
fea rs , b u t  i t  h a s  n o t  a l ways s topped  i nd i .vi d ua l  Un i on i s ts from 
present i ng  cha l l enges  from o u ts i d e  t he Pa rty. A typ i ca l  c a se  i s  tha t  
o f  T. Henders on , a ho u sepa i nter  who was elected  t o  Sto rmont  to 
represen t the Sha nki l 1  ward be tween 1 92 5  and 1 953 .  Henderson  d i s l i ked 
the upper-c l a s s  i nfl uence upon  th e Pa rty and a dvoca ted  s o c i a l i s t 
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po l i c i es wi thi n  a Un i on i s t  context . The Sha n ki l l  wa s ( and  s ti l l  i s }  
s o l i d l y Protestant a n d  working c l  a ss a n d  tra dit i ona l l y  Uni o n i s t , but 
Un i on i s t  w i th a soc i a l  emp ha s i s .  The Un i on i s t  Party h a s  a l ways been 
ab l e to to l e ra te the odd d i s s enter , on l y  when  they transfo rm th em­
s e l ve s  i nto a po l i t i ca l  Pa rty do they get  wo rri ed  a s  i n  1 9 38 . 
(Wa l l ace:l 9 70 : 6 9 ) .  
There h a s  a l ways been a cha l l e nge  t o  Offic i a l  Un i o n i sm  from th e r i g ht . 
The  Rev Dr I a n  Ri c h a rd Ky l e  P a i s l ey an d h i s  Democrat i c U n i on i s t  Party 
i s  b u t  o n e  o f  a l ong  l i 's t  o f  hard l lne Protes tan t  Un i on i s ts . P r i o r  to 
th e a ctu a l  s ett i n g  up of the Northern  I r i sh  State i n  1 92 1  there was 
the Be l fa s t  Prote s ta n t  Ass o c i a ti on who wo rke d  po l i t i ca l ly to secure 
the nomi na t i o n  o f  1good 1 Pro tes ta nt cand i dates  i n  Be l fa s t  Corpo rat i on  
e l e c t i on s . I n  the 1 9 20 ' s  a n d  l 930 ' s  there wa s the U l s te r  Protes tant  
Lea g u e , i n  the 1 9 50 ' s there was U l ster  Pro te s ta n t  Act i on  and  i n  t he 
19 60 1 s P a i s l ey ' s  Pro te stan t  U n io n i st Pa rty ,  a l 1 o f  wh i ch put  u p  
i nd i v i dua l c a n d i da te s  a t  l oca l  a n d  S to rmont  e l e ct i o n s .  The i r po l i tica l  
p l a tfo rms i n va r i a bl y  centered a round  P ro te s tan t fu ndamenta l i sm a nd  
fea r  o f  the  re l a t i ve ' s oftn e ss '  o f  tra d i t iona l  Un i on i sm .  Th i s  fe ar  
s tems from the trad i t i 'o na l  domi nat i o n  of  Un i on i sm " by th e u pper-c l a s s 
whic h  i t  fea rs mi ght p l ace  i ts own eco nomi c i ntere s t s  above th ose  
of the o rd i nary peopl e of  U l s ter  a nd  s e l l t he  U n io n  i f  the  pr i ce wa s 
r i g ht". (Ha rdb i ns o n :l 9 73 : 22 5 } . 
The threat  to Offic i a l  Un i o n i sm  from th e l ef t , after  1 945 , came 
pri ma r i l y  from the No rthern  I re l and  La bour  Party (tHCP}. Neve r a n  
exc l u s iv e l y  Pro tes ta n t  Pa rty o r  s teadfa s t l y  U n i o n i s t ,  i t  did on the 
who l e come o ut i n  fa vour  o f  t he U n i on .  If p ut  forward  i n  the  1 9 50 ' s  
a nd  1 9 60 ' s  a ser i es  of  refo rmi s t  po l ic i e s wh i ch pa rtic u l a r l y  a ppea l ed 
to the wor k i n g  c l as s Prote s ta nts of  the i ndu s tr i a l i s ed ea s t ,  e s pe ic a l l y 
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i n  No rth , West  a nd Ea s t  Bel fa s t , Larne , Portadown , Carr i c kferg u s  and  
Lurga n . The NILP enj oyed a c e rta i n  mea sure .o f s uccess  a n d  i n  the  
ear l y  1 960 ' s  g o t  the Un i on i st  Pa rty qu i te wo rried. Due to changes  i n  
the post-wa r economy a n d  t he i ntroduct i on o f  the We l fare  S ta te the 
Un i on i s t  Party was u n a b l e to rel y tota l l y  upon i ts s e c ta r i a n  a ppea l  to 
combat the N I LP .  The U n i on i s t  Party wa s forced  to 'ou tdo'  the N ILP . 
(See  Cha pter 3). 
As can  b e  s een  by l oo k i n g  a t  Ta b l e 2 the pol i t i c a l  u n i ty o f  th e 
Un i o n i sts  fel l a pa rt be tween  th e years of  1 9 69 and  1 9 7 3 . From th i s  
obs erva t i on  i t  wo u l d s eem tha t  events  b etween thes e years  mu s t  have  
ca u s ed the  fra gmen ta tion  o f  the  Party .  Th i s  i s  o n l y  pa rt ly  tru e ; the 
c u l mi na t i on o f  th e C i v i l R i g hts Campa i gn ,  Un i on i st ha nd l i ng of  l aw 
and  o rde r ,  the r i s e  o f  v i o l enc e  a nd d i rect ru l e  are  a l l events  wh i c h  
ha ppened i n  th i s  period and  a re cruc ia l to the s p l in ter i ng of  the 
Pa rty ;  but i t  does  g o  b ac k  furth er  than that; to the c ha n g i n g  n ature 
of the s tate  ( wh i c h  wi l l  b e  d i sc u s s ed i n  th e n ext two chapters ).  
Br i efl y ,  w i th th e acce s s i on o f  Terence O ' Ne i l l  a s  Ul ster ' s  P r i me 
Mi n i s ter  a n d  U n i o n i s t  Party l eade r  i n  1 963 , there was a c hange  i n  
ty l e  and  empha s i s o f  the  Party.  A change wh i c h  had been s l o wl y  
growi n g  i n  the  1 960 ' s . O ' Ne i l l was  fa ced wi t h  c ha l l enges  from the 
NILP a nd the  need  to i nc rea s i ng l y i n te rvene  i n  economic  a nd soc i a l  
l i fe ;  a n d  fie hoped t o  d o  t h i s wi tho u t  u p s ett i ng the fra g i l e  u n i ty of 
h i s Pa rty . Prev i o us l y  the  Party was h e l ped i n  ma i n ta i ni ng u n i ty by 
never rea l l y  h av i ng to go  b eyond th e const i tuti ona l i s s u e . The 
Un i on i s t  Pa rty ' s  l ac k  o f  conc rete s o c i a l  a nd economi c po l i c i es a t  
l ea s t  u n t i l the 1 9 60 ' s  c a n  b e  h i g h l i g hted by l oo k i ng  a t  a s tatement  
of po l i c i es i s s u ed by the  e xecut i v e commi ttee o f  t h e  UUC  i n  
November  1 9 5 9 ,  I t  s tates  "Fi rst ,  t o  ma i n ta i n  the  cons t i .tu t i ona l  
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pos i t i o n  of  Northern I re l a nd a s  a n  i ntegral  part o f  t h e  Un i on i s t  
Ki ngdom a n d  t o  defend th e pr i nc ip l e s  of c i v i l a n d  re l i g i o u s  l i berty .  
Second , to i mprov e soc i a l  s tanda rds and  to expand i ndu stry a nd 
a gr i c u l t ure . Thi rd , to wel come to o ur  ran Rs o n l y  tho s e  who 
uncond i ti on a l l y  s u pport  these  i deas " .  {Ha rbi n son : l 9 7 3 : 44 ) . E v e n  a s  
l ate a s  197 1 , Ro se co ntended tha t t he Un i on i s t  Par ty were e s se n ti a l l y  
a s i ng l e c l a i m  Party ,  advanc i ng n o  d i s t i nct i ve  pr i nc i p l e s o r  
programmes other  tha n  that  o f  c o nt i nued  u n i o n  w i th Br i ta i n . ( Ro s e : 
1 97 1 : 2 2 3).  
I dea l o g i c a l l y ,  the  U n i on i s t  Pa rty wou l d  be  c l a s s i f i ed a s  conserva t i v e  
Un i o n i s t. MP 's a t  Wes tm i n s ter a l wa ys fol l owed the c on s e rva t i v e  Pa rty 
wh ip , and  there  wa s a l ways a genera l a ccepta nce  of  c a p i ta l i sm even  by 
the  reform i st  e l emen ts wi thi n the Pa rty . However , th e Party wa s 
re l a t i ve l y  f l ex i bl e ,  a s  seen  by l oo ki ng a t  its imp l ementa t i o n  of  
economi c a nd  s oc i a l  pol fc i e s .  I t  had  to  be ;  i :f a l a bour  We _s tm i n s ter 
government  i nt roduced wel fa r i s m; the  U n i on i st Pa rty had l i tt l e c ho i ce 
but to i mp l ement tno s e  po l i c i es within Northern Ire l a nd ,  a nd c l a im 
them a s  benef i :ts of  the U n i o n . lt was fo rced to i nterven e i n  the  
economy to accommodate a res tructu r i ng of ca p i tal in U l ster , r a ther  
tha n  from a des ire  to  red i stribu te wea l t n  o r  br i ng a bout  a s oc i a l i st 
type  of  government .  The i r  ma i n  concern  was to ma i nta i n  Un i o n i s t  
un i ty ,  a n d  t his was d one  fa i r l y  s uc c e ss fu 1 l y  u p  u n t i l t h e  ear l y 
1 970 1 s .  As ca n be s een  from Tab l e  2 ,  the  1 9 69 e l ect i on s howed s i g n s  
of i n crea s i ng d i sconten t , wi th  i ndependent U n i o n i st s  g a i ni ng n i neteen 
per cent  of  the vote . Nevert he l e s s , t he Un i on i st Pa rty i n  1 969 wa s 
s t i l l  by fa r t he l a rgest  Party i n  U l ster  and  h a d  enou g h  s e a ts 
(s i xty-n i ne per  cent  of to ta l } i n  Sto rmont to ma i nta in con tro l . But  
by 1 9 7 3 ,  t he  U n i on i s t  P arty had fa l l en apart wi th the  emergenc e of 
other  l oya l i st/Un i on i st Pa rt i e s  enj oyi ng  a re l a t i ve l y  l arge  degree of 
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e l ectora l s u c c e s s . Between 196 9 a n d  197 3 ,  t h e  contrad i c t i on s  a l ready 
i nherent wi t h i n the  Party were expos ed by the  even t s  of  the s e  yea rs , 
caus i ng the  Un i on i sts  to fragment .  Th e reas on s  beh i nd t h e  fra g ­
menta t i o n  wi l l  b e  dis c u s sed  i n  the forthcomin g  cha pter s . 
Conc l u s i on  
Thu s , t he  U l ster  Un i o n i s t  Pa rty wa s ne ver a centra l l y  orga n i sed 
u n i ted b l o c k . Structu ral l y ,  the  Party was v e ry d es pe rate  w i th ma ny 
d i fferent powe r centres .  Th i s  type o f  organ i sa t i o n  wa s nece s s a ry to  
ma i n ta i n  t h e  c l a s s  a l l i ance  of  a l l U nio n i sts  to i mpose  c entra l  
d i rect i v es  a n d  a s i ng l e Pa rty l i n e  on  a l l i s s ues  wo u l d  ha ve c a u s ed 
fric t i on between  c l a ss i nterests and  be tween the  c entra l  a nd  l oca l 
Pa rty. The Un ion i st Party  had  a l oc a l i s ed s tructu re as U l s ter was 
l a rge l y  a l oca l l y  run  s tate , ena b l i ng d ifferent  U n i o n i st  i nteres ts  to 
dom i nate  i n  d i fferen t l o ca l condit ions . This type of arra ng ement 
wo rked very wel l u nt i l the 196 0ts , ena bl ing a d espera te Pa rty to 
domi nate U l ster's po l i t i ca l  l i fe for a l mo s t  fifty yea rs.  
In  s um ,  t he Un i on i st  Pa rty represented "a n u n h a p py and  u n ho l y a l l i an ce 
of peop l e t hrown tog ether  by wha t they we re fu nda menta l l y  opposed  to 
(i e a Un i ted I re l and l rather  than  by a n  pos it i ve or co-opera t i v e  
pr i nc i p l es ". ( Arthu r : l 980 : 6 5}. Th i s  worked f i ne i n  a l oc a l i s ed 
state ; but by 197 3 , U l ster was d i rec t l y  ru l ed by We stmi .n s ter  and  the 
trad i t i o na l  l oc a l  eco n omic ,  soc i a l  and pol i t i ca l  a rra ngements  had 
bro ken  d o wn. The  Un i on i st  Party from th e 19 50's on wa s forced to 
i mp l ement  po l i c i es that  wo ul d create d i v i s ions  a nd e xpo s e  contrad i ct­
i o ns . Ma ny of these  c ontrad i c t i ons  were inherent  a n d  ma ny d i vi s i ons  
created before the eve n ts of  the  1969 - 19 7 3  pe riod;  but  i t  too k the  
events  o f  t his period to t ra n s fo rm these  d i vi s i ons  a nd  contrad i ct-
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ton s  i nto po l i t i c a l  c l eava g e s . I t  is the creation  o f the s e  divisions 
and expo s i n g  o f  the se  contrad i ct i ons  w i th i n  the Un i o n i s t  Pa rty wi th 
wh i ch the res t of th i s  paper  wi l l  be  dea l i ng .  
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOM I C  POL I C IE S  
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reg u l ate  th e eco nomy . Ho weve r  the dec l ine in U l s ter's trad i ti ona l 
i ndu stries  o f  s hi pbu i l d ing , a g r i c u l tu re  and l i nen , forced the  govern­
ment , even i n  the 1 95 0 ' s  to ta ke  a number  of mea s u re s  to  combat  th i s  
dec l i ne and  enco u rage  new industries  to re -l oc a te in U l s te r .  
Between 1 94 5  a nd 1 9 53 Stormo nt  i ntroduced a series o f  " I nd u s tr i e s  
Deve l o pmen t Act s "  wh i c h  empowered th e Min i stry  of  Commerce t o  l ease  
modern factory premi ses , a nd pro v i d e  f inanc i a l  a s s i s tance  to new 
i nd u str i e s , a s  wel l a s  expand i n g o l d o n e s . P l u s  there were the  " Re­
equ i pment  of  I nd u s try Acts " of  1 9 5 1  a nd 1953 . Thes  e prov i ded g rants  
to  meet one-th i rd of  re- equ ipment a nd moderni sa t i o n  costs ; these  
meas u res  part i cu l a r l y  helped the  a g e i n g  l i nen  i nd u s try . Fu rthermo re 
there were the " Ca pi .ta l Grants  to I nd u s try Act s "  1 954 -62 , wh i c h  
prov i ded a n n u a l  g rants for g rowth a nd e xpa ns i o n ;  a s  we l l  a s  l oca l 
author i t i e s  s t i l l  be i ng  a bl e  to prov i de ra tes exemptions  a t  the i r  own 
d i s c ret i on w h i c h  ma ny of them  d i d .. ( Prober t : 19.78 : 6 9l . 
I n  a dd i t i o n , the Stormont reg i me s et u p  a numb e r  of a g r i c u ltural boa rd s  
to ma i nta i n  prices , su c h  a s  t h e  P i g  Ma rke t i ng Boa rd i n  1 954 , the  M i l k  
Ma rket i ng Board i n  1 955  and  t he Seed Pota to Ma rket i ng Boa rd in 1 96 1 "  
I n  fac t , d uring thi s pe r i o d  t h e  Union i s t  gover nmen t  seemed t o  be  do i ng 
more to he l p the farme r s '  than  that  o f  the B r i t i s h  governmen t .  
(Wa l l a ce : l 9 7 1  :1 3 1 -1 32}. 
Th is amount  of  economi c act i v i ty a n d  intervent i o n s  was remarkabl e fo r 
a governme nt  that  had prev iou s l y  been  noted fo r i ts l ac k  o f  economi c 
concern  and  s i ngl e  i s s u e  i mag e . I t  wa s no t a q ues t i o n  of Broo keborough  
and  the  Pa rty establ i s hme nt wa nt i ng to get  tnvo l ved  i n  eco nomi cs ; it 
wa s a c a s e  o f  hav i ng to ; pri ma r i l y  to ma i nta i n  Party  u n ity .  Wi th  the 
rece s s i on o f  the  1 950 ' s  in Northern  I re l and ,  u n emp l oyment  rea ched  e l even  
per cent  i t  wa s even affec t i n g  Pro te s ta n t  wo rkers a s  wel l ;  when in  1 960 
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8 , 000 were l a i d  off from th e Sh i pya rd the resu l t of th i s  was that  
Protestant  work i ng c l a s s  voters  i ncreas i ng l y  tu rned to the  Northern 
I rel a nd Labour  Pa rty and oth e r  i ndependent  l a bour  cand i dates . By the 
1 96 2  Stormo nt  e l ect i o n s , l ab o u r  po l l ed thi rty-two per cent of the  
tota l vote  ( tho ugh  on l y  fo u r  s eats ) .  Even Broo kebo rough  rea l i s ed tha t 
the government wou l d  have  to i ntervene  i n  t he economy to ma i n ta i n  
wor k i ng c l a s s  s u pport , i t  s eemed the me re ex i stence o f  the U l ster  
Un i on i s t  Labour  Assoc i at i on wou l d no l o nger s uff i ce . (O ' Dowd , Rol s ton  
a nd Toml i n s o n  1 980 : 1 2 - 1 3 ) . 
On the  other  h a nd wha t th i s type of  pol i cy mea nt was that Northern  
I re l a n d  wa s pen etrated by Br i t i sh a nd  fore i g n  c a p i ta l . The  new 
i nves tors were l a rge  compa n i es l i ke I C I , Du  Pont , B r i t i s h  En ka l o n  ( a l l 
produc ers of  synethi c text i l es ) , Genera l  Food s , Mark s  a nd Spenc ers , 
GEC , I TT ,  Goodyea r ,  Nest l e s , Fo rd , B P , Tenneco , Textron (see  Fortune  
Maga z i n e ,  1 9 7 7 1 etc , none  o f  wh i c h  were pa rt  of  the tra d i t i o na l  
. 
. 
Un i on i s t s t ructu re o r  i n tere sted i n  s u s ta i n i n g a n  a n t i -Catho l i c  po l i cy ; 
thus  ma i nta i n i ng � broad Un io n i s t  Al l ia nce . (Be l l  1 9 7 6 : 1 23 ) . I n  fac t  
the expan s i o n  of  fore i g n  i n v e s tment mea nt  that Catho l i c s  now h a d  mo re 
acc e s s  to ma nager i a l  occu pa t i ons , wh i ch i n  t u rn , con t r ib u ted to a 
growt h  of a refo rmi st  Ca tho l i c  mi dd l e-c l a s s , who wa nted to  exerc i s e  
fu l l po l i t i c a l  r i g ht s  wit h i n  t h e  s ta te. 
The s tate  i ntervent i o n  of t he Un i on i s t  economy l ed ,  in th e l ong term , 
to the  dec l i ne of U l s ter ' s  reg io na l  eco nomy and  i nc rea s i ng i ntegrat i o n  
i nto a wo r l d economy domi nated  by monopo l y  ca p i ta l , wh i ch created 
s ev ere s tra i n  w i th i n  Un i o n i sts .  Thes e  stra i n s  were a l ready a pparent  
i n  the  1 9 30 1 s  wi th th e l oc a l  bourgeo is i e  s u ffer ing from the  depres s i o n ; 
but  i t  h ad  been kept tog eth e r  by pl ayi ng the  erange Card a n d  empha s i s ­
i ng the externa l thre a t  o f  I r i s h  na t i ona l i sm . After  the  temporary 
boos t  of  the  Wa r years , t he hegemo ny of U l ster " s  bou rgeo i s i e was 
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further  wea kened by t hese  econom i c changes  over  wh i c h  i t  had l i tt l e 
control ; c hanges  enco u rag e d  by a gove rnment  a n d  Party they had  a l ways 
s u p ported . These  cha nges  a n d  econom i c  mea s u re s  wer e  eno u g h  to s top  a ny 
further l a bo u r  ba sed cha l l enge  to the U n i on i s t  Pa rty (a t l ea s t  for the  
t i me be i ng ) ; but  on ly i ncrea s ed l oc a l  petty b o u rgeo i s  d i s t r u s t  of  the  
cen tra l Party a nd Pa rty l ea d e rs h i p in  the  form of  the  Sto rmon t  
governmen t .  ( P robert : l 978 : 78 } .  
The effec t o f  the  i nt erna ti o na l i s at i o n  a t  cap i ta l  accumu l a t i o n  ha s  been 
to i ntegrate U l ster  (and for that mat te r  the Re pub l i c  of I re l and ) i nto  
a dependen t  rel a t i -0 ns h i p  wi th  i nterna ti ona l  c a p i ta l w i th i n  t he  po l i ti ca l  
framework of  t h e  Eu ro pea n commun i ty .  An examp l e of the  amo unt  of  
fore i g n  c a p i ta l  t ha t  wa s be i ng i nve sted i'n Northern Ire l and  i n  the 
per i od c a n  be s een  By t he fact t hat  througho u t  the 1 9 50 ' s  o n l y  ten per 
cen t of  t he  n ew s tate  a s s i s t ed fac to r i e s and  p l a nts res u l ted from l oca l  
i nve stment a n d  i n i t i a t i v e .  When and where l oc a l  i nvestmen t  d i d  occur , 
i t  came mon t h l y  from the l o ng -e s ta b l i's h ed and  trad it i o na l  i nd u s t r i es . 
Suc h a s  tobacco , l i ne n  and  mec ha n i c a l  eng inee r i ng  concern s , rather tha n 
fi rms . ( O ' Dowd , Ro l s ton  a nd  Toml i n so n  1980 : 37 } . 
Neverthel e s s , t h i s  i s  not to  say the proces s  wa s o n e  of  comp l ete i nva s ­
i on a nd take-over o f  t h e  No rthern I r i s h  economy.  The i nfl uence  of  the 
pa ttern o f  c a p i ta l accumu l a t i o n  was pred i cated i n  the North v i a  a wea k 
Bri t i sh  economy a nd a powerfu l l oca l  bourgeo i s i e  ca pab l e of  f i g h t i ng a 
s trong rea r-guard act i o n  aga i n s t  the ero s ion  of  i ts econom i c a scendancy. 
I t  wa s the  l oc a l  Bourgeo i s i e  wh i c h  co ntrol l ed the  l oca l  U n i on i s t  Party 
i n  the  co n s t i tutency a s s oc i a ti ons , yet the ir own Party at  the centre 
wa s i n crea s i ng l y pa s s i ng acts  and crea t i ng economic  po l i c i es tha t  were 
aga i ns t  t he i r  own l oc a l  eco nom i c  i nterests . Thi s c reated ten s i ons  wi th­
i n  t he Party wh i c h  wer e  to Be  execerbated l ater  on . �ut t he  Party as  a 
who l e cou l d hard l y  not  accept th i s  penetrat i on o f  fore i g n  c a p i t a l , i f  i t  
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d i d  not  wan t  to keep  the s u p port  of t he work i n g  c l a s s es , who were 
e s s ent i a l to ma i nta i n  U n i on i s t  hegemony . (Smyth 1 980 : 49 ) . 
Eco nom i c  and  Phys i c a l  P l a n n i ng 
To e n s u re a s ucces s fu l  tra n s forma ti o n  of the  economy a nd a comprehens i ve 
economi c po l i cy ,  i t  wa s neces s a ry for t h e  Un i o n i st  governmen t to engage  
i n  Prov i nc e-wi de  p l an n i ng a nd reg u l at i o n .  Al ready , dur ing  the  1 9 50's , 
Northern I re l and  had  oeen s ubj ect to s u c h  a proces s  v ia B r i t i s h  Reg i ona l  
Pol i cy and  centra l  p l ann i ng , a nd th i s  had  cau s ed some concern  amongst  
l oca l  U n i on i s t .  An  examp l e o f  th i s  can  be  seen  oy l oo k i ng  a t  the  " Stat­
i st i c s of  Trade  Act " , 1 9 56 , wh i ch wa s passed  a t  Wes tm i nster  a nd presented  
to Sto rmo nt  to pa s s  i n  t h e  exac t  s ame fo nn .  I t  s eemed fa i r l y  o b v i ou s  
tha t i f  s ta t i s t i c s  we re to b e  co l l ected for  t h e  U n i ted Ki n gdom a s  a who l � 
then Nort hern I re l a nd mu s t  c onform .  B ut  Un iuntst  bac kbenchers  a t  Stor­
mont  made the  Un i on i s t  governm ent ·  withd raw the  B i l l , a nd amend a s  many of  
the  or i g i n a l  prov i s i on s  a s  i t  c ou l d w i t ho u t  ma k i ng  the B i l l  s u b stant i a l l y  
d i fferent from tha t  i ntrodu ced  a t  We s tm i n s ter . The Bi l l wa s  oppo s ed on  
the g ro und s t ha t  it smac ked of soc i a l i sm and  such s ta t i st i c s  were the  
precursor  o f  na t i ona l i s at i o n ; yet a nother  a tt empt o f  centra l i sa t i on of  
eco nom i c power . (Haro i ns o n : l 20 J . 
However , i t  wa s u nder  the premi ers h i p  of  Terence  O ' Netl l tha t economi c 
pl a nn i ng a nd the  bu i l d i ng of  a n  i nfras tructure s u i tabl e to  the  new type 
of  i nvestmen t rea 1 1.y go t u nd e r  way .  As soo n  as fie b.ecame Pr i.me M i n iSter 
i n  1 963 he  c omm i s s ioned a n umber of economic reports , the mo s t  import­
ant  of  v1h i c h  b e i ng  the Ma th h ew Report " Be l fa s t  Reg i o na l  S u rvey and P l a n "  
( Cmd 4 5 1 , Be l fa s t  1 96 3 } . I t  came ou t aga i n st  the  trad i t i ona l  concent­
rat i on of i ndu stry a nd  po pu l a t i on i n  a nd a round Be l fa st  a nd recommended 
a g reater d i s pers emen t  of  i nd u s try and emp l oyme nt  througho u t  Northern 
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I re l a nd . The c entral  thes i s  of  the  report was to a ttract  n ew i nd u s t­
r i e s  not  s i mp l y  by offer i ng l av i s h  g rants , wh i c h  wa s the prev i o u s  
stra tegy , b u t  a l s o  by c reat i n g  a modern eco nom i c  infra s tructure , v i a 
c reat i n g  a s e r i e s  of new growt h  c entres , moto rway a nd  roa d  b u i l d i ng ,  
i nc rea s ed h arbo u r  fac i l i t i e s , expa ns i on of  a i rport fac i l i t i es ,  even 
the bu i l d i ng of a second Un i vers i ty .  Th i s report in  effect became the 
b l u epri nt  of  the  gove rnment ' s  eco nomi c po l i cy ,  ma r k i n g  the beg i n n i ng of 
wha t has been c a l l ed " New Tec h noc rat i c  U n fo n i sm 1 1 • (Bu c k l a n d  1 981 : 1 1 0 ) . 
The U n i on i st governmen t  acce pted the Ma thhew Stra tegy , a s  endorsed  i n  
the  Wh i te Pa per o n  " t he  Adm i n i s trat i on of  Town a n d  Cou ntry P l a n n i n g  i n  
Northern I re l a nd " . (Cmd 456 , Be l fa st  1 964 } .  Thi s s et o u t  to l ay the  
fou ndat i o n s  o f  a n  admi n i s tration  with maj o r  reorgan i s a ti o n  of  the  
mac h i nery of government  w i th effect  from J anuary 1 st ,  1 96 5. The ma i n  
changes  was the  s etti ng u p  of  a n ew M i n i s try of  Deve l opment w i t h  a 
s pec i fi c  p u rpo s e  of  i mprov i n g t he· phys i c a l  i nfrastructu re of  Northern 
I re l and  and a n ew M i n i s try of  Hea l th and  Loca l Gove rnmen t to  be  
u l t i ma t e l y  respons i o l e  fo r a l l p l a nn i ng powers a nd d u t i es and  rat i on­
a l i s e the  many government a c t i v i t i e s i n  t h is f i e l d .  However , the  
tra n s i t i o n  wa s not a smooth one , a s  l oca l autho r it ie s  were rel uctant  
to l o s e  t he i r p l ann i n g  powers  a nd  they d i d  the i r  best  to de l ay the  
tra ns fe r  of  power . In  fact , t he i s s u e  was n o t  reso l v ed u n t i l 1 97 0 , 
whe n u nder  p res s u re from the  B r i t i s h gov ernme nt  to ma ke reforms , the 
rev i ew body on l oca l  governmen t s tated tha t a l l p l a nn i ng powers be 
res ted d i rect ly  i n  th e M i n i s try of  Dev e l opmen t .  (Wa l l ace  1 97 0 : 1 40 - 1 4 1 ) .  
Thi s new technocra t i c a s pec t  of  wha t h a s  been d ubBed 11 0 1 Ne i l l i sm 11 
wa s not  one  vo l u nta r i l y  embarked u po n  by the U n i o n i s t  governmen t .  
Undoubtedl y ,  o • Ne il l , a s  near  t o  be i n g a Soc i a l  Democ ra t  a s  o ne cou l d  
pro ba b l y  f i nd w i thi n the  Un i on i st  Pa rty s aw t h i s  type o f  change  a s  
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benefi c i a l  to U l s ter , a proces s wh i ch wo u l d h e l p to erad i c a te 
sec ta r i an i sm a t  the  l oca l l ev e l . Howeve r ,  wi th  i nc reased  economi c 
dependanc e on  the Un i ted Ki ngdom a n d  fo re i g n  c a p i ta l  i t  mea n t  that  th e 
North ' s  economi c a u tonomy wa s severe l y  c i rc umscr i bed a n d  econom i c  
po l i cy ha d t o  fol l ow the genera l l i ne s  o f  reg i ona l  deve l o pmen t po l i cy 
pursued  i n  Great  Br i ta i n ;  e s pec i a l l y  s o  a fter the  e l ect i o n  o f  a l a bour  
governme n t  i n  1 964 . Thu s th i s  new  emphas i s i ng o n  p hys i ca l  a nd economi c 
p l a nn i n g  i n  the 1 960 ' s  wa s adopted partl y d ue  to Br i ti s h  reg i ona l 
pol i cy and  part ly  due  to the  Trea s u ry ' s  refu s a l  to cou n tenance  the 
conti nued s u bs i d i s a ti on  of  Northern  I re l a nd ' s  tradi t i ona l  i nd u s tr i e s . 
(See the Ha l l Repo rt , " Economy of  Northern  I re l a nd :  Report of  Jo i nt  
Work i n g  CoITUTii ttee , Cmd 446 , Be l fa s t  1 96 2 ) . 
The res u l ts  of  th i s  economi c p l a nn i n g  a nd  reports  were embod i ed i n  the 
Wi l son  P l a n  of 1 96 5  ( Econom i c Deve l o pmen t  i n  Northern  I re l a n d  Cmd 479 , 
Be l fa s t  1 965 ) , wh i c h  was a n  a ctua l f i v e  year p l a n  to p u t  thro ug h the 
preced i ng  recoITUTienda t i ons , s pec i f i ca l l y  foc us i ng on  house  b u i l d i ng and  
job  c rea ti ng , re l ated  to  dev e l opment  of  new  towns  as  a l te rna t i v e  
eco nomi c growth centres to Bel fa s t ,  s uc h  a s  Antr im  a nd  Cra i gavon . I n  
a dd i t i on to th i s  a n  U l ster  Tran s p ort  Au tho r i ty wa s s e t  u p  t o  run  
nat i ona l road  fre i g h t  and trave l serv i ces  as  we l l  as  a Ra i l way Boa rd to 
co-ordi na te c ro s s - bo rder  ra i l tra v e l  wi t h  E i re .  I n  add i t i on , the 
Un i o n i s t  government  i n  Augu s t  1 964 , recog n i sed  the a u tonomo u s  Northern 
Commi ttee o f  the I r i s h  Congres s of  Trade Un i on s  and th i s  i n  turn 
ena b l ed  t he e s ta b l i s hme nt  of  an empl oyer- l abour-gove rnment  economi c 
adv i sory counc i l . 
O ' Ne i l l  a nd h i s governme nt  s ucceeded i n  comba t i ng  the  N IL P  by ba s i ca l l y  
co-opt i ng the i r  reformi s t  s tra teg i es . Wh i l st th i s  i nvo l ved ta k i ng away 
power from the  l oca l U n i on i st  mac h i ne v i a i nc rea s i ng centra l i sa ti on , . i t  
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d i d not  rea l l y  change  the po l i tica l  form of  the  state . Thi s n ew 
empha s i s wa s n ecessary to  ma i nta i n  Party u n i ty a s  bang i ng the  
secta r i a n  drum was n o  l onger eno ug h , o r  pract i c a l . O n  t he  othe r hand  
th i s  new stres s wa s n ot at  the  expense  of  sectari'a i sm .  No i n i t i a t i ve , 
whatsoever , wa s taken by O ' Ne i l l to refo rm the  pol i t i ca l  s up erstructure 
i e  the s tate  i t s e l f ,  or  to  i n tervene i n  commu n i ty rel a t i o n s , ( a pa rt 
from v i s i t i n g a few Nuns , etc ) . I n  e s s ence, econom i c expans i o n l eft 
the cha racter of  certa i n  s ta te apparatuses  i ntact . The  Un io n i s t  
government  mad e  many economi c change s , many o f  wh i c h  bro ught  s ome 
benef i t s  to s ome Cathol i c s . But  O ' Ne i l l  cou l d not  go beyond  what  he  
ha d done p l u s  s u perf i c i a l  po l i t i ca l  ov erture s . Al ready the  econom i c  
p l a nn i ng h a d  po l i t i c a l  consequences  i n  that it  had taken away powers 
of  l oca l Un i o n i s ts i n  terms o f  patronage  ov e r  j ob a l l oca t i on s , 
a l l ocati on of  res ources  etc . O ' Ne i l l  wa s not  i n  a pos i t i on po l i t i ca l l y  
t o  p u s h  for po l i t i ca l  reforms , a n d  th i s  a l l m'.'ed t h e  prob l ems wh i ch 
were to a ppear  l ater o n  i n  t he  1 960 1 s  a nd ear l y 1 9 70 ' s .  (Bew , G i b bon  
and  Patterso n : l 98 1  : 1 56 ) .  
O ' Ne i l l  a n d  h i s government were s t i l l f i rm U n ion i sts  a nd u pho l ders  o f  
pa rti t i on ,  s ee k i ng to ma inta i n  U n i o n i s t  ascenda ncy thro u g h  the 
tra nsforma t i on  of  the economy a t  the centre (i e Stormo nt } a nd chang i ng 
the  tone i f  not  the  na ture o f  governme nt . o � Ne i l l ism  wa s thus  
i n tended to  put  a new face o n  U l ster  U n i on i sm  w i thout  j eopard i s i ng i ts 
control  o f  the  No rth . But  by actua l ly  p l ann i ng to accommoda te the 
mo no po l y  and  l arge c a p i ta l  O ' Ne i l l a l i enated muc h petty bourgeo i s  
s u pport . As  can  b e  s ee i n  th i s peri od by the r i se  of  Pa i s l ey ,  w i th 
h i s j i bes  a t  " B i g  Hou se Un i on i sm " , who arti c u l ated the  vague ly  fe lt 
res entment  of  the  sma l l Protestant  s ho pkee per , merc ha n t , bu s i nes sman 
etc . ( Farre l l : 1 976 : ?. 34 } . O t Ne i l l ' s  unempl oyed pol i c i e s  are  a 
s pec i f i c  examp l e of how the Un i on i s t s  tr i ed to upda te i nd u s try and  
ma i n ta i n  Prote s ta nt domi nati on . 
-�n_e_�_l_o_X!llen�_o_l_i_c i e_s_ 
One of  the  ma i n  a i ms o f  the  Wi l s o n  P l a n  was to reduce  u nempl oyment i n  
U l s te r ,  runn i n g at  a round e l even  per cent  i n  t h e  ear ly  1 9 60 ' s ,  by 
attracti ng new modern i ndu s try to repl ace the sectors where  empl oymen t  
wa s contract i ng .  Pa rt  o f  the s tra tegy of  the Wi l son P l a n  was to 
create new growth centre s  away from the  Grea ter Be l fa s t  Reg i on to 
co unter the uneven deve l o pmen t wi th i n U l ster . The further away one 
trave l s from Be l fa st  i n  a wes te r l y  d i rect i on the  mo re ru ra l and l ess  
pros perou s  becomes the  s urro u nd i ng a rea . 
The target  s et  i n  th e W i l s o n  P l a n  wa s to crea te 30 , 000  jobs  i n  the 
ma nufactur i ng sector , 5 , 000 i n  cons truct ion  and 30 , 000 i n  the serv i ce 
i nd u s tri e s . (Probert : l 9 78 : 82 J . Go vernmen t ' s ro l e i n  the  c rea ti on of  
the se  jobs  was vast , v ia  the increa sed ro l e o f  pl a nn i ng a n  economi c 
i n fra s tructure and  d i rec t  a s s i s tance . For i n s tance , i n  1 96 1  
government  s ponsored emp l oyed s onie twenty-fi ve  per cent  o f  a l l 
ma nufactur i ng emp l oyees , b u t  1 9 7 2  the corres pond i ng fi g u re was forty­
fou r  po i nt n i n e  per  cent . However , des p i te these  mea s ures  emp l oyment  
i n  U l s ter ' s  ma nufactu r i n g  indu stry cont i nued t o  dec l i ne , from 
206 , 000 in 1 950  to 1 66 , 000 in 1 9 73 . The governmen t d id c reate 29 , 000  
jobs  in  manufacturing  by 1 970  but  i. t was hard l y  enough  to repl ace the 
amount  that were l o st . (B uc k l and : l 98 1  : 1 1 3} .  It was the tremendous  
expan s i on  of  empl oyment  i.n the  s erv i ve  s ecto r  tha t he l ped offs et  th i s  
decl i ne .  (Probe rt : 1 9 78 : 69 - 70 J . 
There i s  some d i sagreement u pon  the equ i ty o f  th i s  d i rec t government 
emp l oyment  po l i cy .  Ros e  repo rts a n  att i tude s u rvey conducted i n  1 968 , 
i n  wh i ch s i xty- n i ne pe r ce n t  o f  pub l i c  empl oyee s  i n terv iewed were 
Prote s tant , whereas they made u p  a bout  s i xty- s tx per  c en t  of the  
po pu l a ti on . Th i s  he s ugges ts i nd i c a ted  tha t t�ere wa s no g reat  
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aggregate d i sc r im i na t ion s  i n  pub l i c  empl oyment . ( Ros e : 1 97 1 : 297 ) . 
Th i s  a rgument i s  a l s o  oa c ked by a uthors l i ke the economi st  S impson , 
who adds that  o f  a l l the  empl oyment pro jects s et  u p  o r  a i ded  by the 
state , s i xty- s i x  per cent wer e  l oca ted i n  th e Greater  Be l fa s t  reg i on ,  
wh i ch co nta i ned s i xty- e i ght  per cent o f  the unempl oyment ;  b u t  th i rty­
three per cent  were l oca ted  Wes t  of t he  R i ver  Ba nn ( i e  t h e  Catho l i c  
pa rt  o f  U l s ter } wh i c h  conta i ned th i rty- two per  cent  o f  the  u nemp l oyed . 
He s uggests  that  th i s  i nd i c ates  t ha t  Catho l i cs were ga i n i ng fa i r  
acce s s  to th e new j o b s  be i n g  c reated . ( S irnps on : l 983 : 1 04 ) . 
On the other  hand , there i s  much e v i dence to s ug ge s t  o th erwi s e . 
Wr i g ht  po i nts  out tha t o f  a l l the new j obs crea ted oetween  1 963 and  
1 69 1 , seventy-one per  cent were l oc ated within the Grea ter Be l fa st  
Reg i on ,  a n  a rea whi ch. conta in ed s eventy-f i ve  p er  c e nt  of a l l U l s ter ' s  
Protes ta nts . (Wr i.ght : l 97 3 : 268 } . Thus i t  seems tha t 0 1 Ne i l 1  was 
tyr i n g  to combat  the poten t ia l pol it i c a l  d isru ption  cau sed by the  
res tructur i ng of th e economy by mak i ng s ure mo s t  j o5s  wen t  to the  
Prote s ta n t  work i ng c l a s s . Th i s i s  b ac ked u p  by the New town s tra tegy 
where a l l new towns bar one were l oca ted east  of the Ban n , a nd mos t  
o f  them were i n  Protestant  U l ste r ,  not mo re than  twenty- th i rty mi l es 
from Be l fas t . I n  add i.t i.on  ma ny of the se  new job s  we re created 
with i n trad i t i ona l  i nd u s tr i e s , j u s t  i ncreased s pec i a l i s a t i o n , h e l p i ng 
the s ki l l ed Prote sta n t  wor ke r . Leav i ng Catho l i. c s  to enter  a s  
u n s k i l l ed  l abourers i. n con s truct i on ,  o r  fo r t h e  i n c reas i ng amount  of 
ed uca ted Catho l i c s ,  j ob s  w i t h i n the s e rv i. ce  i ndu str i es . ( Probert : 
1 9 78 : 70 ) . 
Thu s , wh i l e  the O ' Ne i l l  admi n i stra t i on cou l d a rgue that the  o r i g i na l  
eco nomi c i mba l a nce  between the  e a s t  and  west  P rote s tant  a nd Ca tho l i c s  
wa s none o f  the i r do i ng , the i r dev e l opment pol i c i e s  d id l ittl e to 
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remedy the s i tua tion . I t  s e ems that they we re c l e ar l y  u sed to ma i n-
ta i n  work i ng c l a s s  l oya l ty to the Un i on i s ts . (Farre l l : 1 97 6 : 2 32 } ; 
O ' Dowd �t a l  : 1 980 : 56 ) . 
Howeve r ,  d es p i te some d i s pu te a bo u t  the  equity o f  t h e  Un i on i st  
emp l oyme n t  po l i c ie s  (and the  ev i dence  does  s eem to s ugge s t  th a t  they 
we re used  to the  benefi ts o f  the  Pro te s tants } the i mportant  th i ng i s  
tha t a ga i n  i t  i s  a nother , mo re s pec i fi c , e xamp l e o f  how the l oc a l  
Un i on i sts  were l oo s i n g  contro l  t o  the  centre . The i nc reas i ng contro l s 
over  the a l l ocat ion  of  ma ny top  j ob s  o f  th e centre mea nt  a wea ken i ng 
of the  c a nva s s i n g  techn i qu e  of  j ob s  a l l ocat i o n  at the  l o ca l l eve l , 
thu s  reduc i ng the ab i l tty o f  t he l oc a l  U n ion i s t e l i te to d i s tr i b u te 
pa tronage  and  re i nfo rce  the i r  economtc dominance  amongst  the i r own 
exc l u s i ve l y  P rotesta nt c l i q u e . (O ' Dowd �t__<0__ : 1 980 : 1 9 } . Th 1�s i s  not  
to  overstate thei r l oss  of  eco nomi c statu s , fo r a s  ha s been  s ee n  
many j o b s  sti l l wen t  to P rotesta n ts . Wha t a l i ena ted ma ny m i d d l e­
c l a s s  Protesta n ts wa s l os s  o f  much  po l i ti c a l  power a nd freedom to 
ma noeu vre , s eeming l y  a t  toe . oenef i t of tne  Ca tho l i c s , though  t h i s  i n  
rea l i ty s eemed of o n l y a marg ina l benef i t .  B u t  i t  i s  the symbo l i c  
l o s s  wh i c h  s eems important (}fright : l 97 3 1  a s  wel l a s  the  cont i n u i ng 
centra l is at ion  proce s s , erod i ng Ora nge  c l i en ta l i sm a nd t he  h i g h l y  
decentra l i s ed l oca l  a uthority system u po n  wh i c h  l oca l Un i o n i s t  power 
wa s ou i l t .  (O ' Dowd �t_}.-�: 1 980 : 9 7 } . 
Conc l u s i on 
I t  was  a t  t he  l oca l  l eve l  rather tha n a t  the centra l l ev e l  that  
Prote s ta nt/Unfon i st so l i d a r i ty wa s mo s t  powe rfu l l y  re i n forced , 
through  a c l o s e  a l l i a nce o f  l oca l  Protesta nt  c a p i t a l , the  U n i on i s t  
const i tuency a s soc i a t i o n s , l oca l gover nmen t  and  t h e  O ra n g e  Order . 
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Centra l  g overnment l ocated a t  Sto rmont  o r i g i n a l l y  was concerned wi th 
co-ord i nati ng a l l U n i on i st pol i t i ca l  act i v i ty and a rt i c u l a t i n g  the 
arg uments for  ma i nta i n i ng the  Un i on . I t  wa s pr i ma r i l y  du r i n g  the 1 9 50 1 s  
a nd 1 960 1 s  that  maj o r  struc tura l  cha nges  occu rred i n  the  U l ster  economy , 
and t he  b roader  Angl o-Ir i sh  framewo r k  wh i ch part ly began  to u nderm i ne  
the l og i c  of  pa rt i t i o n  but  more importa nt l y  the  consonance  of i nteres ts  
upon  wh i ch the  Un i on i st  sta te a nd Party wa s ca s ed . 
W i t h  the  penetrat i on  o f  fore i gn c a p i ta l  and  the  n ec es s i ty of  econom i c 
p l a n n i n g i n  t he  post-wa r  cap i ta l i s t s ta te , the  " No rt h "  needed to b e  
rat i ona l i s ed ( Be l l : 1 9 7 7 : 24 } . T h i s wa s refl ected i n  O ' Ne i l l  i sm .  H i s  
po l i c i es were des i gned to br i ng about  t he new " technocrat i c " U n i on i sm ,  
ab l e to cope  wi th the probl ems of organ i s ing  a comp l ex i nd u s tr i a l i s ed 
modern s ta te . The  l eaders h i p o f  the  U n i o n i st  reg ime wa s forced by the 
need to restructure c a p i ta l  and prov i de empl oyment for the i r  wo rk i ng  
c l a s s  s u pporters to i ntervene i n  the  eco nomy , wor k  ou t centra l  p l a n s  
a nd  take  mu ch  eco nomi c power  out  of  t he h a nd s  o f  l oca l  Un ion i s ts  a nd 
centra l i s e  that  power . On the other  ha nd tnese type s  of po l i c i es under­
mi nded the  l oc a l  Un i on i st powe r  s tructures  and took away l oc a l  autonomy 
over  a l l ocat ion  and  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  economi c resources . A mos t  obv i ou s  
exampl e was t he Breakdown o f  the l oc a l  patronage  sys tem ; l oc a l  Un i on i s t  
no  l onger  h a d  s uch  co ntrol  a s  prev i ou s l y  o v e r  econom i c  resou rces . Th i s  
a l i enta ted mu ch  m i dd l e -c l a s s  s u pport i n  the country ,  a s  i t  was they who 
were  l o s i ng power to centra l  government and economi c p l anners , as agents  
of  i n ternati ona l  ca p ita l . ( P robert : l 97 8 : 7 5 } . 
Tec hnocra t i c  Un i on i sm a s su red a no n - sectar i an  front , with  O ' Ne i l l  
ho pe i ng that a s u c c e s s f u l  eco nomi c po l i cy wou l d  a l s o  a ttract  Ca tho l i c  
e l ectora l  s u ppo rt .  I f  th i s  wa s the  ca s e , a s  many P rotestants  fea red 
i t  wa s ,  then the U n io n i s t  Pa rty wo u l d no l onger  Eie exc l u s i_v e l y  
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Protes ta nt ,  or  ' the i r '  Party ,  a change  that  ma ny Orangemen wou l d  not 
we l come . (Ros e : l 9 7 1 : 99 } . However , O ' Ne i l l rea l i s ed th i s  a nd was not 
prepa red to go a l l ou t for Catho l i c  s u pport , a l l ow i ng  ma ny economi c 
po l i c i es to be co -opted for the benefi t of  the  Protestant  work i ng  
cl as s , thus  ma i nta i n i ng  the i r  es s en t i a l  s u ppo rt . An  exampl e o f  t h i s 
can  be  s een i n  U n i on i st j o b  c rea t i on  p roj ects . As Smyth s ta te s : 
" t he b urea ucra t i c  rat iona l i ty of  the  p l anners  c ame i nto confl i ct wi th  
the po 1 i t i  c a  1 real i ty of  the Sto rmo nt sta te 1 1 • ( Smyth : 1 980 : 48 ) .  
Th i s  was to create  prob l ems for the Un i on i s t  Party l a ter o n . No t 
o n l y  had i nc rea sed  economi c i n terventi o n  oy the Un i o n i st reg ime  
a l ienated i ts l ocal  members h ip v ia  l o s s  of  the  l a tters  power , but  
the  Pa rty was s t i l l  ma i nta i n i ng i ts s ectari a n  pos it i o n  - it  had  to 
en s u re P rotestant  workin g  c l a s s  s u pport  i n  fac e of the  N I LP c ha l l enge . 
To u s e  the  i nc rea s i ng  amount  o f  resources  i t  had a t  i ts d i s po s a l  
l a rge l y t o  t he exc l u s i on o f  Ca tho l i c s  wa s a dangero u s  po l i cy o n  the 
part of  the  Un i on i st reg i me . The U n i on i s t  gov ernment had l i tt l e 
l a t i tude  for economi c maneouvre . I t  h ad to co nt i n ue i ts i n tervent­
io n i s t  a nd cen tra l i s i n g  course , yet a t  the s ame t i me was commi tted to 
the entrenched po l i t i c s of s ecta r i a n i sm to e ns u re cont i n ued  Protestant  
wo rki ng  c l a s s  s u ppo rt , whi c h  was  es s enti a l  to  rema i n  po l i t i ca l l y  
dom i nant , " Un i o n i sm wa s c a u g ht i n  a n  i nexorab l e  v i ce " . ( Smyth : l 980 : 
50 ) .  
Th i s  i s  not  to s ugge s t  that Stormont ' s  econom i c po l i c i es caused  the 
Pa rty to s p l i t ,  but it d i d  c reate  d i v i s i on ;  s pe c i fi ca l l y  between  the 
i nc rea s i ng l y  c entra l i s ed l eaders h i p and the l oca l  Party .  As  a resu l t 
of the  tra n s fo rmat i o n  o f  c a p i ta l  i n  U l ste r , t he  fo rmer ga i ned  power , 
wh i l st the  l atter  wa s l o s i ng i t .  Stormo nt ' s  accommodat i on  of fore i gn  
c ap i ta l  meant  that t he g rowth  s ectors  in  U l ster ' s  economy , were  no l o nger  
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owned  by U l s te r  cap i ta l no r neces s a r 1 l y  contro l l ed by l oca l  
bou rgeoi s i e . Sto rmont ' s  econom i c po l i c i e s  may have  he l ped t h e  
Protestan t wor k i ng c l a s s  (ma rg i n a l l y ! ) b ut  the  s ame cou l d h a rd l y  be  
s a i d  for the  U n i on i s t  m i dd l e - c l ass . Eve n  trad i t i o na l  i n d u str i e s  l i ke 
s h i pbui l d i n g  were be i ng ta ken  over  by the Br i t i s h  government . Th i s  
s i tua t i on  c reated a sma l l but  g rowi ng  m i dd l e-c l a s s  who se i ncomes a nd 
status  were not re l a ted to the o l d U n i o n i s t  o l i g arcy . They were 
appo i nted  e i ther  by centra l government or d i rectors o f  fore i g n  c a p i t a l , 
more on  the  ba s i s  of  s ki l l  a nd p rofes s i ona l competan cy ( the fact  that 
there were more Protes tant  s ki l l ed and profe � s i ona l workers , than  
there were Cat ho l i c ,  i s  bes ide the point } .  These  peop l e d i d  not  have  
to  j o i n  the Orange  Order to  g et to  know l oca l b u s i n e s smen , t he i r  
l i v i hoods  d i d not depend o n  i t .  ( Probert : l 978 : 7 5 ) . 
Wha t  O ' Ne i l l ' s  economi. c  po l i c i es d i d  wa s expo s e  co ntrad i ct i o ns between  
l o ca l  U n i on i st i nterests a nd the . i nteres ts o f  l arg er  c a p i t a l  a s  
repres ented by the U n i o n i sts  at Sto rmo nt . The U n i o n i sts  a t  Stormont  
were  forced to  bra i ns to rm the  econom i c n ature of  U l s ter , yet  the i r 
power wa s based  u pon tHe  s u pport of a l l Protestant s . When  t he i r  
econom i c po l i c i e s  mi l i tated a g a i n s t  the  i nterests  and  power o f  l oca l  
m idd l e-c l a s s  U n i on i sts , the ba s i c  rea so n for the  U n i on i st state  
pa rt ly  c o l l a ps ed . I f  a Un i on i st  Party in control  of  Sto rmo n t  was no t 
go i ng to protect l oc a l  U n i on i st econom i c  i nterests  wha t  wa s the  po i nt 
of cont i nu i ng to s u ppo rt the  U n i on i s t  Party a s  i t  s tood? The e xpos u re 
of t h i s . contrad i c t i o n  wa s hard l y  eno u g h  to s pl i t t he  Party ,  b ut  i t  d i d  
create ten s i ons  a nd create cond i t i o n s  that wou l d muc h  fac i l i tate  the 
r i s e  of  Pa i s l ey and Cra i g , both of whom had much petty-bourgeo i s  
s u pport and  too k i ndependent s tands  aga i ns t  the Br i t i s h  government 
and  the  r i s e  o f fo re i gn ca p i ta l . (Harb i nson : l 9 7 3 : 74 o r  Protes tant 
Te l egraph  J u l y  1 97 7 ] . 
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The U n i on i st Party a t  the  l oca l l ev e l  d i d  not  face  the i r  f i rst  
cha l l enge  from C i v i l R i g ht s  Marchers , but ra ther from eco nomi c 
p l a nners  a nd  fore ign  cap ita l , who took away the i r power over  l a nd 
u s e , a l l oca t i o n  of s ome j o b s  and ho u s i ng . (O ' Dm'ld !:_t_� : l 980 : 42 ) . 
At the  h e i ght  of  the i nterna l c r i s i s  i n  U n i o n i sm between 1 96 5  and  1 9 7 3 , 
it wa s s i gn i f i cant  that  the o n l y  reso l u t i o n  on  the Party ' s  
Co nference agenda oppos ing the  l eaders h i p  wa s concerned  wi th  the  
procedures  a nd effec ts  of p l a nn i ng d i recti ves . (Ha rb i n s o n : l 9 7 3 : 58 ) . 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOC I AL POL IC I ES 
4 1  
As a n  i ntegra l  part of  the  U n i ted  Ki ngdom Northern I reland  cou l d not 
rema i n i mperv i ou s  to wha t  was  ha ppen i n g  i n  po st-war B r i ta i n .  There 
ha d been e l ected  a n ew reformi st  Labour gove rnme nt to We s tmi nster  
commi tted to  setti ng  up  a Wel fare Sta te , wi th  free  ( i e  s oc i a l i s ed ) 
med i ca l  c are , secondary edu cati o n  fo r a l l , l a rge  p ub l i c  hou s i ng 
pro j ects , o l d age  a n d  s i cknes s pens i on s , u nemp l oyment benefi t ,  c h i l d  
and  moth e r  sup port e tc . Northern I re l a nd ' s  U n ion i s t  government  a t  
Stormont , h a d  no  choi ce bu t t o  i mp l ement  the se  reforms . Des pi te the 
fac t  tha t many Un ion i sts  d i s l i ked wha t to them wa s the th i n end of  the  
wedge  of  soc ia l i sm they ha d to accept  these  po l i c i e s , ba sed  u pon the  
pr i nc i p l e  o f  par i ty .  The U l ster  peopl e pay tne same taxes  a s  the  
Bri ti sh , therefore they rec e i ve the s ame serv i. ces a s  the  res t  o f  the 
Bri ti s h  peopl e .  The probl em w ith  the s e  reforms wa s that  they were 
d i ffi cu l t to u s e  d i s c rimi nate l y ,  i e ,  for t he benef i ts of Prote s ta n ts 
and  exc l u s ion o f  Catho l i cs . On  the  whol e a l a rg e  proportion  o f  the 
Catho l i c  popu l at i on  as wel l as many P rote sta n ts d i d  benefi t from 
we l fa re a nd edu cat i o n  refo rm s . 
Howeve r ,  the  overa 1 1  effec t o f  these  po l  i d e s  wa s 11impercept i b l y  a t  
f i r st , to unde rm i ne t h e  po l i t i c a l  s tructure s  o f  the U n i. o n i s t  State a nd 
i t s  rel a H o ns h i p  to the re s t  of the  U n i ted Ki ngdom " .  ( O ' Dowd et  a l : 
1 980 : 203 ) .  D i rect  po l i c i e s  s ent  from We stm i n s ter  i nc rea s i ng l y  
demoted the ro l e  of  Stormo n t  to tha t  o f  a n  agent  o f  B r i t i s h  soci a l  
democracy , whi l s t i nc rea s i n g l y  ta k i n g  power over  we l fa re , h ea l th and  
educat i on  away from the l oc a l  a u tho r i t i es , and  a t  the  s ame t i me 
i nc rea s i ng l y  i ntegra ti ng  Catho l i. c s i n to the  State ' s  da i l y  act i v i ty .  
Th i s  type of  po l i cy a g a i n  p ut  fu rth er s tra i n s  u pon the  u n i ty o f  the 
Pa rty by fu rth er ero s i on of l oca l power , bre a k i ng down O range  
c l i ental i sm and  the l oca l U n i on i st oversee i n g  of  Cathol i c  segregati on . 
Thi s b re akdown o f  the l og i c  o f  the  Un i o n i st Party ' s ex i s tence  wa s 
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further execerbated by oppos i t i on to Catho l i c  i n tegrat i on  by 
trad i t i ona l  a nt i -Cathol i c  Un i on i sts  a nd those  who were a nt i - s o c i a l i s t .  
( Da rby : l 9 77 ; 86 ) . Th i s  c ha pter w i l l  exam i ne the  s pec i f i c  effect  of  
some o f  these soc i a l  po l ic i e s  and  how they c rea ted fu rther s tra i ns 
wi th i n U n i on i sm .  
We l fa re Po l i c i e s  
I n  1 946 ,  the  S tormont  and We s tmin s ter  governments l ay down pari ty of  
serv i ces  a n d  taxati o n  a s  t he  g u i d i n g  p r i nc i p l e of  fi nanc i a l  rel a t i ons  
between Northern I re l and  a nd Great  Br i ta i n .  Th i s  comm i tted the  
Un i on i s t  government  to i mp l ement  and o rgan i se a ny nat i ona l we l fare 
po l i c i es that We stmi nster  i n troduced . In  re tu rn for t h i s benefi t of 
be i ng Br i t i s h  and tflerefore rece i v i ng Bri ti sh  s erv 1 ce s , the  peopl e of  
U l s ter  were s u bj ec t  to  a l l Bri ti s h  taxe s . In fact , thi s worked o u t  
we l l  for Northern Ire l and  a s  they . rece i ved g reater benef i ts from 
Bri t i s h  Soc i a l  Servi c e s  tha n they cou l d ever have hoped  for i f  they 
were rel yi n g  tota l ly  upon  thei. r  own tax base . I t  wa s th.ro u g h  l oca l  
government  tha t  the  pr ime. respon s i bi l  i. ty for  the i.mp l  ementat i o n  of  
we l fare po l icies  l ay .  In 1 945 , l oc a l  g overnment  i n  U l s ter  ra i sed 
forty- two per cent of  i ts own revenue  to pay for  a l l the  s e rv i ces  i t  
provided , yet by 1 960 thts ftgure s tood a t  twenty-five per  cent . 
(O ' Dowd et  a l  : 1 980 : 1 03 ) .  Aga i n ,  thi s i s  a c a s e  o f  dec l i n i ng l oca l 
a utonomy v i z-a-vtz Westminste r ,  and  th e i ncrea� ing power of  Stormont  
to  a l l ocate fu nds . The Un ion i sts  mi ght  enjoy the benefi. ts of  be i ng 
Briti s h , b ut  tt a l so meant  tha t  if the Br i ti's h were payi ng  mos t  of  
the expenses t hey wou l d hav e  a g rea ter s ay on where a nd how t he  money 
was spent . I t  wa s not  neces sar i l y  a question of  the l oca l  Un i on i s ts 
loos i n g power , b ut  no t  gain ing any .  I t  was the centra l s ta te that  wa s 
in crea s i ng l y  ma klng  d ec i s i ons affect i ng the everyday 1 Ue of  i ts 
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c i t i zens . Wi t h  the creation o f  a Nat i onal  Hea l th  Serv i c e , u nemp l oyment 
benefi ts etc , a whol e n ew era of  s ta te i n tervention  a nd s ta te power 
ha d been c reated , a devel opment  U n i on i s ts had l i tt l e control over . 
Th ey were forced to g ive  hea l th ,  u nemp l oyment ,  s i c kne s s  and  o l d age 
benefi ts to Protesta n t  and  Catho l i c  a l i ke ,  the p ower concern i n g  who 
shou l d  recei ve wha t wa s out  of the hands  o f  l oc a l  Un i o ni s ts ,  i t  had 
been dec i ded a t  Westmi n s ter . The l oca l s tate was be i ng  de l oca l i sed , 
and  the contrad i cti ons  th i s c rea ted fo r l oca l U n i on i st Party control 
and u n i ty we re to become apparent when  the  u l t imate author i ty of 
Wes tmi ns ter was i ncrea s i ng l y  exerci sed . 
Thi s process  o f  b i nding  and  centra l i sa tton was s pecif i. e d  i n  va ri ous  
agreements  throughout  the  l ate 1 940 ' s .  I n  1 948 , the Unemp l oyment  
F u nd s  of  Bri ta i'n and  Northern Irel a n d  were v irtua l ly  ama l gama ted . I n  
effect ,  thi s made the Westmi n s te r  government  pay for t h e  rap i d l y  
expand i ng  bene f i ts for u nempl oymen t ,  s icknes s , matern i ty ,  wi dowhood , 
orphanhood , retiremen t  a nd death .  The Soc i.'a l  Serv ices  Ag reements of 
1 949  made Br i tai n pay most of  the c os ts of  Nationa l Ass i stance  
prog rammes ,  famil y a l l owances , non-contr i fiutory pen s i ons and  the  new 
Na t i ona l  Hea l th_ Serv ice . (Bu c k l a nd : l 981 : 86-8 7 l .  
The consequent  expans ion  and  improvement of  �erv tces was not  wi t hout  
d i ffi c u l t i e s . The U n i on i sts were a s  determined a s  pos s i b l e ,  to 
ma i nta in  the Protestant  na ture of  U l ster . The best  examp l e of thi s i s  
the Ma ter hos p i ta l  a ffa i r .  The Ma ter wa s a Ca thol i c  hos p i ta l  wh i c h 
wanted to reta fn  its Ca tho l i c i denti ty by u s i n g  Nuns a s  a i des  a nd  
reta i n i ng  i ts Ca tho l tc teachi ng fac i l i ty .  However , the M i n t s.ter ,of 
Hea l th i n  U l s ter i n  1 948 , Wi l l i am Gran t ,  refused to tnco rporate the 
Ma ter i nto the  Nat iona l  Hea l th Serv i ce as a Catho l i c  hos p i ta l , as  i t  
wou l d  have been  e l ectora l l y  very unpopu l ar ,  des p ite  the fact that i n  
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Bri ta i n  Ca tho l i c  hos p i ta l s were i ncorpora ted i nto the s ta t2 serv i c e .  
Con sequentl y ,  the Mate r had  t o  opera te i ndependentl y a nd l o s t  much  
s ta te a i d .  Terrence O ' Ne i l l , when he became Prime M i n s ter , tr i ed to 
i ncorporate the  Mate r ,  however , i t  wa s aga i n  dropped d ue  to ba ckben ch 
oppos i ti on ,  a n d  the i s sue  was n ot  res o l ved u nti l d i rect  ru l e i n  1 9 73 . 
(Wa l l ace : 1 970 : 1 1 2- 1 1 5 J . Thu s ,  d e sp i te the pr i nc ip l e of  par i ty ,  the  
Un i on i sts  were prepa red to change  some a s pects  of Bri ta i n ' s  po l i c i es 
to p l acate the hardl i ne s . The Ma ter a ffa i r  g i ves some i nd i ca t i on  on 
how many U n i o n i s ts fe l t abo u t  Catho l i c s  rece i v i ng soc i a l  benef i ts  from 
the i r  governme nt . Neverthe l e s s , No rthern Ire l and  wa s fu l l y i ntegrated 
i n to the He l fa re State . The  Un to n i s t  Party were not  s l ow i n  ta k i ng 
fu l l  c red i t for the res u l t i ng benefi t s  desrite the fact  tha t  many 
Un i on i sts  rese nted the b enefi ts  received by Catho l i cs a nd the i ncrea sed  
state i n terven t i on , resu l t i n g  i n  a dec l i ne of  l oca l power . I n i t i a l l y ,  
We l fa re l eg i s l at i on d id he l p  to s trengthen the Union i st � P�rty ' s  hand 
and  re i n force pa rti t i on ,  6y ma i nta i n i ng the g ap  i n  l iv i n g  s ta ndards 
between U l s ter a nd t he fri s h  Rep ub l ic . I t  made many Cathol i cs l e s s  
de term i n ed i n  thei r wi l l ingne s s  to u n i te wi t h  the so u th .  A n  i nd i ca t i o n  
of th i s  may be  s een  by  the fa i l u re o f  t he IRA border c ampa i g n  between  
1 956-62 . ( P ro bert : 1 978 : 77 J .  
Wh i l s t  t he Catho l i c  popu l ation  ha d rej ected u n i f i ca t i on  throug h  
v i o l ence ; turn i n g  i n stead to Nat iona l i st and  Repub l ican  po l i t i ca l  
Pa rti e s , l i ttl e wa s done  to incorporate Ca tho l ics  i nto t he mac h i nery 
of the state . In  fac t  the s ta te ' s  one-s i ded natu re became even more 
pronou nced a s  Northern Ire l a nd  fa i l ed to fo l l ow Br i ta i n i n  
i mp l ement i ng  o ne  man , o ne  vote a nd abo l i s hi ng property qua l i f i ca ti ons  
for vo ti ng a nd U n i.versi ty seats . Da rby , Ros e  and  o thers a rg ue  that 
wi th the adven t of  Wel fare reforms , the Cathol i c  popu l at i on wou l d  
soon  wa nt  to have a s ay tn the government which. i ncrea s i n g l y  affects 
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the i r l i ve s . (Darby : l 976 : 86 ) . Befo re the war commu n i t i e s  were l a rge l y  
i ns u l a r , both Protes ta nt a n d  Cathol i c ,  w i t h  peopl e re ly i n g  heav i l y  o n  
the Church , fri e nds a nd re l a t i ves  for mo st needs . W i th We l far i sm th i s  
l arge l y  changed , Cathol i cs c o u l d no l o nge r i gnore government  a s  they 
came i nto da i l y c onta c t  wi th i t  whether  a t  the  u nemp l oyment  exchange , 
hos p i tal  etc . 
Howeve r ,  the U n i on i s t  Pa rty was not u s i ng We l fa ri sm i n  a l i bera l ­
democra t i c  form . A l o t of  the a l l oca tion  of re source s was o u t  o f  
l oca l  gove rnment  a nd Stormo nt ' s  hands , a n d  p u t  i n  the  ha nds  o f  
We s tmi ns ter and  ' rat i onal ' b u rea ucra ts ; b u t  even t h i s was res i s ted by 
bac k- bend Un i on i s ts i n  Sto rmont . I n  1 9 5 7 , We s tmi n s ter  i n trodu ced a 
B i l l  for Ch i l d  Suppo rt g iv i ng a sma l l s um for the f i rs t  chi l d ,  yet 
l a rger  s ums  of money for eac h s u b sequent  c hi l d .  When th i s B i l l  was 
sen t  to Stormo nt  to be  pa s sed , bac k-benders tr i ed to amend i t  wi th 
the effect  that the fi r s t  c h i l d  wou l d  receive the l a rger amount  of 
s u pport , a nd  s ubsequent  c h i l dren l es s e r  amou nts . Th i s ,  of cou rse , 
wou l d d i s crimi na te aga i ns t  t he  l a rge r  Ca thol i c  fam i l i es .  The M i n i s ter 
of Hea l th howeve r ,  was u na b l e to accept t h i s , ma i n l y  bec a u se o f  
pres s u re from Wes tmi n s ter  bu reaucrat s  a n d  po l i ticans , a nd  t h e  B i l l  
wa s forced through  u nc hanged . (Ha rb i nson : l 9 73 } . Thi s i s  another  
examp l e of  l oc a l  U n ion i sts u s i ng Wel fa re spec i fi c a l l y  tt>  the benefi ts 
of P rote s tants , and aga i n  they we re thwa rted by the b u reaucrats  and  
Wes tmi ns ter . 
Wha t  i s  i mportant  to understa nd i s  tha t much power i n  dec i s i on ma ki ng  
and  the a l l ocati on of  resou rce s  wa s decentra l i s ed i n  Northern I re l and . 
Loca l governme nt was the k ey to the da i l y  admi n i stra t i on of  soc i ety 
even i n  We l fare State , wi th county boards re s pon s i b l e  for hea l th and 
we l fa re . Thi s gave them muc h l eeway i n  ta k i na  soc i a l  democra t i c 
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po l i c i es a s  exempl i f i ed by We l fa r i sm , a nd adapt i ng  them to the i r 
i nd i genous  sectar i a n  pract i c e s . ( See  Devl i n  1 96 9  for d i scr i mi nat i on 
i n  qua l i fyi ng  for we l fa re paymen ts dur i ng the l 9 50 1 s } . I ncrea s i ng ly , 
l oca l counci l s  fo und th i s  power ta ken away from them , cau s i ng a 
d i s ru pt i on between  the Party l eadersh i p  and P arty a t  l arge . At  the 
same t ime , the We l fa re Sta te redu ced the  pre ssure  to emi g ra te a nd 
s h i e l ded ma ny Catho l i c s  from the pr i va t i on of  the sys tem wh i ch he l ped 
con t r i b ute to mo re Ca thol i c s  want i ng to work  wi th i n  the system . 
( P robert : l 978 : 1 1 4 ) . 
Educa ti on  
The  But l er  Educa t i on Acts , pa ssed  i n  Br i ta i n  i n  1 944 , were 
s ub sequen t ly  reprodu ced in t he  No rthern I r i s h  Edu cat i on  Act of 1 947 . 
Th i s  b road l y  fo l l owed the B r i t i s h  mode l s i n  e s tab l i s h i ng a tri -parti te 
sys tem of educati on (thoug h on a cont i n u ed Cathol i c -Prote sta nt  ba s i s ) 
p l u s  prov idi ng .free h i g her  educa t i o n  for tho s e  who deemed 1 a b l e 1 • 
Th i s  l ed to a fundamenta l change i n  the s oc ia l  pro fi l e  o f  the Ca thol i c  
po pu l a ti on ,  by greatl y i ncreas i ng the  n umber o f  young peop l e who went 
on  to hi gher  educati on . B y  1 960 l ower midd l e - c l a s s  a nd work i n g  c l a s s  
Ca tho l i c s found  i n  po s s i bl e t o  obta i n h i g her  educa ti o n  through  the 
new system of gra nts a nd a l l owances , a s  a mea n s  of i ndependent  s uppo rt . 
I n  educa t i on  the  pro b l em o f d i scr im i nati on  wa s s ki rted i n  that 
Prote s ta nts  went  to fu l l y  ma i nta i ned s tate s c hoo l s to wh i ch the s tate 
co n tr i bu ted s ixty-five per  cent  of the cost fo r bu i l d i ng and  runn i ng ,  
p l u s  free items s uch  a s  tra ns port , mea l s ,  mi l k  etc . ( Wa l l ace : 1 9 7 1 : 
1 0 7 ) . Aga i n th i s  worked fo r the benef i t  o f  the Prote s ta nts , a nd 
confirmed the noti on of  a ' Prote s ta nt  State for a Protestant  peopl e '  
con tri bu t i ng to the i deo l og i ca l  u n ity of  the  U n i on ist  c l a s s  a l l i ance . 
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At the same t i me a co ntrad i ctory p rocess  was cont i nu i ng , i e  the  
emergence of a new educated profes s i ona l  mi dd l e -c l a s s  who had  gone to  
Un i vers i ty ,  a ga i n  got  away from the i nfl u ence of  the c h u rch  and  had 
been affected by the s tate and i ts a p paratu ses . I ncrea s i ng l y  there 
were Catho l i c s  who wou l d no  l on ger  accept  the  pol i t i ca l  a nd  to some 
exten t  economi c anoma l i es of No rthern I rel and . 
At the same t ime  there wa s a growi ng contrad i ct i o n  between th e 
admi n i s tra t i on of edu cati on  and  the  f i nanc i ng  o f  i t .  By the mi d-
1 960 ' s ,  educat i on accounted for forty per cent  of tota l l oca l  
a u thori ty expend i ture wh i l s t the  Mi n i stry of  Educati o n  prov i ded 
seventy-five  per ce n t  of a l l educat i o n  cos ts . " Loca l government  wa s 
caught  i n  a doub l e trap . Autonomy wa s u ndermi ned , a s  l oc a l  taxat i o n  
dec l i ne d , a nd fu rther wea kened by t he  fact that  expendi ture of  the 
dwi nd l i ng l oca l revenue  was i nc reas i ng l y  d i rec ted by Stormont  
e s pec i a l ly  i n  educa tion " . ( O ' Dowd e t  a l : l 9 80 : 1 04 - 1 05 ) . Once more 
l oca l U n i on i sts  were l oos i ng  power to the cen tre v i a  the demands  of a 
modern i nd u stri a l  State . 
Hou s i ng 
The quest ion  of hou s i ng i n  No rthern I re l and was , a nd  s t i l l  i s , 
de l i ca te , e s pec i a l l y  wi th c arefu l l y  d rawn e l ectora l  boundar i e s  to 
fac i l i ta te gerryma nderi ng that  e x i sted u n ti l the  earl y 1 9 70 ' s .  The 
wrong  s i t i ng a nd a l l ocat i o n  o f  hou s i n g  i n  a c i ty s u ch a s  Londonderry 
cou l d have  c a u sed a change  i n  the po l i t i ca l  control of  the c i ty from 
U n i on i s t  to N at i o na l i s t .  Hou s i ng  i s  another exampl e o f  how power was 
taken away from l oc a l authori t i e s a nd p l a ced  i n  centra l i sed hands , i n  
the face of U n i on i s t  a ttempts to u s e  i t  to ma i nta i n  u n i ty a nd 
domi nance . 
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I n  1 944 , a Ho u s i ng Commi s s i o n  conc l u ded that 1 00 , 000 hou ses  were 
i mmed i a te l y  n eeded , a nd tha t  a c omp l ete prog ramme of s l um c l ea ra nce 
a nd  the e nd i ng of overcrowd i ng wou l d req u i re at l ea s t  200 , 000 houses . 
Thi s wa s i n  a country that  a t  the t i me h ad o n l y  323 , 000  hou se s . 
(Wa l l ac e : l 97 1 : 1 44 ) . Obv i ous l y  l oc a l  a u thori t i e s  were n o t  i nterested 
i n  prov i di ng pub l i c  hous i n g . I n  fa ct  u p  u nt i l th e Second Worl d War 
they had o n ly  b u i l t  1 , 700 hou se s , concentra t i ng  i n s tead i n  g i v i ng 
s ubs i di es  to pri vate b u i l de rs ( i e U n i on i s ts } .  ( O ' Dowd et  a l : l 980 : 1 20 ) . 
To remedy thi s the Hou s i n g  Act ( N I ) , 1 944 , p rov i ded for the payment 
o f  l ump s um s u b s i di es  to l oca l a uthori t i es erec t i ng  houses . Wh i l e  a 
subsequent  Ho u s i n g  Act of 1 94 5  s et  u p  t he N orthern I re l and Hou s i ng 
Tru s t , a pu b l i c  authori ty empowered to erect houses  throu ghou t 
Northern I re l and . I ts ro l e be i n g  to s uppl ement  the  effort of  l oca l  
a u thori ti es . By the end of  1 969 , t he  tota l  o f  post-war hou s i ng  b u i l t  
was 1 76 , 086 . These i nc l u ded 6 6 , 828 dwe l l i n g s  b u i l t  by l oca l 
a u thori t i es ; 42 , 1 60 by the Northern I re l and Hous i ng Tru st  ( N I HT )  and 
5 5 , 1 67 by pr i vate e nterpri s e  w i th  s ub s i d i es . (Wa l l ac e : l 9 7 1 : 1 45 ) . 
However , i t  s eems tha t the N I HT had  l i ttl e effect i n  u p s etti ng  
Un i o n i s t ba l a nce s . Local  c o unc i l s  were the p l a nn i n g  a u thori t i e s , a nd 
the  N I HT actu a l l y he l ped to reproduce  segregat i o n . I n  addi ti o n , 
between 1 960- 7 1 , seventy-fo u r  p er cent  o f  a l l hous i ng constructed was 
bu i l t w i thi n the env i ron of B e l fa st . Th i s  seems i n  accord wi th  the 
W i l s on  P l a n , a nd  s eems to ha ve  been u sed to hou s e  Protestant  workers 
who were moved out  to thei r new p l aces  of work . ( O ' Dowd et  a l : l 980 : 
1 2 5 ) . At the  same t ime hou s i n g  was a l l ocated not  neces sar i l y  on the 
bas i s  of need , b ut  on  the b a s i s of po l i t i c s . I t  mu st  be rememb ered 
that i n  U l ster  one ha d to be a tenent  to vo te in the Stormont  
e l ect i on s , them i t  was es s e nt i a l  for the Un i on i sts to  ma ke s u re any 
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new Cathol i c  tenents  wou l d be hou s ed i n  e l ectoral  wards that were 
a l rea dy cons i'dered as ' u nwi n ab l e ' . I ndeed , t he  Mayor o f  Londonderry , 
a l ways a Un i o n i s t ,  had persona l  power over the  a l l oca t i on of  houses , 
a n d  t h i s power was u s ed effecti ve ly  to ma i nta i n  a U n i on i st control l ed 
counci l where the maj or i ty of  e l ectors  vote d  na ti ona l i st ;  1 0 , 27� 
U n i o n i s t  voters to 20 , 1 02 ant i -Un i on i s t  voters  i n  1 96 6 . ( De Paor : 
1 970 : 1 58 ) . 
Hou s i ng po l i c i es were d i rec t l y  u s ed to ma i nta i n  U n i o n i s t  hegemony a s  
seen  by pract i ce s  i n  Londonderry a nd  the s pec i f i c c a s e  o f  Dungannon , 
weh re 1 94 hou ses  were b u i l t  by the  l oca l  a uthor i t i es  i n  1 96 5 . Al l 
these  houses  were b u i l t  i n  th e Un i oni s t  Ea s t  Ward , a n d  every one 
a l l ocated to a Prote s tant ; i nc l ud i ng a s i ng l e Prote stant  teenager ; 
desp i te the fact  that there were home l e s s  Cathol i c  fami l i e s . ( Darby : 
1 97 7 : 74 - 75 ) . Whi l s t  i n  the s hort  term thi s was feas i b l e ,  i t  cou l d not 
be conti nued ; t i mes h ad l i tera l l y  changed . ( See 3ew , G i bbon  and  
Patterso n : l 979 ) . I ncreas i ng l y  Catho l i cs were be i ng  b ro ug ht  i nto 
contact wi th the §ta te , a nd sys temati ca l l y exc l uded (at l ea s t  i n  terms 
of hous i ng )  from i ts wo rk i ngs  a nd benefi t s . I ndeed , i t  was hous i ng 
a nd l oca l  gove rnment  c ontrol  o ver th at was o ne of  the ear ly  s tarti ng  
po i nts fo r the C i v i l R i g hts Movement . O ' Ne i l l  1 s  fa i l u re a nd 
i na b i l i ty to extend h i s new Un i on i sm to hou s i n g  s howed that  to do so  
wou l d  mean undermi n i ng Un i on i st  s trength a n d  u n i ty .  Yet  i n  the  l ong  
run  the  Un i on i st Party had to cha n ge to a new sys tem ,  as  seen  by the 
e s tab l i s hment of the Northern I rel and  Hous i ng Execut i ve i n  1 9 7 1 , 
wi t h  fu l l res pons i b i l i ty for a l l p ub l i c  hou s i ng b u i l d i ng and  
a l l ocation , a nd run  by Br i t i sh  o r  Bri t i s h  a p po i nted c i v i l s e rva nts , 
ba sed o n  a ' po i nts ' sys tem . Once a ga i n  cen tra l i sed control  took  away 
power from the l oca l U n i o n i s ts a s  the central i sed Party d i d not  ha ve  
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the po l i t i c a l  wi l l  (or  s en s e ! )  to do so . ( O ' Dowd et  a l : l 7 ) . 
Conc l u s i on 
As c a n  be seen the Un i on i s t  Party s trugg l ed to annex  the benefi ts 
created by the new empha s i s on we l fare pol i cy ,  in order to p re serve 
the po l i ti ca l  sta tus quo . Th i s  annexa t i on was l a rge l y  s ucce s s fu l  
u n t i l the l a te l 960 ' s .  Bu t i t  d i d  cau se  i ntra -Un i o n i s t  ten s i on  as  
l oca l Un i on i sts  increa s i ng l y  s aw the i r power ta ken away from them . I n  
face  o f  th i s  a nnexat i on , U n i on i s ts were i ncreas i ng l y  faced  w i th 
Ca thol i c  d i s content wi th U n i on i s t  a ttempts at try i ng  to exc l ude  them 
from hou s i ng , educat i on  and  we l fare . However ,  t4e l far i sm and  other  
soc i a l  pol i c ie s  were res pon s i b l e  for the  increased  i n tegra ti on of  the 
Catho l i c  commu n i ty i nto the Northern I ri s h State . The l og i ca l  
deve l o pment o f  which wou l d b e  po l i ti ca l  i ntegra t i o n  to  e n s ure they got  
the fu l l benefits  they were ent i tl ed to . (Probe rt : l 97 8 : 77 ) . 
The U n i o n i s ts cou l d no t afford to a l l ow fu l l Ca tho l i c  pa rti c i pa ti on , 
a s  i t  wou l d ha ve destroyed the i r  c l a s s  a l l i ance  of  P rote s ta nts . As a 
re s u l t po l i ti c s  woul d ta ke a n  u n - par l iamenta ry twi st , a nd  i t  wou l d  be  
l eft to Bri ta i n to force through  the neces sary change s , f i na l l y  
s hatteri ng the U n i on i s t  Party .  Not on l y  were the  l oca l  U n i on i st  
bourgeo i s ie l amenting the i r s l ow l os s  o f  power (as  seen  by  the 
i ncrea se  in popu l a rity of Pa i s l ey in the l 96 0 ' s ) , but , as Wr i gh t  
po i nts o u t , o n c e  the Un i on i sts  were i ncreas i ng l y  forced t o  i mp l ement 
po l i c ies  i n  a soc i a l  Democ ra t i c manner ,  or t hey were ta ken out of 
the i r hands  comp l ete l y ,  ma ny work i ng c l a s s  P rote sta nts  began  to feel 
betrayed tha t  des p i te th i er  l oya l ty to the U n i o n i st  Pa rty , Catho l i c s 
were i ncreas i ng l y  getti ng the  same benefi ts they were . (Wri ght : l 9 75 : 
276 } .  
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O ' Ne i l l ' s  a ttempts  a t  ' bu i l d i ng br i dges ' wi th the Cathol ic  commun i ty 
were j u s t  for s how a n d  l argel y s u pe rf i c i a l  mea s u res , not  rea l l y  go i ng 
too far beyond v i s i ti ng the odd Ca thol i c  s c hoo l a nd s hak i ng  hands  wi th 
Nu ns . The boast of  Lord C ra ig avon , the Northern I r i s h  Pr ime Mi n i s ter  
i n  1 934 , that 1 1 a 1 1  I boa s t  i s  that  we a re a P rote s ta n t  Par l i ament  for 
a Prote s ta nt State 1 1 • (Be1 1 : 1 978 : 40 } . Sti l l  h e l d more o r  l es s  true 
throughou t  t he pos t-wa r per i od u nt i l the  l ate 1 960 ' s .  It was the 
i na bi l i ty of the Un i on i st  Par ty and  governme n t  to conform to a s oc i a l  
democrat i c mode l , a s  the economi c and  soc i a l  changes  demanded , that 
l ed to it i n  e ffect becomi n g  ou tdated as a govern i ng agent . The  
Un i on i st  Party wa s exc l u s i ve l y  a Prote stant  Party tryi ng to  orga n i se 
a Prote sta n t  s ta te ; yet they were i ncrea s i ng l y  forced by the Br i ti sh 
to i ntegrate Catho l i cs i n to that sta te . As can be  seen i n  hou s i ng 
po l i c i e s , t he  U n i on i sts  fo ught  very we l l  to exc l ude Ca thol i c s from the 
fu l l and proper  a l l oc at i on of pu b l i c  hou s i ng des pi te t he fac t  that 
th ey were be i n g  l arge ly  bu i l t  by money from Wes tmi nster  for a l l ocati on 
by need . Th i s  contrad i cat i on was to b e  s u ccessfu l l y  exp l o i ted a t  a 
l a ter date by the  C i v i l R ights  Movement .  Th i s  i nteg rat i on  o f  Cathol i cs 
i nto the sta te u nderm i ned the P rote s ta n t  nature of U l s te r , c reati ng a 
c ri s i s  w i th i n Un i oni sm . A Prote stant  U n i oni s t  Party cou l d  not  be 
expected to ru n a state that  extended b enefi ts to �atho l i cs yet th i s 
i s  wha t was ha ppen i n g . I n  add i t i on the rati ona l i sa t i o n  and  
central i sa t i on  of soc ia l  s e rv i ce s  u nde rmi ned l oca l  U n i on i s t  power . 
Tne U n i on i st  Party wa s l oc a l i sed wi th  i ts branches  hav i ng much  
au tonomy .  The soc i a  1 a nd econom i c  changes  i n  Northern ,  I re 1 and  1 eadi  ng 
to centra l i sa t ion of  power a nd Cathol i c  i ntegrat i o n  too k  away not on l y  
the U n i o n i s t  Pa rty ra ison d ' etre , b u t  a l so u nde rmi ned i ts l oca l 
struc ture destroyi ng Orange  c l i enta l i sm a nd m i ddl e -c l a s s  po l i t i ca l · 
power . (Probert : l 978 : 7 7 } . The soc i a l  and economi c cond i t i ons  of  
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Northern Ire l a nd  were c hang i ng ,  b ut  the  U n i o n i s t  Pa rty was not . The 
contrad i ct i on  between the compl ex , cen tra l i s ed  i nterdependent s tate 
and  t he a utonomous ,  l oc a l i sed  Party de s i gned to ru n i t ,  wa s the ba s i c  
contrad i ct i on  that forced the  Pa rty apart . Neverthe l es s , i t  took  the 
po l i t ica l events of  the  l ate  1 960 ' s  a n d  earl y l 9 70 ' s  to br i ng that 
contrad i ct i on  to the fore and ma ke the  Br i ti s h  rea l i se that  the 
Un i on i s t  Party was i ncapab l e  of  ru l i ng U l ste r  i n  a soc i a l  Democrat i c 
ma nne r . 
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CHAPTER 5 
C I V IL R I GHTS AND  THE LAW AND ORDER  PROBL EM 
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Througho u t  the 1 960 ' s  a nd even  i n to the ear l y  1 970 ' s much of  the  
Ca tho l i c  commun i ty ,  and  even a few l i bera l P rotestants , were U n i ted 
beh i nd the ca l l of C iv i l  R i ghts . The Cathol i c s wa nted to become 
po l i t i ca l l y  i nvo l ved i n  the s tate tha t had s uc h  a grea t effect over 
the i r  l i ves . These dema nds for reforms were met w i th deaf ears  wi th i n  
the Un i o n i s t  Party a nd by v i o l ence o uts i de o f  i t .  The threa t of  C i v i l 
R i g hts wa s a new one  to the U n i on i sts , they knew how to coae  wi th the 
odd I RA ' terror i s t ' ,  but not  peacefu l demon s tra t i o ns a s k i ng  for r i ghts , 
wh i ch i n  the rest  of  the U n i ted Ki ngdom s eemed o n ly  reaso nab l e  a nd 
fa i r .  
The i s s u e  o f  C i v i l R i ghts  wa s one  the  U n i o n i s t  Party wa s unab l e to 
dea l wi th , l es t i t  br i ng i ts e l f down . I ncrea s i ng l y ,  the Stormont  
governme nt found  i ts e l f cau g ht  b etween  the ever  growi n g  mi l i tancy of 
the C i v i l  R i ghts campa i gners  a nd the hard l i ners  of i ts own Party , who 
had a l ready l o st much  of  i ts power a t  the l o ca l  l ev e l . The react i on 
of the U n i on i s t state was o ne  of  c o ntrad i ct i o n i fo rced reform a nd 
repres s i on .  I t  wa s the fa i l u re o f  t he Un i on i sts  to cope wi th the 
i ncrea s i ng v io l ence that  l ed to the co l l apse  of  Stormont , and  the 
fo rc i ng  thro u gh  o f  reforms tha t  bro ught  i n tra-Un i on i s t  tens i on s  fu l l y  
ou t i nto a t  l ea s t  pub l i c  v i ew .  
The C i v i l R i ghts  Movemen� 
Th e Northern I rel and  C i v i l R i g hts As s o c i a t i o n  ( N I CRA )  wa s formed i n  
Ja nua ry 1 96 7 , the i r  ma i n  a ims be i n g ' o ne man , one  vote ' , the e nd i ng 
of  gerryma nder i ng ,  t he sett i ng  u p  o f  mach i nery to prevent d i s c r i m­
i na ti o n  by pub l i c  au tho r i t i es and  to dea l  wi.th comp l a i n ts over  u nfa i r  
a l l ocat i on o f  pub l i c  ho u s i ng , the repea l o f  the  Spec i a l Powers Act 
( a l l owi ng  a ny s u s pect  to be  he l d for seven  days wi tho u t  bei ng  charged ) 
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d i sba nd i ng of  the ' B '  S pec ia l s ,  th e excl u s i ve l y Protestant  Res erve 
Pol i ce force . (F l a c ke s : l 980 : 94 ) . O bv io u s l y  des p i te Terence O ' Ne i l l  ' s  
prom i ses  o f  ' extend i ng the h a nd of  fr i endsh i p '  a nd ' bu i l d i ng b r i dges ' 
w i th the Cathol i c  commun i ty ,  Catho l i c s  were s t i l l d i s cr imi na ted 
a ga i n s t . 
Th e r i s e  o f  th i s  new Catho l ic  act i v i sm wa s due  to a number of  factors 
a l ready ment i oned , s u c h  a s  the i nc rea s i ng marg i na l  integra t i o n  of  
Catho l i cs i n to the s ta te v i a economi c and  socia l  c ha nge s ; pl u s  the  r i s e  
o f  a newly educa ted reformi st m i nd ed Cathol i c  m i ddl e - c l a ss . Many 
l eaders of the  movement s u ch a s  Bernadette Dev l i n ,  Eammon Mc cann 
and  Paddy Agnew were a l l u n i vers i ty trai ned Cathol i c s , a nd now they 
were demand i ng the  same r i ghts  a s  o ther Bri t i s h  c i ti zens  a nd u s i ng  
accepta b l e methods ( in  B r i ta i n a t  l ea s t } to  a i r  and  protes t about  the i r 
gri evances . B ew ,  G i bbon and Patterson  a l so po int out  two other factors 
that hel ped to ra i s e Catho l i c  consc iousness  a nd ma ke the m mo re 
wi l l i n g  to be l i eve  tney mi g ht g a i n  through  p l ayi ng t he con s t i tut i o na l  
game . The f i rst , i s  t he  Labour  v i cto ry of 1 9_64 and  the  sett i ng  u p  of  
a ' c ampa i g n  for  Democracy i n  U l ste r • amongst  Labou r MP � s . Another 
factor  i s  the Nat i ona l i st Party ta k i ng the rol e of  offic i a l  oppo s i t i on 
between 1 96 6-68 . (Bew , Gibbon  and  Patterson : 19-7 9 :  168 ; 9 } .  
U p  u n t i l t he  C iv i l  R i g hts  Campa i gn , the Catho l ic s  of  U l s ter had a ctua l l y  
ach i eved very l i tt l e in the way of concrete refo rms . As Ros e  po i nts  
out  des p i te O ' Ne i l l ' s  overtu res of fr i endshi-p , " to l era t i.on ts  not  to 
be confu sed wi th integ rati on '' . (Ros e : 1 97 l : l OO J . At no  time d i d  the 
Pr ime M i n i s ter  encourage  the a p po i ntment of  Ca th.o 1 \c s to prom i nent  
pos i t i on s  in the reg ime , l et a l o ne the U n iu n ts t  Pa rty . An  i n teg rat i on 
of  Catho l i c s i nto the state a nd i ts a pparatuses l arge l y  came abo u t  
through  t he  po l i c i e s of t h e  Br i t i s h  government a n d  t h e  need t o  
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res tructure the economy .  O ' Ne i l l  rea l i s ed tha t to go  further wou l d 
o n ly  antagon i s e the  Party i n  the  c o u ntry even more . What  O ' Ne i l l  
wa s a fter wa s not  fu l l  integrat i o n  o f  Ca tho l i c s ,  b u t  ra ther a n  
acceptance of  the l eg i t i macy o f the  S tormo nt regi me and  the Con s t i tut­
i o n .  ( Ro se : l 97 1 : 9 7 ) . 
The C i v i l  R i g hts Campa i g n pre sented a new type of  cha l l enge to the  
Un i on i s ts .  They were not  a rg u i ng about  the  exi stence o f  the  s ta te of  
Northern  I re l and . There were no demands  for reu n if ica t i on , o r  power 
s har i ng or  commu n ity government , o n l y  immed i a te ga i n s w i thi n a U n i ted 
Ki ngdom context  such  as j obs , ho u s es a nd voting r i ghts .  The demands  o f  
t h e  C i v i l R i ghts  Movement were e s sent i a l l y  a l og ic a l  exten s i on of  
conti n u i ng economi c  a nd soc i a l  change . (Probert : l 978 : 95 } .  However , 
the nove l  c h a l l eng e presented by the C i v i l  Rig ht s  Movement l ed to 
d i v i s i o n s  amongst  U nionists  abou t  how to res pond to th i s  extra parl ­
i mentary ;  through  non-v i o l ent , chal l enge .  
Throughout  1 967  a nd 1 968 , th e N I CRA he l d  a nd o rgan i sed marches  through ­
out  U l s ter to  h i g h l i g ht d i sc rim i na t io n  in hou s i ng , emp l oyment and 
po l i t i c a l  r i g hts , pub l i c i s ing  the s i tuat i on  o f  U l ster Catho l i c ' s  
a round  the rest of  the wor l d .  As l o ng  a s  the  marche s  and  demons trati ons  
rema i ned peacefu l O ' Neil l was under  no grea t pressure  to accede  to  the i r 
dema nd s . Wi th the pus fltng of the  Br i t i s h  government , 0 l Ne i_l l had 
prom i s ed to abo l i s h the b u s i nes s  vote i n  1 9.66 ;  but as of  mi d-1 968 , he 
had not done i t .  ln fac t , O ' Ne i l l  wa s  u nder g reater pres sure from 
Un i o n i sts , both  i n a nd o uts i de of  the Party no t to a ccede to any 
demands  put by the  C iv i l Rig hts  Mo vement . Q lN e i l l was a l l too aware 
that he co u l d accompl i s h  no maj o r  po l i t i c a l  cha nge w itho ut  the 
Un i on i st s  s u pport , oath tn a nd out of  the  Party .  (Ha s ti ng s : l 970 : 58 ) . 
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Ref onn 
Un i on i s ts s aw  C i v i l R i ghts a s  a s tep  towards reun i fi c a t i o n , and  the i r  
reformi st  demands  were i mmed i atel y defi ned as  a threat  to the U n i on i s t  
s tate , n o t  j u s t  by t h e  l oca l s ecur i ty forces  (whose powers were 
threatened by the i r  demand s )  but a l s o  by much  of the Prote stant  
work i ng c l a s s , w ho  s aw  thei r ma rg i na l  pri v i l eges  u nder  a ttac k . I ndeed , 
many Unio n i s ts saw th e N I CRA c ampa i g n . a s  noth i n g e l s e  b ut  a front  for 
the I RA .  Even though  i nd i v i d ua l  I RA members  were i nvo l ved , by no 
mea ns  d i d  they have a contro l l i ng vo i ce w i th i n  the movement . The 
who l e affa i r  was l a rge ly  i n dependent of  the I RA .  ( F l a cke s : l 980 : 1 6 ) . 
I n  October 1 968 , the N I CRA a pp l i ed  to the  hard l i ner Home Secretary 
Wi l l i am Cra i g  for permi s s i o n  to ho l d  a march i n  Londonderry . C ra i g , 
who saw the  C i v i l R i ghts  Mcv ement a s  a n  I RA front , refu s ed permi s s i on 
( O ' Ne i l l  was not i nfo rmed ) .  Neverthe l es s , the o rga n i sers went ahead 
wi th the march , and the  Roya l U l ster Con stabu l ary ( RU C } tri ed to 
forcefu l l y s top it ; the resu l t ,  a major  r i o t . The s pec i f i c  res u l t of 
th i s  ri ot wa s that i n  November  1 968 , O ' Nei ll a nnounced a package of 
reforms d e s i g ned  to med i a te the tense  s i tuat i on i n  Londonderry and 
take the st i ng  o u t  of  the who l e C i v i l R i ghts  campa i gn .  Londonderry 
wa s to be ru n by a commi s s i one r , thu s  ta ki ng power ( to d i s cr i mi nate ) 
out  of the  hand s  of  the  l oc a l  U n i o n i sts . The Spec i a l Power Act was 
to be ' l ooked i nto ' . The mu l t i pl e  (pu s i ness } vote was to be abol i s hed , 
and  hou s i ng a uthor it i es  " encouraged to ba se  a l l ocat i o ns on  a po i nts 
sys tem . ( Buck l a nd : l 981  : 1 24 ) . 
For many th i s  pac kage was " too  l i tt l e ,  too l a te " . ( Farre l l : 1 9 76 : 248 ) . 
I ts effec t wa s 1 argel y to o utrage ma ny 1 oya 1 i s t s  w i thout  rea l l y  
sat i s fy i ng the C i v i l R i g hts Movement . The who l e campa i gn began to 
cen tre around ' one  man . one vo te ' .  O ' Ne i l l wou l d  not  a nd cou l d not 
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concede i t  - i t  wou l d ha ve j eopard i sed  h i s  pos ition  within the  Party ;  
but , o n  the  other hand , the C i v i l  R i ghts  Movement wou l d  not  have  been 
sat i s fi ed wi tho ut it . The react i on of  the RUC to the Londonderry 
march , and that of  Cra i g  revea l ed that  the  demands  of  the C i v i l R i ghts  
Movement cou l d not be  ach ieved through  a g i tat ion and p i ecemea l 
l eg i s l ati on . To accede wo u l d put s evere stra i n s  on  the  Un i o n i s t  
a l l iance  a nd requ i re muc h  res tructu r i ng of  t h e  s ta te a pparatuses . 
( Probert : l 978 : 9 5 ) . 
The s i gn i f i cance  of t he 1 968  reforms , a nd  a ny more tha t mi g h t  occur  
l i e s  in  the  effect it  had o n  trad i t i o na l  rea t i ons  w i t h i n the b roader 
Un i on i s t  po l i t i cs mac h i ne . The U n i o n i s t  cab i net  were ab l e to s ee the 
neces s i ty of  at  l ea s t  l im i ted reforms , but these  reforms further 
threa tened to u ndermine the b a s i s  of trad i t io na l  U r i on i st  s o l i dari ty 
by cha l l eng i ng even mo re the  power  of  t he l oc a l  Party a s s oc i a ti ons  
and l oca l  government . O ' Ne i l l mi g ht be  ab l e to  contro l  the  cab i net , 
but  the  U n ion ist Party a s  a who l e wa s a l a rge and  c umbersome 
organ i sat ion , w i th many MP ' s  awa re of  the  power of  the i r  own 
cons ti tuency a s s oc i at i ons . Mos t  U n i oni st  s ea ts were safe s eats i n  
the sense  tha t the Un i on i st c a nd i d ate was u sua l l y  returned unopposed . 
The rea l s e l ect i on proces s  occurred before the  e l ect i o n , and the 
l oca l  a s soc i a ti on had the powe r  to ma ke th i ng s  very d i ff i c u l t for an 
MP  if  he s hou l d  ta ke a n  i ndependent  s ta nd . I t  was prec i s e l y  at  the 
l oc a l  l eve l  tha t  reforms were mos t  u nwe l come . On the  o ther  hand , 
many were aware that i t  was the  l abo u r  government at  We stmi ns ter who 
wa s putt i ng pres s u re on O ' Ne i l l  to i ntroduce  reforms "wi t h  po s s i b l e  
sanc t i ons tha t ,  i f  it were not  carr i ed  out  l oca l l y ,  i t  m i ght  be  by 
Wes tm i nster  i ntervent i on " . (Wri g ht : l 97 3 : 2 7 1 } .  Ev i dence  of  
d i s a greement wi thi n the Party came when 0 ' Ne i l l sac ked Cra i g  for h i s  
conti nued c r i t i c i sm of  the reforms . 
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I n  January 1 969 , O ' Ne i l l es tab l i s hed the Macrory Comm i s s io n  to rev i ew 
l oca l  government hopi ng to ea s e  the  pres s u re from the  C i v i l  R i g hts 
Movement  and  We stmi n s ter ; b u t  the government wa s open l y  s trugg l i ng 
w i th  contrad i ctory pre s s u re s  s u rround ing the reorga n i sat i on  of  l oca l  
government .  F i rs t l y ,  t here were t he " d emands  o f  eco nomi c and phys i c a l  
prob l ems and  c i v i l s ervants  for technocra t i c  eff i c i e ncy i n  the 
adm i n i strat i on of l oc a l  serv i ce s , demands  wh i ch had tr i ggered the  
reform proposa l s i n it i a l l y " . (O ' Oowd �-a-�: 1 980 : 1 1 0 ) . O n  the  other 
hand , the U n i on i st  Party at  a l l l ev el s had to b e  rea s s u red that  
reorga n i s at i on  wou l d  not invo l ve  a s i gn if i cant  eros i on of Protes tant/ 
Uni on i s t  power . Thus  the  proposa l s ,  when  pub l i s hed by the  Macrory 
Commi s s i on i n  1 970 , s t i l l  l eft hou s i ng under the  control  of  l oc a l  
author i t i e s , p l u s  there was l i tt l e done t o  redeem t h e  i nj us t i ce  o f  
gerrymanderi ng , b a r  s uggest i ng t o  wa i t  for future  l oc a l  g overnment 
reorgan i s at i on u nder cons i dera t i o n  for the Un i ted K i ngdom a s  a whol e .  
(Wa l l ace : l 97 1 : 54 ] . 
I n  the meant ime , 0 ' 1�e i l l ca l l ed a n  e l ec t i on in Febru a ry 1 969  to 
c ha l l enge h i s l oya l i s t  cr i t i c s . Many l oca l cons t i tuen cy a s soc i a t i on s  
chose  cand i d a tes who were d e c i ded l y  a nt i -O ' Ne i l l  and  a nti -reform . 
Neverthel e s s  O ' Ne i l l  d i d  wi n the  e l ect i o n  des p i te hav i n g  a s i zeab l e 
number  of MP ' s  wi thi n h i s own Party who had defi n i te l y  came out  
aga i ns t  a ny reform . Wi th t h i s Wi l l i am Cra i g  formed the V anguard 
Movement w i t h i n  the Pa rty a nd th i s  i ncreas i ng l y  s erved as  a focu s  for 
the hardl i ners . At the  s ame  t ime , there wa s a n  i nc rea s i n g l y  ri g ht­
wi ng Un i on i s t  threat  i n  the  form of  Pa i s l ey ' s  Protes tant  U n i o n i s t  
Party ( PUP ) , wh i c h  rec e i ved a res pecta b l e n i neteen per  c e nt  of the 
vote in  the  1 969 e l ect i on . (Laver : l 976 : 26 } . 
By March 1 969 , t he power strugg l e w i th i n the pa r l i amentary Un i o n i s t  
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Party was qu i te c l ear . O n  the one  s i de were o • Ne i l l a nd h i s  fo l l owers 
who were in favour of  a reform programme des i g ned to remove  the more 
obv ious  Catho l ic gr ievances ; backed ( pu s hed ) by Wes tm i nster . On  the 
other  s i d e  were Cra ig and h i s  fol l owe rs , who fe l t that  any conces s i on s  
t o  the  Catho l ic mi' nor i ty co u l d on l y  l ead to  a wea ken i n g  of  the 
cons t i tut i ona l pos i t i on .  ( Ha rb i n s o n : l 9 73 : 1 53 } . O ' Ne i l l  rea l i s ed that 
the trad i t i o n a l  repre s s i ve s trateg i e s  were no  l onger  poss i b l e g i ven the  
Brit i s h  government ' s  s u pport for the reform programme . For O ' Ne i l l  i t  
was quest i on o f  how fa r the Un i on i s t  Party co u l d ta ke the reform 
programme wi tho ut des troyi ng t he bas i s of  its own power wi th i n  Northern 
I re l and  a ny further . (Probert : l 9 78 : 1 0 1 ) .  
O ' Ne i l l  was q u i c k ly  l oo s i ng t he s u pport of  h i s Pa rty , espec i a l l y  the 
l oc a l  Party machine  as repres ented by the  UUC . So i n  Apr i l 1 96 9 , he  
res i gned before C ra ig cou l d get  o rgan i sed eno ugh  for a ta ke-over . 
Th i s  smoothed t he path fo r a nother moderate to  take  over  a s  P r i me 
M i n i ster , J ames Ch ichester- C l ark .  As  the new l eader of the  Party 
Ch i c hes ter-C l ark  cou l d do l ittl e b u t  carry on  a nd try a nd pu s h  for 
reforms . Th i s  wa s not  at a l l popu l a r amongst  Un ion i sts , b u t  he  was 
s e l ected l ea der  by the  parl i amenta ry Pa rty o u t  of  a des i re for Pa rty 
un i ty rathe r than  reform . ( Ro se : l 9 7 1  : 1 04 } . 
The fa i l ure  of  the i n i t i a l  reform package to p l acate  the  Catho l i c s wa s 
enoug h proof fo r ma ny Prote s ta nts  that  the I RA wa s beh i nd i t , and  
reform s hou l d  go  no further . A s i gn of  d i s content wi th i n  U n i o n i sm 
s howed when Pa i s l ey wo n O ' Ne i l l  ' s o l d seat i n  Sto rmont , B a nn s i de i n  
Apr i l 1 970  a nd the W'e stm i ns ter constHuency o f  Nort h  Antr i m  i n  the 
fo l l owi ng J u ne , on  a p l a tform of more l oca l  c o ntrol , e s pec i a l ly  over 
s ecu r i ty and  an  end to  refo rm . (Buck l a nd : l 98 1  : 1 49 ) . I n  a dd it i on  
t here were ma ny organ i sat i o ns s pr i n g i ng u p  not  control l ed o r  l i n ked to 
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the U n i on i s t  Party ,  s uch  as  t he  U l ster  Cons t i t ut i on  Defence  Commi ttee , 
U l s ter  Prote s tant  Vo l u nteers ; and  there had e ven been a res u rec t i o n  
o f  t h e  o l d U l ster  Vo l unteer Force (UVF ) who i n  1 969 v io l ent l y 
expres sed the i r oppos i t i on to reform by sett i ng  of a n umber  of  
expl o s i ons . 
On 1 2  Aug u s t  1 9 69 , th e Apprent i ce  Boys  of Lo ndonderry had  the i r  annua l 
march through  the  c i ty to c e l ebrate t he l i ft i ng of  the  s e i g e  of the 
Catho l i c  J ames I I ,  by Wi l l i am ,  P r i n ce  of Ora nge . Tens o f  thou s ands 
of Protestants  attended to demons trate the i r  s u pport for the 
Pro testa nt way of  l i fe that  seemed to  be threa tened by recent  events . 
The August  1 9 69 ce l ebra tions  turned i nto Catho l i c/Protestant  r i ot i ng , 
and the RUC a nd the U l ster  Spec ia l Constabu l a ry (USC  or  ' B '  Spec i a l s )  
were c a l l ed out  to in tervene . What  in fact h appened wa s that  the 
po l ice . be i ng exc l u s ivel y P rotestant , a p proxi matel y n i nety-s i x  per 
cent (O ' Dowd et:_� : l 970 : 1 79 } ,  a nd· ma ny members of t he Ora nge Order 
( pa rent  organ i s ation  of  the Apprent i ce Boys ] ,  attac ked the Catho l i cs 
a nd forced them back  i nto their  g hettos ; s pec i f i ca l l y  the Bogs i de ,  
f i fty hours  of  neavy r i ot i ng broke o u t  and tt s prea d  acro ss  the who l e 
of Northern I re l and . The po l i ce ,  b e i ng  Prote stant throug hout  the 
who l e of  U l ster , went o n  the rampage  through  Cathol i c  g hetto s , 
espec i a l l y  i n  Bel fast , u s i n g  s uc h  c rowd contro l  equ i pment a s  heavy 
Brown i ng s ub-mach i ne g u n s , a rmoured cars  and  CS  gas . There can be  
l i tt l e doubt that  the po l i c e  e s ca l ated the  s i tuation  and  s aw any type 
of Catho l i c  demonstra t i on or protest  as a threat to the s ecur i ty of 
U l s ter . ( H i l lya rd : l 9 78 : 1 2 1 ) .  
Neverthe l e s s  the res u l t of  th i s  r i o t i ng wa s t h at  the  Br i t i s h  army wa s 
ca l l ed i n  to ma i nta i n  peace o n  th e s t reets , and  the GOC wa s put  i n  
c h arge  of a l l o f  U l ster ' s  s ecur i ty a nd l aw and  order control . The 
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a rmy u nder Westminster ' s  control  wa s mor e  tru sted by the Catho l i c s  
a n d  was o bv i ou s l y  l es s  part i s a n  i n  i t s  a pproach t o  Cathol i c/ P rotestant  
r i o t i ng . I n  add i t i on , the  U n i on i sts  themse l v e s  rea l i sed  they cou l d  no  
l onger  hand l e the  s i tua ti on ; t hey were unab l e to cope  wi th th i s  d i rect 
cha l l enge  for C iv i l R i g ht s  and  res po nded i n  the  trad itiona l  manner  
wh i ch no  l onger  wo rked . (Bu c kl and : l 98l  : 1 3 1 ) . 
Not o n l y  was the  Bri tis h Army put  o n  the  s treets , the  Wi l son  govern­
ment forced Ch i chester-C l a r k  to d i s band  the  U SC , d i s a rm the  RUC and  
i ns t i tute one  ma n ,  one  vo te . Thu s ma ny of  the  a ims o f  the  N I CRA were 
fi na l l y  met , after muc h  riot i ng and b l oods hed . 
The Probl em o f  Law and  O rder  
The  fi na l  a tta i nment of  the mo s t  i mportant dema nd s of  the  N I CRA became 
of  s econdary importance to many . .  The s i tutat i on had gone beyond  re­
form for many Catho l i c s ; they were not  g o i n g  to be defence l es s i f  
Protestan t ' s  atta c ked aga i n and  l oc a l  I RA un i ts beg a n  to re-arm 
thems e l ve s . By the s ame to ken ma ny P rotesta n ts were  i n  a s tate  of 
d i s content . As Wr i ght points  out  " I t s eemed to them that  nobody cares 
a bo u t  the  o rd i n ary Protesta n t , wh i l e  everybody i s  bend i ng  over back­
wards  to g i ve everythi ng  to  the  Fen ians  (ca thol i c s ) " .  (Wri g ht : l 97 3 : 
7 5 } . For ma ny P rotestants  the  fa c t  tha t Catho l i c s  had bro ken the  
l aw to  ga i n  refo rms (though  i t  can  b e  a rgued  they had  l i tt l e c ho i ce )  
s howed tha t  i f  they wanted t o  sto p a ny fu rther ( i e  na t i ona l i st )  
demands , they to wou l d have to  res i s t  by forc e . The i r d i s s a t i fact i on 
i s  s een i n  the  fact  t hat  i t  wa s t hey ,  throughout  the  l a tte r  part  of 
1 969  and 1 97 0 , who we re carryi ng  ou t mo st of t h e  r i o t i ng , b urn i ng 
out  Catho l i cs , even k i l l i ng the  f i r st RUC man o n  the S han k i l l  Road , 
I n  response  to I RA re-armi ng , P rotes tants  set  up  l oc a l  d efence 
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a s s oc i at i ons  for s imi l a r rea sons . I t  i s  i nteresting  to note  that the 
S ha n kh i l l  Defen s e  Assoc i a t i o n  was  ori g i na l l y  set  up  in  Apr i l  1 969 , no t 
pri mar i l y  for a rmed d efense , b ut  to res i st Be l fa s t ' s  Corporat i on ' s  
redeve l opment p l a n s  a s  put  forwa rd i n  the  Wi l s o n  Plan . Th i s  wa s 
a nother  i nd i c at i o n  of  worki ng c l a s s  U n i on i st d i s s a t i s fact i o n  wi th 
tec hnocra t i c e  Un i on i sm at t he c entra l l eve l . ( Buck l a nd : l 981 : 1 28 ) . 
Many Protestants  were i ncrea s i ng l y  redefi n i ng the  C i v i l R i ghts  
Movement  a nd  Catho l i c  res i s tanc e  a s  a p robl em of  l aw and  orde r . I t  
d i d not  ta ke t he Catho l i cs l ong  t o  rea l i s e  that  t h e  B r i t i s h  Army were 
there as muc h  to contro l  the Cathol i cs as  to protect t hem and i t  wa s 
not l ong b efore they we re f i g ht i ng the  a rmy , s ett i ng u p  " No -Go Areas "  
where  they effect i vel y ru l ed themsel ves . The ex i· stence  of  " No -Go 
Areas " i n fu r i ated many U n io n i s ts , who more and  mo re saw James 
Ch i chester-C l a r k  a s  wea k  and  the  Un i on i st Pa rty unab l e to ma i nta i n 
contro l over  secur ity .  As ha s a l ready been  po i nted ou t ,  th i s  c a n  be 
seen  by the mus hroom i ng of Pro tes tant  parami l i ta r i e s  a nd the e l ect i on 
of P a i s l ey to a fo rml y safe Un i on i st  seat i n  B anns ide  f o  J u ne 1 970 . 
Pa i s l ey ' s  ma i n  p l atfo rm here was "ma i nl y  conc erned wi t h  l aw and  order 
i s s u e s ; h e  c a l l ed for mo re effec t i v e  po l icing  of Ca tho l i c  a reas  and 
urged the re- a rm i ng of the po l i ce a nd the rec a l l  of  the USC . . . . .  " .  
(Wa l l ace : l 9 7 2 : 76 } . A l so  i n  the  s ame month , Wi l l i am Beatty won 
a nothe r s e a t  i n  South  Londonde rry for Pa i s l ey ' s  newly  formed 
Protes tant  U n i o n i st  Pa rty on a s i mi l ar p l a tfo rm . O bv i ous l y  the 
Un i o n i s t  Party wa s fac i ng a c r i t i ca l  cha l l eng e ,  w i th  ma ny Un i on i sts  
wan t i ng tou g her  s ecur i ty arrangements  i e  go i n to the  Catho l i cs areas  
and  f l u s h  o u t  a l l the troub l ema kers . 
Th i s res i s tance to change  a nd  a dema nd for a c rac kdown on  the  I RA 
man i fes ted i ts e l f aga i n  wi t h i n the  Party no t o n l y  t hrough  Vanguard , 
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but a l so  the  Wes t  U l s te r  Un i o n i st Cou nc i l set  u p  after th e Augu s t  
1 969  r i ots . Thi s was based i n  the  Wes t , es pec i a l l y  a round  the border 
a reas  and apart from demand ing  to ug her  security mea s u res  wa s o utr i ght  
i n  i ts oppo s i t ion of t he propo sed  reorg a n i s at i on of  l oca l  government , 
whi c h  threatenr.d to ta ke away l oc a l  U n i on i st control  of  author i t i es 
i n  mos t  of the wes t .  
Throug hou t 1 9 70 , d i ss ent  wa s b u i l d i ng u p  wi th i n  the  Pa rty .  I n  Ma rch , 
f i v e  MP 1 s  C ra i g ,  West , Boal , McQu ade  and  La i rd were expe l l ed from the 
pa r l i mentary Pa rty fo r not  s u pporti ng  a vote of conf i dence  i n  the 
governmen t ' s  s ecur i ty pol i cy .  I n  Apri l the Party ' s  annua l co nferenc e 
voted aga i n s t  the  gove rnmen t ' s  dec i s i on to s e t  u p  t he  Northern I rel and  
Hou s i ng Exec u t i ve wh i ch too k o v er comp l ete contro l  o f  hous i ng .  
( Fa rrel l : l 9 7 6 : 2 7 1 - 2 ) .  
At Wes tmi n ster  a new Tory government  had  been returned and  
Reg i na l d Mau l d i ng ,  the  n ew B r i t i s h  Home Secreta ry ,  v i s i ted Be l fas t  
a n d  gave  the  go-a head for tougher  l aw a n d  o rd e r  pol i c i e s .  The fi rs t 
cons equence  o f  them was i n  J u l y  1 9 70  when the  Carmi na l J u s t i c e  
(Tempora ry P rov i s i ons } B i l l  wa s rus h ed throug h Stormont  b r i n g i n g  i n  
a mandatory s i x-mo nth mi n i mum pri son  term for r i ot i ng . I n  effect , 
i t  was us ed  ma i n l y  aga i nst  Ca tho l i cs , w h i c h  on ly  pushed  them nearer 
to the  reo rg a n i sed Pro v i s i o n a l  IRA . I n  Augu s t , Ch i che s ter-C l a r k  
rep l aced  a res i g n i n g  modera te wi th  J ohn  Tayl o r  a l ea d i ng  r i ght­
wi nger  a s  M i n i ster  of  Home Affa i rs , who l ate r on s umma ri s ed h i s 
po l i cy fo r dea l i n g wi th Catho l i c s  then . 1 1We a re go i ng to s hoot i t  
out  w i th them . I t  i s  a s  s i mp l e a s  that 1 1 • ( The T i mes  of  Londo n : 
Feb rua ry 5 : 1 9 7 1 ) .  
Des p i te  t hes e mea s u re s , Ch i c h e ster- C l a r k  rea l i s ed  that  i t  wa s not  
enoug h to ma i nta i n  comp l ete Party u n i ty .  Chi chester� C l ark  conc erned wi th  
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-kee p i ng h i s Party u n tt ed ha d n o  c ho i ce b ut  to t ry and  conc i l i ate 
hard l i ne U n i on i sts . The appea rance of  Protestant  MP ' s  outs i de the 
Party ranks  red uced the  amount  of  s u pport tha t  he cou l d affo rd to 
l oo s e  wi th i n  h i s d imi n i s hed ran k s  and  s t i l l  rem3 i n  Pr ime M i n i s ter . 
As such  C h i c hes ter-Cl ark  wan ted  to go  for " s a tu rat i on  by s ecur i ty 
forces of  a reas  wh i ch he  cons i dered were  dom i nated by the  I RA " . 
(F l ackes : l 980 : 9 1 ) .  However , the  Br i t i s h  government wa s u nwi l l i ng to 
offer the amount  of troops n eeded ; so i n  prot e s t  in March 1 9 7 1  he 
res i gned . 
The strugg l e  fo r l eadersh i p  now c entered on  l aw a nd o rder . Th i s wa s 
t he one  a rea of  po l i cy i n  wh i c h  U n i on i s ts l oo ked fo r l eaders h i p  wh i ch 
wou l d s uppre s s  s u bvers i ve (i e repub l i ca n ) e l ements  i n  s o c i ety and  so  
ma ke  a g reater  contri but i on  to the retention of  the  U n i on  than  a ny 
other . "A  U n i o n i s t  l eader  who cou l d not  c onta i n  the  a n t i -Un i on forces 
outs i de as wel l a s  i ns i de Par l i ament wou l d  never command the  res pect 
of the Pa rty " . (Harb i n son : l 97 3 : 1 53 ) . I t  was Br i an  Fau l kne r , a l ong­
t i me hardl i ne r , who  b ecame l eader  o f  the U n i on i s t Pa rty a nd thu s  the  
Pr i me M i n i ster . Fau l kner i mmed i a t e l y  l aunc hed a n ew tou g h  s ecu r i ty 
campa i gn ,  c u l minat i ng i n  Au g u s t  1 97 1 , w i th the  i ntroduct i o n  of 
i nternment , tha t i s , detent i on and i mp r i sonme n t  w i thout  tr i a l . Th i s 
pol i cy ,  ca rr i ed out  wi th  the back i ng of the  Westmi n s ter  government , 
pro v ed a s e r i ou s  m i sca l c u l a t i o n  i n  t erms of  improv i n g  l aw and  order . 
F i r s t l y , i t  compl eted the  a l i ena t i on  of  Ca tho l i c s from the  Stormont/ 
U n i o n i st  reg i me . Second l y , becau s e  of  the i nd i s c ri mi nate nature  of 
i nternment ,  t he Prov i s i ona l s g a i ned  muc h s u pport , who were i n  fact 
not g reat l y  affected by i nternment . The  ma i n  re s u l t of  i nternment 
was that the v i o l ence  got wors e . Deaths  due  to the v i o l ence  befo re 
i nte rnment were t h i rty fo r that  yea r ,  a nd  i t  ros e  to one  hundred and 
forty-three , after i nternment  for the  res t  of 1 9 7 1 . (F l ac kes : l 980 : 2 1 0 ) . 
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Des p i te i ts fa i l ure  a s  a l aw a n d  o rder  measure  inte rnment d i d  prov i de 
some meas u re of  u n i ty w i th i n the  Party .  Ma ny were s a t i s f i ed that  i t  
was l east  a s te p  i n  t he r i g h t  d i rec t i on , Fau l kner  s u c ceeded i n  
reta i n i ng muc h  confi dence  o f  the Party .  However , i t  wa s s t i l l  not 
eno u g h  for some and  i n  September 1 9 7 1 , Boa l and  McQuade  res i gned  from 
the Un i on i s t  Pa rty a n d  j o i ned  w i th  Pa i s l ey a nd  Beatty to fo rm the 
Democ ra ti c U n i on i s t P a rty ,  i n  e s s ence j u st  another name fo r the 
Protestant  U n i o n i s t  P arty .  Th i s  a ga i n prov i d ed pre s s u re from wi thout 
the Un i on i s t  Pa rty to s tep up o n  the secu r i ty mea su res . Fau l kner had 
l i tt l e c ho i c e  but to ma i nta i n  a heavy RUC/army presence  on the streets 
and cont i nue  i nte rnment , j u s t  to ma i nta i n ful l Pa rty un i ty .  Th i s  i s  
turn i ncrea s ed s u pport fo r the  I RA ,  wh i c h  i n  tu rn i nc reased  s u pport 
for the Protestant pa rami l i ta r i es . I t  has  been  poi n ted o u t  that i n  
th i s peri od the re were abou t forty- s i x  Protestant  parami l i ta ry 
o rg a n i s at i o n s  from the  U DA c l a i mi n g  a members h i p  of 60 , 000  i n  l ate 
1 97 1  ( Fa rrel l : 1 9 76 : 297 ) through  to the UVF , U l ster  Freedom F i ghters , 
Red Hand  Commandoes , P rotes tant  Act i o n  Force , Ta ra , a nd a who l e host 
of  what s i mp l y  amounted to tarta n  g a ng s . Many acts of  Protestant  
v i o l ence occurred wi thout  c entra l  d i rect i o n . Ma ny wor k i n g  c l a s s  
Protes tan ts were (are ) prepared to ta ke the i n i t i at i ve  i n  the i r  own 
commun i ty to defend t he i r way o f  l i fe , i f  they feared tha t offi c i a l 
sec u r i ty forces were not  s t rong  enough  i n  defense  of t he i r r eg i me . 
I n  the s i tu a t i o n  of n ea r  c i v i l  wa r the  U n i o n i st  Party was u n a b l e to 
contro l  mo s t  of the i r work i n g  c l a s s  s u p port , and  conseque n t l y  the  
Party (Fa u l kner ) wa s forced  to try and  outdo them . ( Ro s e : l 976 : 
1 54 ) . 
I nc reas i ng l y , t he tol l of deaths  and  bad  pub l i c i ty for U n i o n i s t  
po l i c i es got  Wes tm i n s ter wo rr i ed ;  they saw that  the Un i on i sts  coul d 
no t cope  w i th the s i tuat i on .  The f i na l  straw for the Br i t i s h  
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government came i n  January 197 2 when pa ratroopers  s hot  dead t h i rteen 
una rmed c i v i l i a ns  a t  an i l l ega l C i v i l  R i g hts  ma rch i n  Londonderry ;  
t h i s a l ong  w i th the  i ncreas i ng fa i l u r e  o f  Fau l kner ' s  l aw and  o rder  
campa i gn forced Wes tm i nster  to  ta ke a fre s h  l oo k  at the i r  ro l e w i th i n  
the s i tua t i o n . A rea ppra i s a l  wh i ch wou l d  eventua l l y l ead t o  D i rect 
Ru l e .  
Conc l u s i on 
The i s s ue  of  C i v i l R i g hts a n d  i ts deve l o p i n g  into a w i der  secur i ty 
pro b l em was one  wh i c h  f i na l l y  b ro u g ht the  l atest  d i v i s i on s  w i th i n  the 
Party out i nto the o p en . A l r eady l oc a l  Un i on i st s  were concerned 
about ero s i o n  of  power  and autonomy v i a  i nc re a s ed centra l i s a t i o n  and  
p l a nn i ng ,  a l o ng with  soc i a l  reforms . These  s ame po l i c i es i ncreased  
the  l i kl i hood of  Catho l i c  expecta t i o n s  a nd de s i res for corres po nd i ng  
pol i t i ca l  changes , changes  wh i c h �ven O ' Ne i l l was not prepared to  
i mp l ement fo r fea r that they wou l d b r i ng  Un i on i s t  d i fferences  out 
i nto the  o pen , wh i ch in  fac t  d i d  ha ppen . D i s s en s i o n  and  d i s un i ty 
d i d  occur , a s  powerfu l a nd  determ i n ed e l ements  wo rked des pa rate l y  
aga i n st  c omprom i se  a n d  conc es s i ons  t o  t h e  Catho l ics . O ' Ne i l l  c ou l d 
l i v e  w i th  the  P a i s l ey i tes , bu t when the reform package  of 1 969  fa i l ed 
i t  l ed to i nc reas i ng d i s s a t i s fact i on wi th i n  the  Un i o n i s t  Party wh i ch 
bec ame stead i l y more d iv i de d , w i t h  no  o ne sect i on i n  rea l contro l . 
The l eaders h i p  though  s trong , had  l i tt l e control  ov er  con s t i tutenc i es 
etc . ( Bu ck l a nd : 1 981 : 1 26 } . 
The C i v i l  R i ghts  campa i gn presented a novel  c h a l l enge  to the 
U n i o n i s ts - Br i t i s h  c i t i zen s  d ema nd i ng Bri t i s h  r i g hts . These demands  
ha d to  be  met , yet  the U n i o n i s t Party was not t he v eh i c l e to carry 
out  the  d ema n ds ; i t  was no t d e s i g ned  to . As l ong  a s  Cathol i c s l oo ked 
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towards D ub l i n  and  refra i ned from po l tt i cs i n  No rthern I re l a nd , the  
U n i on i s t  Pa rty cou l d  conta i n i ts d i s s en s i on a nd reta i n  contro l ; but  
economi c and  soc i a l c ha ng es c reated d iv i s io ns and  brought  ma ny 
Catho l i cs i nto po l it i c s . T h u s  the  U n i on i st Pa rty res ponded i n  the 
o n l y  way it  knew how : treat a l l threats  to the i r  monopo l y  of  power as  
a I RA/ repub l i can/nati ona l i s t p l o t . The a ttempts of the  U n i on i s t  Pa rty 
to s ecure  u n i ty v i a  a tough l aw a n d  o rder  campa i g n ,  i n stead l ed to 
i ns tab i l i ty ,  v i o l e nce and U n i o n i s t  i nf i ght i ng . The  U n i on i st Party 
cou l d  hard l y  co ntrol t he i r own po l i ce forc e , the i r worki ng  c l a s s  
s u p porters were ta k i n g  th i ngs  i nto the i r own ha nds  a n d  were fo rm i ng  
pa rami l i ta r i es  and  ou t on  the s treets i mp l emen t i ng  the i r own fo rm of 
U n i on i sm .  The tota l c o l l a p se  o f  l aw a n d  o rde r , and  the  U n i on i s t 
Party ' s  i na b i l i ty to cope  wi th  the s itu at i o n  f i na l l y  brou ght  i n  
D i rect  Ru l e  a nd i t  wa s th i s w h i ch  prov i ded the f i na l  s traw i n  b rea ki ng  
u p  the  Un i on i st  Pa rty . 
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C HAPTER 6 
D I RECT RUL E AND THE WH ITE  PAPER  
7 0  
Br i t i s h  I nvervent i on Pr ior  to Di rect R u l e 
Th e Bri t i s h  go ve rnmen t  had  p l ayed a n  i mporta n t  ro l e i n  U l s te r ' s  
affa i rs s i nce  the  ri s e  of  the  C i v i l R i ghts  Movemen t .  P re v i ou s ly , they 
had a n  i nd i rect  affect  through  we l fa re a nd soc i a l  po l i c i e s , a l ong 
wi th eco nomi c p l ann i ng  and regu l ati o n .  After Augu s t  1 96 9 , Wes tmi nster 
too k  a more d i rec t  i n teres t .  They h a d  troops  o u t  on the  s treets for 
secur i ty .  They app l i e d  be h i nd  the  s cenes  pre s s u re to p re s s  fo r 
reform . They sent  E n g l i s h  c i v i l s ervan ts over  to keep a n  eye on  
th i ngs  l i ke hous i ng a l l oca t i on s , p l u s  econom i c a nd p hys i ca l  p l a nners 
to work  o u t  where ho u s es a n d  j o b s  s h ou l d  b e  l ocate d . O ' Ne i l l  
recogn i s ed the  i mportance  o f  the B r i t i s h  governmen t  i n  h i s  
res i gnat i on  i n  Ma rch 1 969 . 1 1 U l s ter  i s  not a ri c h ,  powerfu l , 
i ndepende n t  s tate , b u t  a part  of the  U n i ted Ki n gdom cor:rni t ted to 
Un i ted Ki ngdom s tand a rds  a nd s ubject  i n  the l a s t  resort  to U n i ted 
Ki ngdom a u thor i ty .  We mu s t  go fo rwa rd , for Br i ti s h  p ub l i c  a nd  
pa r l i amentary o p i n i o n  wou l d n o t  to l era te o ur  g o i ng  b a ck " . ( O ' Ne i l l :  
1 969 : 201 } .  Th i s  sent i ment wa s echoed  ma ny t i me s  by B r i t i s h  
po l i t i ca n s  pr i or to Di rect Ru l e and  wa rn i n g s  of  i t  were  o ften g i ven by 
Pa i s l ey .  (Wa l l ace : l 9 7 1 : 1 72 } . 
I t  was becomi n g  i ncrea s i ng l y  c l e ar  tha t re l a ti ons  betwee n  S tormont  
and  Westm i n s te r  were c hang i ng co n s i dera b l y ,  and  tha t a number of  
importa n t  po l i t i c a l  dec i s i ons  were b e i n g  take n  o u t  o f  th e hands  of 
the Un i on i s ts by referri ng them to j o i n t  wor k i ng part i es . Th i s  meant 
tha t  the Un i on i s t go vernme n t  h ad l i tt l e room to ma neouvre w i th i n  any 
recommenda t i ons  made . Al l of th i s  was a tra uma t i c exper i ence for th e 
Un i on i st  Party a t  l a rge . B r i ti s h  po l i t i cans  s aw noth i n g  wrong  wi th 
U l s te r  tha t cou l d not b e  c u re d  by a good s trong do s e  of soc i a l ­
democ rat i c  type refo rms . Fa u l kner  wa s prepa red to accept  ma ny 
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refo rms ,  b ut  he  was no t go i ng to b e  pu s hed o u t  o f  l eadersh i p  for be i ng 
too weak  i n  fa ce  of  Ca thol i c  demand s . B ut  " l i tt l e d i d  he  rea l i se that  
the  more secure  h e  made h i s pos i ti on i n  the U n i on i s t  Party ,  t he  l es s  
secure a n d  c red i b l e h e  became i n  the eyes of  the Br i ti s h  government " . 
(Harb i nson : l 97 3 : 1 60 } . Efforts  to s ecu re u n i ty of  the Pa rty ,  made the 
reg i me a s  a who l e l e s s  s tab l e .  
D i rect Ru l e 
The Bri t i s h  were commi tted to reform i n  U l ste r , yet back i ng u p  a 
government  wh i ch re s i s ted i t .  I t  became c l e a r  tha t o n ly  Wes tmi n s ter 
co u l d re so l ve  the po l i t i ca l  i mpa s s e ; a nd bec a u s e  of  the s i ze o f  the 
gu l f  between the  Un i on i s ts ( a l ready i n  d i s a rray } and the o ppos i ti on 
i n  U l s te r ,  the  o n l y  l og i ca l  s tep  th e B r i t i s h  cou l d ta ke was  to i mpos e 
D i rect Ru l e .  Thi s s tep-by- s tep  a pproach  by the Br i ti sh i n  the tak i n g  
o ver  of  Storrno nt ' s  respo ns i b i l i ti es a nd  i ts l og i ca l  conc l u s i on was 
seen  by Cra i g , who , i n  Fe bru a ry 1 9 7 2 , i s s ue d  a statemen t  o n  b e ha l f o f  
the Vanguard movement  sayi ng  t ha t  they were ded i ca ted to the 
ma i ntena nce of the Northern I ri s h  parl i ament , the res torat i o n  to that 
Pa r l i ament  of  fu l l i nterna l s ecu ri ty a nd a rej ect i on of a ny move 
towards  a Un i ted I re l and . ( Ha rb i ns on : l 97 3 : 1 63 } .  The  Un i on i st Party ' s  
ra i son  d ' e tre res ted o n  the fac t that  the i rs was a l oc a l l y  contro l l ed 
s ta te , a nd a ny moves wh i ch e roded/fi n i s hed thi s l oca l con trol , eroded 
the u n i ty of the Party a nd rea sons  for i ts ex i s tence . 
I n  March 1 9 7 2 , Br i an  Fau l kner  a l ong  w i th h i s Deputy Pr ime Mi n i s te r  
Ted Heath and  other  members of t he  Cab i net , t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  worsen i ng 
secur i ty prob l em .  At th i s  meeti ng  Hea th a s ked for i nternment  to b e  
phased out , fo r comp l ete control  of secur i ty ,  i nc l u d i ng  the  RUC a nd  
re serve , a nd  t he a s s ump ti o n  by  Wh i te ha l l of  re spons i b i l i ty for l aw a nd 
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order ,  i nc l ud i ng contro l o f  courts , appoi ntments  to the benc h , 
pri sons  a nd penal  i n s t i tut i ons , spec i a l  powers  and  pub l i c  prosecut i on s . 
( Ha rb i nson : l 9 7 3 : 1 64 ) . Fau l kner and  Andrews returned to Bel fas t  to 
cons u l t the i r  Cab i net . On l y  a week before U n i on i s t  bac k benchers  had 
vo ted to oppos e any reduction  i n  Stormont ' s  power ; so the i r react i on 
was obvi ou s l y  a nega t i ve o ne .  Fau l kner  retu rned to Heath  to s ay tha t 
h i s demands  were unacceptab l e ,  a t  w h i ch  poi n t  Hea th  a nnounced tha t 
Stormont wou l d be prorogued a nd  Northern I re l a nd run  by a Secretary of 
State ( a s  a member of  the Wes tmi n s ter Cab i net ) . 
Even modera te U n i on i s ts were horri f i ed  a t  the s u spen s i on o f  S to rmont , 
so  l on g  regarded a s  the ir secur i ty a ga i n s t  a Un ited I re l a n d . S tormont 
wa s s een  as a guarantee  aga i n s t  any pos s i b l e a ttempts of  be i ng s o l d 
out  by the Bri t i s h .  The l oya l i s t res ponse  c an  be seen  i n  the fac t  
tha t  the Prote s tant  pa rami l i tar i e s  s tepped u p  thei r m i l i ta ry efforts 
after D i rec t  Ru l e ,  even f ight ing  B r i ti s h  troops . ( Buc kl a nd : l 98 1 : 1 63 ) .  
I t  became c l ea r tha t ,  for s ome U n i on i s ts , the i r f i r s t  l oya l ty was to 
ma i n ta i n  S tormon t  ( i e oppose  D i rec t  Ru l e ) , rather than  the  Un i ted 
Ki ngdom government .  (Wr i ght : l 97 3 : 2 36 ) . However , a s  O ' Dowd po i nts  o ut  
Stormont  had  a l ready l o st  many of  i ts funct i o n s  (po l i ti ca l l y ) , t he  
Un i on i st Party be i ng i ncrea s i ng l y  s u pp l anted by  th e b ureaucracy 
whether a t  Whi teha l l o r  Stormont ; a nd D i rect Ru l e  was the l og i c a l  
conc l u s i on for a n  on-go i ng proce s s . ( O ' Dowd et  a 1 : 1 980 : 204 ) . 
One of  the f i r s t  th i ngs  the B r i t i s h  ach i eved was a tempo rary truce  
wi th the  I RA .  The U n i o n i s ts were a l a rmed tha t  they were g o i ng to be 
so l d  o ut  i n to a Un i ted I re l and , even  more so  tha t  as soon  a s  the i r 
Pa r l i ament  i s  s u spended , the  Br i ti s h  gove rnment  s i t  down a nd have 
ta l ks wi th th e I RA .  The U n i on i s t  Pa rty , for the fi r s t  t i me i n  f i fty 
yea rs , h ad no co ntro l over the a ffa i rs of Northern I re l a nd . No  
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l onger was i t  enough for the Pa rty to empha s i s e  the need to ma i n ta i n  
the U n i o n ; for the f i r s t  t ime i t  was forced to a s k  wi th i n what  context  
and  what  form wou l d it  take . I t  wa s thi s question  o f  what  form a 
fu ture Northern  I ri s h  government s ho u l d ta ke tha t f i na l l y  broke an  
a l ready d i v i ded  Party . 
The 1 9 73 Wh i te Paper 
The Bri t i s h  government were wi l l i ng to c on s i der a devo l ved government 
wi thi n U l ster , they d i d  not want  to l eave a po l it i c a l  vacum , i t  only 
encouraged s u ppo rt for t he parami l i ta r i e s . Be s i de s , they d i d not 
rea l l y  want  l o ng-term re s pon s i b i l i ty for the o vera l l govern i ng  of 
U l s te r ; i f  a po l i tica l so l uti on  cou l d b e  worked o u t , i t  mean t  that 
Bri t i s h  troops cou l d  be  withdrawn . As a re s u l t  the Br i ti s h  government 
i s s ued a Whi te Paper in  March  1 9 73 ,  o u t l i ni ng i ts propo s a l s for the 
fu ture government  of  Northern I re l a nd . 
It  s ched u l ed e l ections , based upon  p ro porti ona l  represen tat i o n , i n  
J u ne 1 97 3  for a Northern I ri s h  As semb l y .  However , th i s  was not  go i ng 
to be a resurect i on of  a Stormont-type system . Th e Stormon t 
par l i amen t  a nd government we re to be repl aced by the Ass emb l y  a nd  an 
Exec u ti ve .  The Exec uti ve wo u l d be  a ppoi nted from the As semb l y , but  i t  
cou l d n o  l onger  b e  " so l el y b a sed u p o n  a ny s i ng l e Party ,  i f  t h a t  Party 
draws i ts s u pport and  i ts e l ected representa ti on  enti re l y  from one 
sect i on  of  the commu n i ty" . (Farre 1 1 : 1 9 76 : 306 ) . I n  other words , the 
Un i on i st  Party wou l d ha ve to s ha re power wi th  the major  Ca tho l i c/ 
Na t i ona l i s t Pa rty - the Soc ia l Democra t i c and  La bo ur Party ( SDLP ) . It  
a l so  c a l l ed for a Cou nc i l o f  I re l a nd , l i n k i n g  the U l s ter and D ub l i n  
governments , there by i ns ti tu t i ona l i s i ng the " Iri sh d imen s i o n " . 
(laver : l 9 76 : 1 3 } .  I n  addi t i on  there wou l d  co nt i nue to b e  a Sec retary 
of State for Northern I rel and  a t  Wes tm i n s ter and  a l l power over 
secur i ty wou l d s ti l l be re served to Wes tmi ns te r .  
The Party f i na l l y  fragmented o ver  th i s  Wh i te Pa per . Fa u l kner was 
l a rge l y  res i g ned to accept i t ,  real i s i ng tha t a s trong sectar i an  
Stormont wou l d never return and  that  power- s ha ri ng  ( a t  l ea s t )  wou l d 
have to be  accepted . Pa i s l ey ' s  DUP of  cou rse reje cted i t  tota l l y ,  
wh i ch for h i s  Pa rty pa i d  o ff a s  i t  ga i ned  fo urteen per  cent  o f  a l l 
co u nc i l seats  a nd contro l  of Ba l l ymena tn the  May l oca l e l ecti ons . The 
Ant i -Wh i te Paper U n i o n i sts accepted the a u thori ty of  Wes tmi n ster , 
be l i ev i ng  that  U l s ter ' s  futu re cou l d o n l y  be g uara n teed by a s trong 
Stormont  ( Un i o n i st  domi nated ) wi th control over secur i ty .  Led by 
Ha rry We s t , these bro ke away from the Offi c i a l  U n i on i s t ' s  ( those  l ed 
by Fau l knerj i n  Ma rch 1 9 73 , j us t  a fter the  p ub l i ca t i on of  the Wh i te 
Paper . 
At the same ti me Cra i g  formed h i s Vanguard U n i on i s t  P rog res s i ve Party 
( V U P P ) whi ch rejected  the r i g h t  of  the Br i t i s h  governmen t to c hange 
the cons ti tut i on of Northern I re l a nd and wou l d  ca l l for a U n i l ateral 
Dec l a rat i on of I ndependance ( U D I ) i f  n ece s sa ry .  There was a l so  the 
We s t  Bel fa s t  Loya l i s t Coa l i t i on ,  wh i ch  he l d the same pos i t i on as  the 
VU P P ; b u t  as i t  wa s ma i n ly  o rgan i sed UDA/ UVF  organ i sed , i t  was 
di s tru s tfu l of  the e s tab l i s hed  pol i t i c an s  (Whyte : l 9 83 : 224 � Th i s  l ed 
to the  s i tua ti on i n  whi ch  " for  the  f i r s t  t ime i n  i ts h i s tory the 
U n i on i st  Party ( l ed by Fau l kner , and n ow wi th  the pref i x -Offi c i a l ) 
wa s l ed i nto a n  e l ec ti on i n  wh i c h  they cou l d not  hope to wi n a n  
abso l u te maj or i ty ,  and  were forced t o  campa i g n  for a s hare of  the 
Protes tant  vote " . ( Laver : l 9 76 : 1 3 ) . 
Thu s  the Prote s ta nts  of  U l ster  were fo rced to dec i de u po n  the type of 
Un i on i sm they wa nted . Prev i ou s l y , t hey had l i tt l e c ho i ce a nd , were 
7 5  
on the whol e rel ati ve l y  content  w i th a strong devo l ved l oca l  a nd 
reg i ona l government . From the  e l ec t i on resu l ts (see Tab l e  No 2 
Cha pter 2 )  i t  seems that a s u b s ta nt i a l  proport ion  ( forty-e i g ht  per 
cen t )  of Un i on i sts  accepted the  fac t  tha t power-shar i ng and 
Wes tmi ns ter ' s  r i g ht  to a l te r  the cons t i tuti o n  wa s a va l i d  o ne .  
Howeve r ,  the majori ty o f  U n i o n i s ts ( fi fty-two per cen t }  rej ected the 
not ion nf at l e a st  power- shar i ng , and a further twenty-one  per cent  
rejec ted Wes tmi n ster ' s  ri g ht to  a l ter  U l s ter ' s  con s t i tut i on . The  
impa s se reached i s  s t i l l not  so l ved , the  Bri t i s h  government we re ( a re )  
de facto ru l ers  i n  U l s ter , they have  troops  o n  the s treets  to ma i n ta i n  
a n  acceptab l e l eve l  o f  securi ty wh i l s t they pa s s  a l l the l aws rel a ti ng 
to Northern I re l and . Neverthe l es s  the  As semb l y  (and  s ub sequent 
As sembl i es )  f::i. i. l ed not  on ly  due  to Ca thol i c  hos ti l i ty bu t j u s t  a s  muc h  
due t o  P rote stant ho s ti l i ty .  Th e U n i oni sts  were d i v i ded b ut  a s  d i v i ded 
Un i on i s t s  they were s ti l l  s trong . ( Bu c k l a nd : l 98 1 : 1 66 ) . 
Conc l u s i on  
The Br i t i s h  government  was i n s trumenta l i n  the  fra gmenta ti on  of  the 
U l ster  U n i on i s t  Party , but the Br i ti s h  had l i tt l e cho i ce , they had to 
pu s h  a head w i th reforms to p reve n t  a l l o ut  c i v i l wa r a nd further 
na t i ona l  and  i nterna tiona l  o u tcry . Reformi n g  u nder a Un i on i st  
government  depended o n  two mutu a l l y  exc l us i ve cond i t ions . F i r s t , they 
had to ma i nta i n  cred i b i l i ty i n  th e eye s of  the Cathol i c  mi nori ty ;  and 
second they had to preserve  the government ' s  power base among s t  the 
l oya l i s t ma s se s . W i th Wes tmi n s ter  i nduced reforms , i t  s eemed a s  
though  the l a tter wa s sacr i f i ced t o  th e forme r .  ( Probert : l 980 : 1 3 3 ) .  
Th e Bri t i s h  governme n t  rea l i sed  that a s  l ong a s  Stormont i n  i ts o l d  
form rema i ned i n  tact , th e U n i on i sts wou l d u n i te e l ectora l l y  t o  reta i n 
control  and therefore never need to worry too much  about  the 
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Catho l i c s  ( po l i t i cal l y ) , cau s i ng greater c i v i l  u nre s t . 
Fa u l kner was forced to ma i nta i n  u n i ty v ia  po l i c i es of  wha t amounted to 
repres s i on .  I t  ma i nta i ned U n i on i s t  u n i ty ( even  i f  i t  wa s frag i l e )  b ut  
i t  d i d  not  so l ve  any of  U l ster ' s  pro b l ems concern i ng reform and  
securi ty .  The Br i ti s h  government  had to ema s c u l a te the  S tormont  
reg i me to  s uch a n  exte n t  th at  i t  became mere l y  an  admi n i s tra t i on u n i t .  
Whe n  the Un i on i st  Pa rty refused  to accept  th i s  the Br i ti s h  had l i ttl e 
c ho i ce b u t  to br i ng i n  D i rect Ru l e .  Br i ti s h  po l i cy s i nce 1 96 9  was 
ba sed on  the a s s umpt i o n  that  the Westm i nster  government  i s  i ts e l f a 
• ne utra l 1 force , bec a u s e  i t  i s  outs i de the trad i t i ona l enmi t i e s  of 
U l s ter . However , th i s  is  not  correc t .  Catho l i c s do not  i dent i fy at 
a l l wi th Br i ta i n ,  trad i t i ona l l y  seen  as a n  e nemy . The Prote s tants , 
for thei r part , a nx i ous  tha t  they were be i ng s o l d o u t , a fter a 
conti n u i ng ero s i on o f  thei r l oca l a u tonomy a nd economi c power , the  
po l i ti ca l  process  became comp l ete � ( Ros e : l 9 7 6 : 7 3 ) .  
The Br i t i s h  governme n t  were tota l ly u n aware o f  the ro l e  they were 
p l ay i ng  a nd the effect  i t  wou l d have  u pon  Un i on i sm .  For them i t  wa s 
a s i mp l e matte r  of u s i n g  B ri t i s h  troops  to keep the  warri ng 
fact i ons  apart , and  a proce s s  of pus h i ng the U n i on i st  Party to ma ke 
reforms to e s tab l i s h a soc i a l - democrat i c type s ta te . Wha t  they 
d i dn ' t  real i se wa s that  every reform undermi ned the very exi stence of 
the U n i on i s t  Party .  When the Un i on i st  Party res i s ted , the Br i ti sh  
government ' s  l og i c  d i c ta ted  tha t  they mu s t  take  ove r .  B u t  they were 
ta k i ng control  i n  a s ta te whe re there was no consenses  over wha t  form 
a new cons ti tu ti on s hou l d  ta ke . ( Probert : l 9 78 : 1 0 1 ) . 
Over the years , U n i on i s t  power became neutra l i sed , f i r s t  l oca l ly  at ' .  
a po l i ti ca l  eco nomi c l eve l  when they no l onger  reta i ned fu l l  contro l 
over  the a l l oc a ti on  of l oca l  authori ty reso urce s .  W i th the ri s e  of 
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C i v i l R i g hts and  the  l aw and order  prob l e� ,  B r i t i sh  po l i cy wa s one of 
effect i ve ly  neutra l i s i ng  Stormont . Bri t i s h b u reaucrats were brought 
to oversee  pub l i c  j ob a l l ocat i o n , o n  educat i on boards etc . Persons 
appo i n ted were genera l l y  those cons i dered ' no n - po l i t i c a l  1 ,  wi th some 
techn i c a l /profe s s i o na l  qua l i f i cat i ons  s u c h  as l awyers , docters , 
bus i nessmen , Trade Un i on i sts etc . ( Ro s e : l 9 76 : 7 2 ) . 
Bri t i s h  i ntervent i on  o n l y  compl eted a proces s  i n  po l i t i ca l  terms that 
had been occu rr i ng , prev i ou s l y  at economic and s oc i a l  l ev l . 
I nc rea s i ng l y  dec i s i ons  were be i ng centra l i sed  and  pu t i n  the  hands  of 
tech nocrats /bureauc rats . T he  U n i o n i st  Pa rty a s  a l oo s e ly  organ i s ed 
autunomou s  orga n i sat i on  became ext i nct . The i r funct i ons  were ta ken 
over by the modern so c i a l -democrat i c  s tate and  the i r accompa ny i ng  
pro fes s io na l s ,  mana gers  and  B urea u crats who a re  " gea red up  to  govern " , 
chang i ng the i r techn i ques  to matc h the n eeds  of  l ate twenti eth century 
cap i ta l i s m .  (Cockburn : l g77 : C ha pter  1 1 . The Un i on i s t  Party ,  as  i t  
was , was n o  l onger  "g eared u p  to gov ern " . I n  the l o n g  ru n i t  fa i l ed 
to reproduce  t he  s ectar ian  d i v i s io n s  a nd ma inta i n  control . As a 
consequence  lt  oecame i ncreas i ng l y  i neces s a ry for B r i t i s h  i nterven t i on  
to en s u re the s tate  d i d  not c o l l a p s e , a t  the s ame t ime underm i n i ng a n  
a l rea dy a nd i n c reas i n g l y  frag i l e  U n i oni s t  Party .  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUS I ON 
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The Un i on i st  Party ,  q u i te o bv i ous l y  was not  the mono l i thi c po l i ti ca l  
b l o c k  of  1 1 0 1 Ne i l l i sm 1 1 , the P a rty l eaders h i p worked h ard to ma i n ta i n  
the po l i ti c a l  u n i ty o f  a l l U n i on i s ts wi th. in  the  one po l i t i ca l  Party .  
I t  i s  a l s o  c l ea r  that the Unionist Pa rty wa s unab l e to cope w i th the 
new economi c a nd soc i a l  forces  comi ng i n to p l ay i n  the  pos t-war era . 
Wel fa ri sm , economi c p l ann i ng a nd regu l a t i o n , state i ntervent i on i n  
the economy ec l i pse  o f  l ocal c api ta l  a nd the  r i s e  o f  fore ign/  mul ti -
nat i ona l  cap i ta l  and i nvestments were a l l part of  a proces s  occurri ng 
or had  occurred in most of Western Europe w i th i n  th i s  per i od . However ,  
the Northern I r i s h  state d i d  n ot f i t i n to the soc i a l -democra t i c  model . 
. 
Whe n  the se  po l icies were a pp l ied to North ern I rel and , th e state as  a 
s ectar i a n  state coul d not accommod ate them , a s  i t  meant  the  integrat­
i on of  Ca tho l i c s , and  extend i ng them benefi ts . The Un ion i st Pa rty ,  as  
a s ec tar i a n  Party and guard i a n of  the Stormo nt reg ime was a l so  unabl e 
to accommodate to this chan ge and a c t  a s  tts agent . As  a consequence , 
the P arty s i mp l y  div ided ;  adj u sti ng  to t he new s i tu a tion  wh i c h  they 
faced . Th e d i v i s ions  wi th i n  U n i on i sm d id not become h i g h l y  v i s i b l e  
until after 1 969, But it i s  cl ear that the process  o f  fragmentat i on 
had been g o i ng on  much l o nger. 
No one  po l icy can be  po i. nted a t  and  i denti fi ed as  the ma in  deter­
mi n ant  of  the fragmentati on  of  th e Un ionist Party . Th e U n i o n i s t  
Party was i n herentl y a wide coa l i t i on o f  interests , wor k i ng c l a ss ,  
reformers , non - r efo rmers . Con sequentl y ,  th e Party had  to b e  l oos ely  
organ i s ed and  have much l ocal autu o nomy to a l l ow dom i na nt interests 
in  each  a rea to take co ntrol a nd ru n  a ffa i rs accordin g to l oca l 
interests . The  Uni'onist Party coul d mainta in  unity a nd r etain contro l 
because the Protestants knew that i f  th ey stood behi nd i t , th e Pa rty 
wou l d ensure th e Un i o n  woul d b e  mai ntai n ed becau se o f  the l ev el of 
devo l ved power wh k h  exi sted . Th ey knew the Un i on i. st Party woul d 
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kee p  Cathol i c s  o u t  of po l i t i ca l  a nd eco nom i c l i fe ,  thu s remov i ng a ny 
fea rs they have ha d about  be i ng threatened by Repub l i c a n  compet i t i on . 
The Party i ts e l f d i d  not  f i na l l y  break  u p  u n t i l 1 97 3  over  po l i t i c a l  
d i fferenc e s , b ut  i t  i s  a rgua b l e tha t  t he se  d i fferences  over  wha t form 
a new devo l ved  government  s h o u l d ta ke  m i ght  have  been  overcome , or  
even avoi ded , i f  it  were not  fo r the  preceed i ng eco nom i c a nd soc i a l  
c ha nges  i n  U l ster . P re v i ou s l y  th e U l ster i nd u s tr i a l i s ts had used  the 
Ora nge  I d eo l ogy a nd P rotestant  S u premacy to e sta b l i s h the North ern 
S ta te a nd e n s ur e  l oca l c a p ita l i st domi nati o n .  After the  Second Worl d 
War mo s t  U l s ter  ba sed  i ndu s t r i es a l l b ut  d i s a ppeare d , becomi ng i nte­
gra ted i n to the wi der  Bri t i s h/ Interna ti ona l ma r ke t ,  a nd wi th th i s  
i ntegra t i o n  many rea s o ns fo r the s ta te ( hence t he U n i on i s t  Party )  
d i s a ppeared . Bu t Ora ng e i sm and  Protesta n t  s u premacy rema i ned a t  most  
l eve l s - and  now t hey were thems e l v e s  v i rtual l y  the rea s o n  for the 
ex i s tence o f  tfle state : " to d isma n t l e Protestant  s u premacy wou l d  be 
to d i smant l e the s tate  i ts e l f . 1 1 (Fa rrel l : l 97 6 : 329 ) . The U n i o n i sts  
res i s ted stubbo r n l y ,  a ny fu r ther  ero s io n of l oca l  a u to nomy that  wou l d  
undermi ne  thei r v e ry exi s tence . 
The Un ioni s t s  rea l i se d  that  they c o u l d not  fu l l y res i s t  the i r  economi c 
i ntegra ti on  no r Br iti. s h  Wel far i sm , b u t  they tded to  adapt  th i s  chang e 
to the  Northern I r i s h  s i tuat i on . The s tructu ra l de termina t i on  a nd 
reproduc t i on of c l a s s es in tha t s oc i a l  forma t i o n  i nvo l ve  i deo l og i ca l  
and  po l i t i c a l  proces ses  as  we l l  a s  economic/ soc i a l  o nes . It  i s  
fundamenta l  to u nders ta nd the natu re  of the d i a l ect ic a l  re l a t i on sh i p  
between the  po l i t i c a l  a nd i d eo l og i c a l  i n s t i tu t ion  o f  U l ster  a nd the 
underl y i ng econom i c / soc i a l s tructure . The U n i o n ts t  Party wa s the 
agent  trying  to synthes i s e  the  d i s l ocat io n  betwee n  the econom i c  base 
a nd the po l i t i ca l / i deo l og ica l  s u pers tructu re . Thu s  confl i c t  w i th i n  
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the economi c reg i on cou l d not be  revea l ed thro u g h  the  " reform" 
(cha nge } of  that  reg ion  wi thout t he equa l l y  s i gn i f i cant  1 1 refo rm1 1  
( change } of  the po l i tica l / i deo l og i ca l  s u pers tru c tu re s . The  fa i l ure 
of the Un i o n i s t  Party to do th i s , to ma nage  t h i s change  wi thin  the 
Nor thern I r i s h  co nfl i c t ,  eventua l l y l ed to the downfa l l o f  the s tate 
and  the  b rea k-u p  of the  Party .  The mob i l i sa t i on  o f  c l a s s  i nterests 
over  econom i c i s s u e s  (eg by the  wor k i ng  c l a s s  over i mproved hou s i ng 
a nd j ob opportu n i t i e s a nd by some sect i ons  of  the bourg eor i se  over 
the  need for the ra ti ona l i s a ti o n  a nd c e n tra l i sa t i on  of Eco nomi c 
p l a nn i ng }  i nev i ta b l y  unde rm i ned  certa i n s a s pects  of  trad i t i ona l 
U n i o n i sm and  t he  Un i on i s t  Party .  T h e  s i tuat i o n  i s  furthe r comp l i cated 
by the fac t  tha t  there ha s been l i ttl e s ecu l a ri s at ion  of i deol ogy ,  and 
re l i g i ou s  modes  of thoug ht  conti nue  to  offset profound ly  the econom ic  
and  po l i t i ca l s trugg l e s  as  wel l a s  be i n g  affe cted by  them ; t hu s  we  see  
the  r i s e  of Pa i s l ey wi th hi s re l ig i on empha s i s . (Probert : l 980 : 1 1 5 } .  
After  1 94 5  new forms of  c ap ita l  a ccumu l a t i o n  (i e i n terna t i o na l l y }  and 
the  emergence  o f  a refo rm i s t  s oc i a l  democra t i c  state  i n  B r i ta i n  began , 
i mpercept ib l y  a t  f irst , to u nderm i n e  t he po l i t ica l s tructures  of the 
Un i o n i s t  s tate  and it s re l a t i o ns h i p  to the res t of the Un i ted Ki ngdom .  
Northe rn I re l and  wa s affected by t h e  expans i o n  of  t h e  Brtt is h  state 
apparatus  requ i red fo r i t s g rowi ng i ntervention  in re struct i ng capi ta l  
and  i n  deve l o p i ng wel fare state s erv i ce s . These  proces ses  of  c ha nge 
" took  p l a c e  aga i n st a bac kg round  of  a s em t  ... au tonomou s  l oc a l  s tate 
whi.ch a ttempted to i n tegrate these  c ha nge s  i nto its own rams hack l e 
po l i ti c a l  s tructure . Th i s  forces  Br i ta i n  to act  a s  a n  agent  fo r 
i nterna t i ona l  c a p i ta l  and  embark  upon a po l i cy of  i nterven t i on 
des i g ned to tran s fo rm the So c i a l  Structure " . (Sr.iyth : l 980 : 5 1 } .  
Stromont  came to func t i o n  mo re d i rec t l y  a s  a n  agent o f  the  Br i t i sh 
s ta te by imp l ementing we l fare  refo rms  a nd d trect ly  encoura g i ng the 
res tructu r ing  of  the l o ca l  eco nomy . 
8 2 
Cons equences  fo r the U n i o n i st  Part were two-fo l d .  F i r stl y ,  the 
h i g h l y  decentra l i s ed l oca l  a uthori ty sy stem - ba sed l arge l y  u pon  
Ora ngec l i enta l i sm and  exc l u s i on of Catho l i cs from po l i tica l  l i fe -
was gradu a l l y  u nd ermi ned by the  centra l i s i ng fo rces of  Br i t i s h  Soc i al 
Democ racy opera t i ng  t hrough Stormo nt , Second l y ,  the  U n i on i s t  Party 
wa s i l l - equ i pped to oversee  a n  increa s i ng l y  comp l ex and  i nter­
vent i on i s t s tate  a pparatu s . As a n  ag ent  to  accommoda te the  c l a s h  
between economic/ soc i a l cha nge  and  t h e  po l i t i ca l / id eo l og i ca l  status 
quo , the  U n i on i st Party was a fa i l u re ; i t  cou l d  not  do  i t ;  i t  wa s not 
des i gned  too though  i t  gave a g ood  a ttempt . I ts o l i ga rh i c a l  l eader­
sh i p was i nterna l l y  d i v i ded on a wh o l e ra nge  of  i s s u es s u c h  as state 
i ntervention  i n  the economy , wel fa r i sm , rel a t io n s h i ps to Bri t i s h  (and 
I r i s h } government , conces s i ons  to Catho l i cs a n d  the ma nagement of 
Pro testant wo rki ng c l a s s  d isaffecti o n  over  u nemp l oymen t . Wh i l e  the 
Un io n i s t  wor ki ng c l a s s  s u pporters favou red state i nterven tion  in many 
area s , they d i d  not  n ecessa r i l y  wa n t  to see  the res u l tant  benef its 
extended to Catho l i c s . However , thoug h Ca tho l i. c s  may hav e o n l y  
benefi tted marg i na l l y  from the  res tructur i ng  o f  the economy there i s  
n o  doubt  that  tney were better off d u e  to wel fare refo rms . Th i s was 
a contrad i ct i on  for the  U n i o n i s t P arty as  a Protest a n t  Party fo r a 
Protestant  peopl e ;  they were a t  the  same t i me extend i ng benef i ts to 
the  Catho l ic s . The prob l em for the  U n io n i st Party was now to 
accommoda te t he i. ncre a sed integ ra t i o n  of  Catho l i c s  i nto U l s ter 1 s 
soc i ety ,  yet ma inta i n  po l i t i c a l  heg emony . 
G iven  i ts s truc tu re  a nd inte rna l d i v i s i ons ,  the Un i on i st Party as  suc h  
was unab l e t o  come t o  terms wi th  t he  c h a l l eng es  presen ted by the state 
i n tervent i o n i sm in the new s o c i o-econom i c  c ircums ta n c e s  o f  the  1 960 ' s .  
The Stormont bureaucracy ,  a s  a n  agent  of  the Brit i s h  s tate  (supported 
by e l ements  w i t h i n the Un i o n i s t  cab i net l ,  was increa s i ng l y  comi ng to 
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s upp l ant  the Un i on i st Party a s  the  po l i t i ca l  organ i s er  of the tens i o n -
ri dden Protesta n t  c l a s s  a l l i a nce . I t  wa s the p l anners , bu reaucra ts , 
tec hnocra ts , profes s i ona l s ,  etc  who g a i ned i n  the  1 96Q l s  a t  the 
expens e  of the  l oca l  interes ts . The  l oca l  Pa rty wa s n o  l onger  i n  a 
pos i t i on to de l i v er to  i ts s u p porters . I t  wa s i n crea s i ng l y  l eft to 
profes s iona l s to a l l ocate resourc e s , wi th  t he Protestants s t i l l g a i n­
i ng a l a rge s hare , but it s t i l l  d i v i ded the Party as they were l oos i ng 
powe r .  ( O ' Dowd et  a l : l 970-204 } ,  
However , the Un i on i st Pa rty s t i l l  cons t i tuted the  Protestant  a l l i ance 
in one key a rea - con trol of the l oc a l  l aw and o rder a p pa ratus , l oca l  
power s t i l l  preva i l ed in  thi s reg i o n .  The i r  co ntro l over the po l i ce  
and  secur i ty c reated probl ems for  the U n ion i s t  Pa rty when  l oca l  
author i t i es were condon i ng the  batter i ng o f  C i v i l  R i ghts  demonstrators 
by the i r  own RUC . It was t he co l l a p s e  of  l oca l  'l l aw and order"  wh i c h  
f i na l l y  u ndermined the po l it i c a l  .i ns u l a t i on of  Nortflern I re l a nd from 
Wes tmi nster  a nd forced the cen tra l s tate  to a s sert  i ts u l timate 
con s t i tut i ona l  res pons i b i l ity .  Thi s widened th.e ga p betwee n  the 
Un i on i s t  Party as a who l e a n d  the  Stormont  state apparatu s , l ead i ng 
to 1 1 the fragmenta t i on of  the fo rmer a nd pre s s u res to restructure the 
l atter . " (O ' Dowd et a l  : 1 980 ; 1 6 ). .  
Thu s  t h e  eco nomic/soc ia l  ba se  i n  U l ster  was a l tered , forc i ng through 
a pa i nful  c hang e  i� the pol i ti c a l  s u pers tru cture tha t too k much b l ood­
s hed . Po l it i c a l  c hang e th a t  cou l d o n ly  l:le comp l eted by l.fe stmi nster 
as the Un i on i st  Party wa s n ot orga n i sed/wi l l i n g  to do  it .  Even under 
Br i t i s h press u r e/ interventiun  po l i t i ca l  c ha ng e  wa s s l ow to come . 
What  the res truc turing  o f  t he economy ,  socia l  po l i c te s  and  B r i t i sh 
i ntervent i o n  d i d wa s , i n  effect , 1 ' neutra l i se 11 governmen t  by ta k i ng  
power away from the Un i on i s t s  a nd p l a c i ng it  in  the  hands  of 
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profes s i ona l  experts , thu s not  g i v i ng Catho l i c s a rea l  s h a re i n  power , 
and  taki ng  i t  away from the  U n i o n i sts , ( Ro se : l 97 1 : 2 3 }  c reati ng  a 
po l i ti ca l  c ri s i s  wi th i n  t he P a rty that  l ed to fragmenta t i o n . 
However , i t  was not enoug h fo r economi c/soc i a l  c hanges  to s p l i t  the 
Party .  As Laver  po i n ts out  "the con s t i tut i on a l  future  of  the  P rov i nc e  
i s  the  ma j or i s s u e " . (La ve r : l 976 : 2 1 ) .  Wh en the  B r i t i s h gov ernment  
wan te d  to  change  the  const i tut i o na l  arrangements , the  U n i o n i sts  cou l d  
not agree o n  a form . As wa s p o i n ted ou t ear l i er ,  Nort hern I rel and  wa s 
a P rotes tant  state  fo r a Protesta n t  peo pl e ru n by a P rote s tant  Pa rty .  
When the  s ta te wa s n o  l o nge r t o  ma i nta i n i ts tota l Protestant  
cha racter v i a  i n c reased  centra l i sa t i o n  a nd soc i a l po l i c i es , the  Party 
whi c h  was des i g ned to run  a n d  o rgan i se t he s tate cou l d  no l onger  a gree  
on how the  n ew state  s hou l d t ake s h a pe ; a nd  i ndeed there  is  s ti l l  
d i s a g reeement  amongst  Un i on i sts  u po n  what s hou l d be the  cons t i tu t i ona l 
nature  (hence s o c i o-economi c natur e }  o f  U l s te r ,  rang i n g  from tota l  
i nteg rati on wi th th e U n ited Kingd om p ut  forwa rd by  t he  DUP , t o  a type 
of domi n io n  sta tu s i ndependence  p ut  forwa rd by the UDA and  i ts 
po l i ti ca l  counterpart . The o l d U n i o n i s t Party wa s  a b l e to a gree  upon 
the  abso l u te neces s ity of t he ma i n tenance  of  the Un i o n ; but when  i t  
was forced t o  i mp l ement/react to  po l i c i es wh i ch g o  Eleyond that , i n  
both the pol i t i ca l  and  socto/econom i c  s phere , a l l i ts t nherent 
contra d i c t i ons  due  to be i ng a l oo s e l y  o rg a n is.ed c l a s s  a l l i ance , came 
out , f i na l l y  fo rced i t  i t  fragment . 
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